Revised December 30, 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-11591
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
FREDERICK PHILIP JETER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
December 16, 2002
Before JOLLY and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE,1 District Judge.
DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:
This appeal asks us to determine whether the district court
erred in rejecting defendant’s initial plea agreement, and whether
the district court engaged in plea negotiations. Finding no abuse
of discretion in the rejection of the initial plea agreement and no
engagement in plea negotiations by the district court, we affirm.
I.
Frederick Philip Jeter was indicted on charges of being a
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F.A. Little Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge, Western District
of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
felon in possession of firearms (Count 1), using or carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime (Count
2), and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (Count
3). Upon learning that the State of Texas was pursuing offenses
similar to those charged in Counts 2 and 3, the Government agreed
in the plea agreement to dismiss those counts; Jeter agreed to
plead guilty to Count 1, being a felon in possession of a firearm.
The district court expressed concern about the disparity
between the sentence Jeter would face if convicted of all charges
and the sentence Jeter would face under the plea agreement. The
plea agreement, the court said, would defeat one of the goals of
the sentencing guidelines, i.e., to ensure that repeat drug
offenders receive harsher sentences for subsequent drug crimes.
The court also indicated that it might be unable to accept the plea
agreement if unable to make the findings required by U.S.S.G.
§ 6B1.2(a), i.e., that the remaining charge adequately reflected
the seriousness of the offense and that accepting the agreement
would not undermine the statutory purposes of the guidelines.2 Due
2
This Guideline provides,
(a) In the case of a plea agreement that includes the dismissal
of any charges . . . the court may accept the agreement if the
court determines, for reasons stated on the record, that the
remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the
actual offense behavior and that accepting the agreement will
not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the
sentencing guidelines.
U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2.
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to these concerns, the district court deferred acceptance of the
plea agreement.
After receiving additional information, the district court
noted that Jeter’s guideline sentencing range under the guilty plea
would be some 30 months lower than if Jeter were convicted of all
of the charges against him. The district court also determined
that accepting the plea agreement would undermine one of the
objectives of the sentencing guidelines, which is to ensure that
prior drug offenses are taken into account in the sentencing for
future drug offenses. Accordingly, the district court determined
that it could not make the findings contemplated by § 6B1.2 and
rejected the plea agreement.
Thereafter, the parties entered into a second plea agreement:
Jeter would plead guilty to Counts 2 and 3, using and carrying a
firearm during a drug trafficking crime and possession with intent
to distribute cocaine base, and the Government would dismiss Count
1, being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court accepted
that second plea agreement.
II.
Jeter first argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it rejected the initial plea agreement by usurping
the Government’s exclusive authority to determine when a
prosecution should be terminated. In addition, Jeter argues that
the district court’s reasons for rejecting the initial plea
agreement were misplaced.
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We review a district court's rejection of a plea agreement for
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Crowell, 60 F.3d 199,
205 (5th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Foy, 28 F.3d 464,
473 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1031 (1994). “A district
court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an error of
law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” United
States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, 860, (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
566 U.S. 1117 (1999).
The Government’s authority in choosing what offenses a
defendant will face is tempered by the role of the district court
in accepting or rejecting plea agreements. Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(e)(2)(district court “may accept or reject the [plea]
agreement"); see also United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 835
(5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981) (Rule 11 does not limit a district
court's discretion in rejecting a plea agreement). Although the
Government initially believed that dismissing the counts similar to
pending state charges was appropriate, the district court correctly
pointed out that it could not accurately assume that those charges
would proceed in state court.
In rejecting the initial plea agreement, the district court
noted “a three-year discrepancy between the bottoms of the
guideline ranges and a 30-month discrepancy between the top.” In
doing so, the district court concluded that the sentence Jeter
would receive under the initial plea agreement might be unduly
lenient. The court's belief that the defendant would receive too
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light a sentence is a sound reason for rejecting a plea agreement.
Crowell, 60 F.3d at 205-06; Foy, 28 F.3d at 472; United States v.
Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1977).
The court also stated that it felt that a conviction under the
initial plea agreement would defeat the objectives of the
sentencing guidelines. For these reasons, the district court
concluded that it could not make the findings contemplated by
§ 6B1.2(a). A court may reject a plea agreement if it determines
that accepting the plea agreement will undermine the statutory
purposes of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines or if it finds
that the remaining charges do not adequately reflect the
seriousness of a defendant’s actual offense behavior. See U.S.S.G.
§ 6B1.2(a); Crowell, 60 F.3d at 206 (affirming rejection of
agreement since district court determined that plea would not meet
standards of § 6B1.2(a)); Foy, 28 F.3d at 473 n.15 (holding that
district court’s rejection of plea under § 6B1.2(a) criteria would
not be an abuse of discretion).
The district court relied on both the sentencing discrepancy
and its conclusion that the initial plea agreement did not satisfy
the objectives of the sentencing guidelines in rejecting the plea
agreement – both permissible grounds for rejecting a plea. See
Crowell, 60 F.3d at 205-06. Accordingly, we find no abuse of
discretion in the court’s rejection of that agreement.
III.
Jeter next argues that the district court violated Rule
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11(e)(1) by engaging in plea negotiations. Jeter contends that in
rejecting the initial plea agreement, the district court made it
clear that it would not accept any subsequent plea agreement that
did not result in a drug conviction.3 Jeter argues that the
3
Jeter contends statements in evaluating the initial plea
agreement were actually suggestions for an appropriate
accommodation in a subsequent plea agreement. At the first re-
arraignment hearing, the district court expressed concerns about
the anticipated sentencing range and stated,
That’s always caused me some concern, that if a plea
agreement is accepted and a plea is made pursuant to a non-
drug offense, it sort of bypasses the intent of the statute
where if somebody who has committed a certain number of drug
offenses will receive a certain punishment. You frustrate
that objective if the plea -- if he’s committed a drug offense
but is pleading to something else.
During a later conference, the court reiterated,
Another issue that I’ve always had a concern about where
you’re trading off a drug conviction for something other than
a drug conviction, then you’re defeating an objective of the
sentencing provisions in the statute and that is that if he in
the future is convicted of a drug offense, then his punishment
at that time will be based in part on his history of drug
offenses. And when you have a plea agreement that
contemplates that he won’t plead guilty to a drug offense that
he, in fact, is guilty of, if that is the case, then that
defeats that statutory objective of sentencing.
Rejecting the initial plea agreement, the district court
discussed the requirements of Guideline § 6B1.2(a), noted the
discrepancy between the sentencing range after the plea and the
range after a conviction on all charges, and stated,
In other words, if I were to approve the plea agreement and
sentence on the basis of the plea agreement, then there would
not be a conviction for the drug offense with the consequence
that one of the objectives of sentencing, that is, the prior
drug offenses, be taken into account in the sentencing for
future drug offenses would be defeated. So, I’ve concluded
that I cannot make the determinations contemplated by Section
6B1.2; therefore, I’ve concluded that I cannot accept the plea
agreement.
Considering the second plea agreement, the district court again
expressed concern over the disparity in sentencing ranges. At
sentencing, the court stated:
I’m not going to approve the plea agreement in the sense
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district court’s concerns dictated the outcome of his case.
A district court is absolutely prohibited from participating
in plea negotiations. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1); United States v.
Miles, 10 F.3d 1135, 1139 (5th Cir. 1994). Judicial involvement
in the plea negotiation process is to be strictly limited to
rejection of the agreement and an explanation for the rejection.
See id. at 1139-40; Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3). Nevertheless, under
Rule 11 “a district court must actively participate in the
discussions that occur after a plea agreement is disclosed."
Crowell, 60 F.3d at 203.
The fact that the parties rely on the district court’s
comments in fashioning a subsequent plea agreement is not
determinative of whether the district court engaged in plea
negotiations. Id. at 204. Rather, when evaluating a district
court’s comments concerning a plea agreement, “[t]he proper inquiry
is whether the district court was actively evaluating a plea
agreement, as the court is required to do, or whether the court is
suggesting an appropriate accommodation for a subsequent plea
agreement, something this Court found prohibited in Miles.” Id.
contemplated by the guidelines because I can’t make the
findings that would be required for me to apply the -- approve
it under the standard proposed by the guidelines, and normally
I would not approve a plea agreement of this kind. But
somewhat because of the history of this case, I’m going to go
ahead and accept the plea agreement, but it’s not in a sense
that I approve it or think it’s a proper plea agreement. I’m
simply going to go forward with the sentencing and not reject
the plea agreement.
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We observe that the district court did not engage in plea
negotiations; rather, it properly stated its reasons for rejecting
the plea agreement. The district court merely expressed its
concerns with the initial plea agreement, and did not suggest an
appropriate accommodation for a subsequent plea. Nowhere did the
district court state, as Jeter contends, that a plea would have to
result in a drug conviction in order to be acceptable. See supra
n.3; cf. Crowell, 60 F.3d at 203 (finding a violation of Rule 11 in
district court’s suggestion that, for a plea to be acceptable, “a
sentence significantly in excess of what [Crowell] likely would
serve under the prior . . . plea agreement would be required”).
In this case the district court neither interfered with
ongoing plea negotiations, as in Crowell, nor specified what plea
agreement would be acceptable, as in Miles. Accordingly the
judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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