IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-50051
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOHNNY FLORES TREJO,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. SA-99-CR-534-1
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November 13, 2002
Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Johnny Flores Trejo appeals his jury conviction for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and
aiding an abetting possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We
address Trejo’s arguments in turn.
First, the affidavit supporting the search warrant was not a
“bare bones” affidavit because it stated that the officer had
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-50051
-2-
“received information from a reliable and credible
individual . . . who in the past has given this officer reliable
information which has proven to be true and correct as to the
trafficking in controlled substances” and that the confidential
informant (CI) had seen Trejo in possession of cocaine within the
previous 24 hours at the location described in the affidavit.
See United States v. McKnight, 953 F.2d 898, 905 (5th Cir. 1992);
Christian v. McKaskle, 731 F.2d 1196, 1198, 1200 (5th Cir. 1984);
see also United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 321-22 (5th
Cir. 1992).
Second, the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), was not
violated because the thirty-day speedy-trial period started only
when Trejo was indicted, and thus detained, in connection with
the present crime. See United States v. Taylor,814 F.2d 172,
174-75 (5th Cir. 1987); Cowart v. Hargett, 16 F.3d 642, 645-46
(5th Cir. 1994) (applying Speedy Trial Act to state detention).
Next, evidence of Trejo’s prior felony conviction was
admissible under FED. R. EVID. 404(b) to show Trejo’s intent,
which was placed at issue by Trejo’s “not guilty” plea. See
United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1562 (5th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc). The evidence possessed considerable probative value that
was not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice under FED. R.
EVID. 403. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911.
No. 02-50051
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Trejo failed to show that his admissions made at a
supervised release revocation hearing were involuntary or
otherwise inadmissible at trial. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting the statements.
Trejo fails to show that the trial court should have given
further consideration to a so-called 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
filed prior to trial. The motion was not the proper vehicle for
raising the claims Trejo asserted.
Trejo fails to show plain error where the trial court
performed the functional equivalent of an in camera review of a
fellow conspirator’s Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”), and where
Trejo’s attorney expressed complete satisfaction with the court’s
handling of the PSR matter. See United States v. Jackson, 978
F.2d 903, 909 (5th Cir. 1992).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing
to allow four witnesses to testify at the sentencing hearing to
rebut the PSR. Trejo and his counsel reviewed the PSR, filed
objections and a presentencing memorandum, but failed to show
that there was a dispute over material facts that the court could
not resolve without a hearing. See United States v. Henderson,
19 F.3d 917, 927 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Mueller, 902
F.2d 336, 347 (5th Cir. 1990).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.