IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. WR-42,963-02
EX PARTE ANTHONY DEVON WRIGHT, Applicant
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
CAUSE NO. FR43359 IN THE 264TH DISTRICT COURT
FROM BELL COUNTY
Per curiam.
OPINION
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the
clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court two applications for writs of habeas corpus. Ex parte
Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of two charges of
burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault, and was sentenced to concurrent
life sentences for both charges. The Third Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. Wright v.
State, Nos.03-94-00095-CR and 03-94-00096-CR (Tex. App. – Austin, October 19, 1994, no pet.).
In 1999, Applicant filed his first application for writ of habeas corpus challenging these
convictions. In it, he alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
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counsel. This Court denied relief on October 6, 1999. In February of 2014, Applicant filed a second
set of habeas applications challenging these two convictions. In his second set of applications,
Applicant alleged actual innocence as a “gateway” claim, tied to constitutional violations of the
prohibition on double jeopardy. Because the validity of Applicant’s claims was not clear from the
record, this Court dismissed the second set of applications on April 2, 2014, as barred by Article
11.07, Section 4 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
In August of 2014, Applicant filed his third set of habeas applications challenging these
convictions. In these applications, Applicant made the same claims he made in his second set of
applications. However, this time an examination of the facts as stated in the appellate opinion
revealed that Applicant’s double jeopardy claim has merit.
After Applicant’s first habeas application had been denied, this Court issued an opinion
clarifying the law with respect to the allowable unit of prosecution for the offense of burglary of a
habitation. In Ex parte Cavazos, this Court held that the complainant is not the appropriate
allowable unit of prosecution in a burglary; rather, the allowable unit of prosecution in a burglary
is the unlawful entry. Ex parte Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Like Cavazos,
Applicant had been convicted of two charges of burglary of a habitation involving two complainants,
but a single unlawful entry. Therefore, he is being improperly punished twice for a single unlawful
entry.
Because Applicant raised a double jeopardy claim in his second set of applications, which
this Court erroneously dismissed as subsequent applications, this Court now reconsiders that
dismissal on its own motion.
Relief is granted. The judgment in Cause No. FR43359 from the 264th District Court of
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Bell County is set aside. Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice–Correctional Institutions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.
Delivered: September 24, 2014
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