IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
IN CAUSE NO. 06-202 FROM THE
235TH DISTRICT COURT OF COOKE COUNTY
ORDER
This is a petition for writ of mandamus filed by Cindy Stormer, the District Attorney of Cooke County. Relator seeks relief from an order of the 235th District Court of Cooke County ordering discovery under the provisions of article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, in Cause Number 06-202, State of Texas v. Herman Dewayne Williams.
Relator contends that Respondent, the Honorable Janelle Haverkamp, Presiding Judge of the 235th District Court, has exceeded her authority under article 39.14 in three specific ways. First, Relator asserts that the defendant, Herman Dewayne Williams, has not shown "good cause," which is explicitly required by the statute, before the trial court may exercise its authority to order the State to produce and allow inspection of material evidence in a criminal case. Second, Relator complains that the trial court ordered production of discovery materials at a specific date that had no relationship to a trial date, which had not been set as of the date discovery was ordered and before all of the requested evidence was available from testing agencies. Third, Relator argues that four specific discovery requests that were granted by the trial court exceed the limits authorized discovery under article 39.14 and therefore constitute an abuse of discretion.
It is the defendant's burden to show that he has "good cause" under article 39.14 before "the trial judge is required 'to permit discovery if the evidence sought is material to the defense of the accused." McBride v. State, 838 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting Quinones v. State, 592 S.W.2d 933, 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (emphasis in original)); Oprean v. State, 201 S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). While we defer to the trial judge's decision to deny a discovery request in the absence of a showing of good cause, we have not held that a trial judge lacks authority to order discovery in the absence of a showing of good cause. For that reason alone, this Court would not grant mandamus relief. But, in this case, we note that the trial judge was familiar with the open-file policy of the District Attorney. The policy would require a defendant to agree to forego filing or requesting a judicial ruling on any discovery motion in exchange for the District Attorney opening its case file to the defendant. The trial judge was acting within her discretion to consider that policy sufficient "good cause" in ordering discovery under article 39.14.
In the context of the State's right to appeal pretrial rulings excluding evidence, we have said that the trial court has the inherent authority to control its docket, free from interference from the appellate courts. See State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Although we have overruled that portion of Roberts that barred the State from appealing a pretrial ruling excluding evidence, we did not alter or overrule our holding that trial courts have the inherent authority to manage their own dockets. See State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). It is thus within the trial court's sound discretion to set a specific date for the State to produce evidence subject to a discovery order for the defendant to inspect and copy. Because the control of the trial court's docket is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, there can be no specific, definitive date, prior to trial, before which the trial court would abuse its discretion to order the production of materials subject to a discovery order. We will not address the State's argument that the trial court will (or might) suppress any evidence that was not produced pursuant to the present discovery order because it did not yet exist or had not been developed. Such speculation is not proper in a petition for writ of mandamus.
A trial court has the authority to order discovery under article 39.14. Article 37.07 and Rules 404 and 705(a) of the Texas Rules of Evidence also require the State to give notice, upon request, before it may introduce certain evidence at trial. Further, the defendant has a federal due process right to the disclosure of material exculpatory information as set out in cases such as Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
The methodology of producing discovery materials is set out in article 39.14. The trial court may not order the State to copy documents and provide those copies to a defendant, but it may order the State to produce discoverable materials and allow the defendant to copy them under the supervision of the State. Id. (the trial court may order the State "to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing by or on behalf of the defendant" of discoverable materials).
The trial court does not have the authority under article 39.14 to order the State to create a document that it does not already have. Article 39.14 deals with the production of discovery materials, not their creation. (1) And article 39.14 explicitly exempts the State from producing its work product materials for inspection under that statute. Id. (stating that the trial court may order the production and inspection of designated materials "except written statements of witnesses and except the work product of counsel in the case and their investigators and their notes or report"). The trial court may, under the reciprocal discovery provisions of article 39.14(b), order the State to disclose the names and addresses of its expert witnesses, and, under Rules 702-705, it has the authority to order any party to disclose the facts and data underlying its experts' opinion before they may express an opinion.
Applying these rules to respondent's discovery order, we find that the trial court granted four requests which exceed, in whole or in part, the trial court's authority to order discovery under article 39.14. Defendant's request A.2 sought
A list of the names, addresses and professions of all expert witnesses the prosecution intends to call at trial, along with each expert's qualifications, the subject and a description of his or her contemplated testimony, and his or her report.
This request exceeds, in part, the scope of article 39.14(b), which requires only the disclosure of the names and addresses of persons that the party may call to testify under Rules 702-705, and permits the court to order the disclosure of facts and data that underlie an expert's opinion before that witness testifies to his opinion.
Defendant's requests B.3 and B.6 sought
The substance of all oral confessions, admissions and statements made by Defendant to the state in connection with this case, which were not electronically recorded.
All statements of a nature as would be arguably admissible as a "res gestae" statement, spontaneous statement, or other utterance which the State intends to introduce in its case in chief, either during the guilt/innocence stage, or during he punishment stage.
According to Relator, documents containing these types of statements do not exist and would require the State to create a document that is not already in its possession. Article 39.14 is specifically limited to the discovery of pre-existing documents and tangible items that are in the State's possession.
Defendant's request F.6 sought
The location from which each piece of physical evidence was found, the time it was found, and the name of the person who found it.
This request is not targeted to the production of a tangible item that is in the State's possession, and it is not within the scope of article 39.14. This request would also require the State to create a document that does not currently exist.
We conclude that Respondent has exceeded her authority under article 39.14 by granting the defendant's requests A.2, B.3, B.6, and F.6 in their current form and requiring the State to create documents that currently do not exist or are not within its possession.
We assume that the Respondent will modify the present discovery order to conform with the dictates of article 39.14. The writ of mandamus will issue only if she refuses to do so.
IT IS SO ORDERED THIS THE 20th DAY OF JUNE, 2007.
Do Not Publish
1. Other statutes or rules may, of course, require the State to create a written response to a
timely request for notice if it intends to offer certain evidence at trial.