IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 01-31449
_____________________
OSCAR DANTLZER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE CITY OF HAMMOND, LOUISIANA, ETC; ET AL
Defendants,
THE CITY OF HAMMOND, LOUISIANA, a political subdivision of the
State of Louisiana
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 00-CV-446-F
_________________________________________________________________
November 15, 2002
Before KING, Chief Judge, JOLLY, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff Oscar Dantzler appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the City of Hammond, Louisiana on his
Title VII and § 1983 claims of race discrimination. After
reviewing the evidence before the district court in the light most
favorable to Mr. Dantzler, we find that he has not established a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to any of his claims of
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
discrimination. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant
of summary judgment.
Oscar Dantzler was employed by the Hammond Police Department
for two years. His employment history reflects numerous
disciplinary reports and disputes with his supervisors, which he
alleges demonstrate a pattern of racial discrimination. Plaintiff
filed two complaints with the EEOC. After he was terminated for
insubordination arising from allegations that he was twice found
sleeping while on duty, he brought suit in federal district court
alleging hostile work environment, discriminatory and retaliatory
discharge in violation of Title VII and § 1983.
Relying on the 180-day limitations period in 42 U.S.C. §
2005(e)(1), the district court restricted its consideration to
evidence of alleged discrimination occurring between June 6 and
December 9, 1997, the date of his first EEOC complaint. Proceeding
to analyze Dantzler’s claim of discriminatory discharge under
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the district
court held that he could not establish a prima facie case of
discrimination on the basis of race, because his evidence was
“speculative, vague, generalized, lacking in detail concerning any
specific dates or incidence, self-serving and contradictory.” (Op.
18). Apart from disciplinary reports allegedly motived by race
discrimination, Dantzler alleged he was denied training and
vacation time, supporting these assertions with his own and another
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officer’s general allegations of discrimination. The district
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed
Dantzler’s claims with prejudice.
Dantlzer urges this Court to review evidence of alleged
discrimination outside the 180-day period either as actionable
discrimination under a continuing violation theory, or as evidence
supporting his theory of actionable discrimination within the time
period. He presented no credible evidence that he should be
entitled to the continuing violation theory. This Court reviews
grants of summary judgment de novo. Celestine v. Petroleos de
Venezuella, S.A., 266 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir.2001). Even
considering the evidence that was allegedly erroneously excluded by
the district court, Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th
Cir. 2002), we find no genuine issue of material fact on his claim
of hostile work environment. He is unable to establish any
inference of intentional discrimination or ongoing harassment.
Price v. Federal Exp. Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 721 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002).
His subjective impression that he was being subjected to a hostile
work environment is inadequate to survive summary judgment.
Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 241 (5th Cir. 1998).
Dantzler also fails to establish a genuine fact issue in his
claim of discriminatory discharge. To survive summary judgment,
Dantlzer must show (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he
was qualified for the position, (3) he was dismissed, and (4) he
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was replaced by an individual of a different race. Byers v. Dallas
Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2000). The
evidence indicates that he was replaced by an African-American
police officer. He therefore fails to satisfy the fourth element
of his prima facie case. Further, the City offered a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for his discharge - insubordination -
which Dantzler has failed to rebut by establishing that the reason
was false and pretext for intentional discrimination. Lawrence v.
Univ. of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, 163 F.3d 309, 312-13
(5th Cir. 1999).
Finally, Danztler cannot establish a genuine issue of material
fact on his claim of retaliatory discharge. He fails to establish
the required causal link between protected activity and the adverse
employment action. LaDay v. Catalyst Technology, Inc., 302 F.3d
474, 483 (5th Cir. 2002).
For these reasons, the decision of the district court granting
summary judgment for the defendants and dismissing Dantzler’s
claims with prejudice is
AFFIRMED.
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