UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6324
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ANGELO GALLOWAY, a/k/a Gelo,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, District
Judge. (2:10-cr-00096-MSD-TEM-2)
Submitted: September 14, 2015 Decided: September 16, 2015
Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Angelo Galloway, Appellant Pro Se. Sherrie Scott Capotosto,
Benjamin L. Hatch, Assistant United States Attorneys, Norfolk,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Angelo Galloway appeals the district court’s order denying
his motion for recusal and his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion
seeking relief from its judgment denying 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012)
relief, as well as the court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e) motion seeking to alter or amend the order denying Rule
60(b) relief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
district court’s orders.
A prisoner cannot appeal a final order in a § 2255
proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability (COA). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B)
(2012). Generally, a COA is required to appeal an order denying
a Rule 60(b) motion in a § 2255 proceeding. Reid v. Angelone,
369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004). This court recently
clarified, however, that a COA is not required in the limited
circumstance in which the district court dismisses a Rule 60(b)
motion as an unauthorized, successive habeas petition. United
States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392, 399-400 (4th Cir. 2015).
To file a successive § 2255 motion in the district court, a
prisoner must first obtain preauthorization from this court. 28
U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h) (2012). Although a prisoner is
permitted to seek Rule 60(b) relief from a district court’s
judgment in a § 2255 proceeding, “a district court has no
discretion to rule on a Rule 60(b) motion that is functionally
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equivalent to a successive [§ 2255] application.” United
States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 206 (4th Cir. 2003). Where a
Rule 60(b) motion “challenges some defect in the integrity of
the federal habeas proceedings,” it is a true Rule 60(b) motion
and may be reviewed without preauthorization. McRae, 793 F.3d
at 397 (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying these
principles, we conclude the § 2253(c) COA requirement does not
apply to this appeal.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s
denial of a Rule 59(e) or a Rule 60(b) motion. Mayfield v.
Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 378
(4th Cir. 2012) (Rule 59(e)); MLC Auto., LLC v. Town of S.
Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 277 (4th Cir. 2008) (Rule 60(b)). We also
review for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a
recusal motion. United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 339
(4th Cir. 2008).
As the district court properly concluded, Galloway’s Rule
60(b) motion seeking relief from the district court’s § 2255
judgment is the functional equivalent of a successive § 2255
motion, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider
it. Similarly, the portion of Galloway’s Rule 59(e) motion
challenging the dismissal of his Rule 60(b) motion and repeating
his challenges to his criminal judgment was equivalent to a
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successive § 2255 motion and therefore properly dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
Insofar as Galloway’s Rule 59(e) motion challenged the
district court’s treatment of a pro se ethics grievance filed
against the prosecutor in his criminal case, those arguments are
not properly raised in a postjudgment motion in his § 2255
proceeding. Moreover, the ethics complaints addressed in
Galloway’s informal brief are based on the same allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct that have been rejected by the district
court and this court. Galloway’s refusal to accept the courts’
rulings on these claims is not a valid basis for postjudgment
relief.
Galloway based his demand for recusal on the district
judge’s adverse rulings and status as a defendant in Galloway’s
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action related to his criminal
prosecution. However, “judicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Rather, a
judge’s opinions formed during the current or prior proceedings
are not grounds for recusal “unless they display a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible.” United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 530 (4th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). We find no
evidence of such antagonism or partiality by the district judge.
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Nor does Galloway’s unsuccessful § 1983 action require the
judge’s recusal. See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985,
993-94 (10th Cir. 1993). Thus, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Galloway’s recusal motion.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders. We
deny Galloway’s request for in camera review of grand jury
transcripts. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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