TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-13-00483-CV
J. R., Appellant
v.
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TOM GREEN COUNTY, 340TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. C-12-0056-CPS, HONORABLE JAY K. WEATHERBY, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant J.R. appeals from the district court’s order terminating her parental rights
to her two daughters, K.A.A. and A.L.A., who were ten and seven years old, respectively,
at the time of the termination hearing. J.R.’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw
and an Anders brief, concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see also Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory
Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646-47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied). Counsel’s brief meets
the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating
that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor, 160 S.W.3d
at 646-47. J.R. was provided with a copy of counsel’s brief and advised of her right to examine the
appellate record and to file a pro se brief. No pro se brief has been filed.
In its termination decree, the district court found by clear and convincing evidence
that termination of J.R.’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child and that J.R. had:
(1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings
which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the children; (2) engaged in conduct or
knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical
or emotional well-being of the children; (3) constructively abandoned the children; and (4) failed to
comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the
parent to obtain the return of the children. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (2).
The above findings were made following a trial before the bench. J.R. did not
personally appear at trial but was represented by counsel. The sole witness to testify was
Melissa Cano, the Child Protective Services (CPS) caseworker assigned to the case. Cano testified
that the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) had received a report
that J.R., who had earlier been diagnosed with catatonic schizophrenia, was not taking medication
to treat her illness and was not providing appropriate care for her children. According to Cano, the
home in which J.R. and her children were living “was falling apart,” had no running water or
electricity, contained insufficient food to feed the children, was infested with insects and mice, and
had maggots growing inside the refrigerator. In the opinion of the Department, the home was not
habitable for young children. The children were subsequently removed from the home and placed
in the care of the children’s paternal grandmother.
Cano further testified that the Department had prepared a service plan so that J.R.
might obtain reunification with her children. The plan included requirements that J.R. undergo a
substance-abuse assessment and a psychological, psycho-social evaluation. According to Cano, J.R.
did not complete these requirements. Cano also explained that J.R. had attended some counseling
sessions as required but had made “no improvement” during those sessions and eventually stopped
attending them. J.R. also eventually stopped visiting her children and contacting the Department.
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As a result of the lack of communication from J.R., Cano did not know where J.R. was currently
living, whether she was working, or whether she had the present ability to support her children.
Regarding the best interest of the children, Cano testified that the children remained
placed with their parental grandmother and that the children are “doing great in the home.” Cano
added, “They’re comfortable there. They’re happy there.” Cano also testified that the grandmother
wanted to adopt the children, that adoption would provide the children with benefits and subsidies
from the State, including Medicaid, and that termination of J.R.’s parental rights and adoption by the
grandmother was in the best interest of the children. Cano acknowledged that the children missed
their mother and “still want[ed] to see their mom.” However, Cano also testified that even if J.R.’s
parental rights were terminated, the grandmother could still arrange and supervise visitation between
J.R. and the children. At the conclusion of trial, the attorney ad litem for the children and the Court
Appointed Special Advocate for the children also agreed that termination of J.R.’s parental rights
was in the best interest of the children.
Having reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, we agree that the appeal is frivolous.
We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Anders, 386 U.S.
at 741-44; Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 646-47. We affirm the district court’s order of termination and
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
_____________________________________________
Bob Pemberton, Justice
Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Pemberton and Field
Affirmed
Filed: November 27, 2013
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