FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
September 16, 2015
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 15-4058
v. (D.C. No. 2:93-CR-00215-DS-1)
(D. Utah)
BRUCE DEREK SPRING,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before GORSUCH, O’BRIEN, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
Bruce Spring filed a petition seeking a writ of audita querela to undo his
federal sentence. The district court denied relief and so the case now comes to us.
The ancient common law writ of audita querela permitted a defendant to
obtain “relief against a judgment or execution because of some defense or
discharge arising subsequent to the rendition of the judgment.” United States v.
Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and
judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
For the purpose of resolving this appeal, we may assume without deciding that
this writ remains available to some petitioners as a form of relief, though this
assumption is by no means obviously correct. See United States v. Torres, 282
F.3d 1241, 1245 n.6 (10th Cir. 2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(e) (“The following are
abolished: . . . writs of . . . audita querela.”). Because even operating on this
generous assumption, Mr. Spring faces a problem: for it has long been settled
that, whatever else might be said about it, “a writ of audita querela is not
available to a petitioner when other remedies exist.” Torres, 282 F.3d at 1245
(internal quotation mark omitted). And other remedies surely exist for Mr. Spring
to challenge the legality of his federal sentence.
Congress has expressly provided 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for just this task. In
fact, Congress has specified that § 2255 supplies the exclusive means for
collaterally testing a federal conviction and sentence unless that statute’s
procedures are “inadequate or ineffective” for that purpose. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e);
Johnson v. Taylor, 347 F.2d 365, 366 (10th Cir. 1965) (per curiam). Mr. Spring
has not sought to show that § 2255’s procedures are inadequate or ineffective to
test the legality of his detention so by necessity he hasn’t established the case for
resorting to the writ he seeks. Neither can we imagine any argument for him that
might succeed where he hasn’t tried. It isn’t the case, for example, that a § 2255
motion is inadequate or ineffective simply because a petitioner (like Mr. Spring
here) has previously failed to win such a motion or might face an uphill battle
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when trying to pursue a second or successive such effort. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h). This court has repeatedly explained that “the remedy under § 2255 is
not inadequate or ineffective merely because the statute greatly restricts second or
successive motions.” Sines v. Wilner, 609 F.3d 1070, 1073 (10th Cir. 2010); see
also Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 580 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Guerrero, 415 F. App’x 858, 859 (10th Cir. 2011).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Mr. Spring’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis is denied, and he is reminded of his obligation to pay
the filing fee in full.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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