TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-11-00658-CR
NO. 03-11-00659-CR
David Preston Campbell, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MILAM COUNTY, 20TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NOS. CR22,208 & CR22,209, HONORABLE JOHN YOUNGBLOOD, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In the above causes, appellant David Preston Campbell was convicted of the
offenses of burglary of a building and theft and sentenced, for each offense, to 18 months’
confinement in state jail, with the sentences to run concurrently. Campbell’s sentences commenced
on September 12, 2011. Since then, the appeals have taken a somewhat circuitous route to final
resolution, including being abated for appointment of new counsel after we concluded, contrary to
an Anders brief filed by Campbell’s initial appointed appellate counsel, that the record presented a
non-frivolous appellate issue relating to jail credits.1 Following appointment of new appellate
counsel and some briefing extensions at this counsel’s request, counsel filed a motion to abate the
appeals again, advising that Campbell by then had served the entirety of his eighteen-month
1
See Campbell v. State, Nos. 03-11-00658-CR & 03-11-00659-CR, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS
7124, at *2-4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 23, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
sentences, observing that this intervening development rendered the jail-credit issue moot, and
further indicating that counsel did not intend to brief any other grounds for appellate relief. Counsel
further explained that he sought the abatements because he intended to file a motion to dismiss
the appeals voluntarily and needed to locate his client (evidently Campbell’s whereabouts
were unknown) in order to obtain his signature. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a) (requiring appellant’s
signature on motion to voluntarily dismiss appeal in criminal case). We granted the second
abatement as requested and gave counsel a deadline of June 10, 2013, to file either a proper motion
to dismiss or a status report explaining why the motion to dismiss had not been filed. But thereafter,
long story short, counsel has shown no further progress toward obtaining the voluntary dismissal
contemplated in his abatement motion.2
Given these circumstances, and because the only issue that counsel intended to raise
on appeal—whether Campbell had received the appropriate amount of jail-time credit for his
sentence—is plainly rendered moot by the completion of Campbell’s sentence, we will proceed to
dismiss the appeals for want of jurisdiction. See Ex parte Canada, 754 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1988) (explaining that “a time-credit complaint may be rendered moot when an inmate is
completely discharged from confinement, control or supervision”); Stout v. State, 908 S.W.2d 552,
553 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref’d) (holding that issue regarding length of appellant’s
sentence was rendered moot when complained-of sentence had been fully discharged); see also
2
Counsel did not file either a dismissal motion or status report by the June 10, 2013
deadline. After two more months elapsed without our receiving any such filing, on September 12,
2013, we instructed counsel again to file a response or a motion to dismiss the appeals on
or before September 23, 2013. As of this date, we have received no response, briefing, or other
communication from either counsel or Campbell.
2
St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 42 (1943) (“We are of opinion that the case is moot because,
after petitioner’s service of his sentence and its expiration, there was no longer a subject matter on
which the judgment of this Court could operate.”). The appeals are dismissed.
___________________________________________
Bob Pemberton, Justice
Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton and Rose
Dismissed
Filed: December 20, 2013
Do Not Publish
3