Hamzah v. Lynch

14-1687 Hamzah v. Lynch BIA Segal, IJ A093 396 876 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4 17th day of September, two thousand fifteen. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DENNIS JACOBS, 8 DENNY CHIN, 9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 YOK TJIN HAMZAH, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 14-1687 17 NAC 18 19 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: David M. Haghighi, Law Offices of 25 David M. Haghighi APC, Los Angeles, 26 CA. 27 28 FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant 29 Attorney General; Ernesto H. Molina, 1 Jr., Assistant Director; Drew C. 2 Brinkman, Trial Attorney, Office of 3 Immigration Litigation, United 4 States Department of Justice, 5 Washington, D.C. 6 7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 10 DENIED. 11 Petitioner Yok Tjin Hamzah, a native and citizen of 12 Indonesia, seeks review of an April 29, 2014, decision of the 13 BIA affirming an April 17, 2012, decision of an Immigration 14 Judge (“IJ”) denying Hamzah’s application for asylum, 15 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 16 Torture (“CAT”). In re Yok Tjin Hamzah, No. A093 396 876 17 (B.I.A. Apr. 29, 2014), aff’g No. A093 396 876 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. 18 City Apr. 14, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with 19 the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 20 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the 21 IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. 22 Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable 23 standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. 2 1 § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 2 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 3 I. Past Persecution 4 The IJ reasonably found that Hamzah did not suffer past 5 persecution. “[P]ersecution is the infliction of suffering or 6 harm upon those who differ on the basis of a protected statutory 7 ground.” Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 8 341 (2d Cir. 2006). “Such a definition is sufficiently general 9 to encompass ‘a variety of forms of adverse treatment, including 10 non-life-threatening violence and physical abuse, or 11 non-physical forms of harm such as the deliberate imposition 12 of a substantial economic disadvantage.’” Mei Fun Wong v. 13 Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ivanishvili, 14 433 F.3d at 341). For economic harm to constitute persecution, 15 the harm must be “severe,” but an applicant “need not 16 demonstrate a total deprivation of livelihood or a total 17 withdrawal of all economic opportunity in order to demonstrate 18 harm amounting to persecution.” Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 19 163, 170-73 (BIA 2007); see also Huo Qiang Chen v. Holder, 773 20 F.3d 396, 405 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying Matter of T-Z- without 21 expressly deciding whether that case is entitled to deference). 3 1 There is no “fixed threshold for the economic harms that will 2 manifest persecution”; rather, the determination turns on what 3 impact the economic harm had on the victim. Huo Qiang Chen, 4 773 F.3d at 405. 5 The IJ reasonably found that Hamzah did not suffer past 6 persecution based on the destruction of his computer store 7 because he worked in a printing factory for four years 8 afterwards and eventually opened his own laundry business. The 9 incident, while unfortunate, did not impact Hamzah in such a 10 way as to constitute a deliberate imposition of “severe economic 11 disadvantage.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 The IJ also reasonably found that the bombing incidents 13 Hamzah described did not constitute persecution because he was 14 never physically injured. Although Hamzah testified that he 15 and his family felt traumatized by the bombings, the record does 16 not suggest that they suffered from any long-term psychological 17 issues, or that the incidents that Hamzah asserts have 18 traumatized him were severe enough to constitute persecution 19 (even if considered cumulatively). Cf. Jorge-Tzoc v. 20 Gonzales, 435 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2006)(per curiam). The 21 three bombing incidents occurred over the course of five years, 4 1 and while one occurred in the parking lot of the church where 2 Hamzah and his family were worshipping, the other two clearly 3 had nothing to do with Hamzah, his family or his religion. 4 I. Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution 5 To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant like 6 Hamzah, who has not suffered past persecution, must demonstrate 7 a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 U.S.C. 8 §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A); Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 9 554, 564 (2d Cir. 2006). To do so, he must show that he 10 "subjectively fears persecution and establish that his fear is 11 objectively reasonable." Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 12 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 13 F.3d 138, 162 (2d Cir. 2008). There are two ways for an 14 applicant to show objective fear: (1) offering evidence that 15 he would be singled out individually for persecution, or 16 (2) proving that a pattern or practice of persecution of 17 similarly situated persons exists in his home country. Mufied 18 v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2007); 8 C.F.R. § 19 1208.13(b)(2). Hamzah does not challenge the agency’s finding 20 that he did not establish a well-founded fear that he would be 21 individually targeted for persecution. 5 1 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that 2 there is no pattern or practice of persecution of ethnic Chinese 3 Christians in Indonesia. "To the extent the BIA has indicated 4 that a 'pattern or practice' of persecution is one that is 5 'systemic, pervasive, or organized,' we have deemed that 6 standard 'a reasonable one' while at the same time seeking 7 clarification from the BIA as to how the standard might be 8 applied reliably." Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 150 n.6 (citing 9 Mufied, 508 F.3d at 92-93). When the agency's determination 10 that an individual did not establish a pattern or practice of 11 persecution is supported by background materials, the agency 12 has provided a "sufficient basis" for its conclusion. Santoso 13 v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2009)(per curiam). 14 Here, the overall record, particularly the State 15 Department reports, supports the agency’s findings, as the 16 country conditions evidence shows that although there have been 17 incidents of harassment and violence, the Indonesian government 18 has attempted to address religious tensions; there is no 19 evidence that the current violence is "systemic" or 20 "pervasive." Mufied, 508 F.3d at 92-93. 6 1 Because Hamzah failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear 2 of persecution, he necessarily could not meet the higher burden 3 required for withholding of removal or CAT relief. See Lecaj 4 v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010). 5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 6 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 7 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 8 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 9 is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in 10 this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 11 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 12 34.1(b). 13 FOR THE COURT: 14 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 7