Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc.

05-1305-cv Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 August Term, 2005 4 (Argued: October 18, 2005 Question Certified to the New York 5 Court of Appeals: February 23, 2006 Decided: May 21, 2007) 6 Docket No. 05-1305-cv 7 ------------------------------------- 8 PATRICIA COLAVITO, as personal representative of Robert Colavito, 9 Deceased, 10 Plaintiff-Appellant, 11 - v - 12 NEW YORK ORGAN DONOR NETWORK, INC., ROB KOCHIK, SPENCER HERTZEL, 13 GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, DOE, I and II, M.D. DR., 14 Defendants-Appellees. 15 ------------------------------------- 16 Before: JACOBS, Chief Judge, CABRANES, and SACK, Circuit 17 Judges. 18 In Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 19 43, 58, 860 N.E.2d 713, 722-23, 827 N.Y.S.2d 96, 105-06 (2006), 20 the New York Court of Appeals answered a question that we had 21 certified to it in Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 22 438 F.3d 214, 232-33 (2d Cir. 2006), as to whether the intended 23 recipient of an organ donation can bring a private cause of 24 action for common law conversion or under the New York Public 25 Health Law if he does not receive the organ. In light of the 26 Court of Appeals' response, summary judgment granted by the 1 district court (Dora L. Irizarry, Judge) in favor of all of the 2 defendants is: 3 Affirmed. 4 Denise Winter Luparello, Hicksville, NY, 5 for Plaintiff-Appellant Patricia 6 Colavito, as personal representative of 7 Robert Colavito, Deceased. 8 Richard E. Lerner, Wilson, Elser, 9 Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker P.C., New 10 York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees New 11 York Organ Donor Network, Inc., Robert 12 Kochik, and Spencer Hertzel. 13 SACK, Circuit Judge. 14 The plaintiff's decedent, Robert Colavito ("Colavito"), 15 suffering from grave kidney disease, was the intended recipient 16 of two kidneys from the body of his late close friend, Peter 17 Lucia. The New York Organ Donor Network ("NYODN") sent one of 18 Lucia's kidneys to Florida, where Colavito resided. But contrary 19 to the wishes of the Lucia family, the NYODN designated the other 20 kidney for another recipient before it was known whether the 21 first one could be successfully transplanted to Colavito. When 22 Colavito's doctor discovered that the kidney sent to Florida was 23 damaged and therefore incapable of being transplanted 24 successfully, he tried to obtain the second Lucia kidney from 25 NYODN. That one, however, was by then in the process of being 26 implanted in the other patient. Colavito, thinking that he had 27 an enforceable right to the second kidney, brought suit against 28 the defendants for fraud, conversion, and violation of New York 2 1 Public Health Law Articles, 43 and 43-A, in the United States 2 District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 3 The district court (Dora L. Irizarry, Judge) granted 4 summary judgment to the defendants on the merits of Colavito's 5 fraud claim. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 356 F. 6 Supp. 2d 237, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Colavito I"). It also 7 concluded that a public policy against recognizing property 8 rights in human corpses barred Colavito's attempt to state a 9 cause of action for common law conversion or under the New York 10 Public Health Law, Articles 43 and 43-A. Id. at 241-47. 11 Colavito appealed to this Court. We affirmed with 12 respect to the fraud claim, but certified to the New York Court 13 of Appeals questions as to whether, under New York law, Colavito 14 could maintain the causes of action for conversion or pursuant to 15 the New York Public Health Law. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor 16 Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 232-33 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Colavito 17 II"). Specifically, we asked 18 (1) Do the applicable provisions of the New 19 York Public Health Law vest the intended 20 recipient of a directed organ donation with 21 rights that can be vindicated in a private 22 party's lawsuit sounding in the common law 23 tort of conversion or through a private right 24 of action inferred from the New York Public 25 Health Law? (2) Does New York Public Health 26 Law immunize either negligent or grossly 27 negligent misconduct? (3) If a donee can 28 bring a private action to enforce the rights 29 referred to in question 1, may the plaintiff 30 recover nominal or punitive damages without 31 demonstrating pecuniary loss or other actual 32 injury? 33 Id. at 233. 3 1 The New York Court of Appeals accepted the certified 2 questions. See Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 6 3 N.Y.3d 820, 846 N.E.2d 467, 813 N.Y.S.2d 37 (2006).1 In its 4 subsequent response to the questions, Colavito v. N.Y. Organ 5 Donor Network, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 43, 58, 860 N.E.2d 713, 722-23, 827 6 N.Y.S.2d 96, 105-06 (2006) ("Colavito III"), the Court concluded 7 that although the intended recipient of a donated organ might 8 have a common law right to it under New York law, no such right 9 exists for the "specified donee of an incompatible kidney." Id. 10 at 53, 860 N.E.2d at 719, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 102 (emphasis added). 11 The court also decided that whether or not a private cause of 12 action exists under the New York Public Health Law for the 13 disappointed intended recipients of organ donations, it is 14 available only to those who fall within the statutory term 15 "donee," which the court read the statute to "define[] as someone 16 who needs the donated organ." Id. at 57, 860 N.E.2d at 722, 827 17 N.Y.S.2d at 105. The court concluded that inasmuch as Colavito 18 could gain no medical benefit from the organs in question, he did 19 not "need" them and therefore was not covered by the Act. Id. 20 The Court, "under the circumstances of this case," 21 decided certified question no. 1 -- "Do the applicable provisions 22 of the New York Public Health Law vest the intended recipient of 1 Colavito died between our decision certifying questions to the New York Court of Appeals and that court's resolution of them. His widow, Patricia Colavito, has been substituted as his personal representative for purposes of this litigation pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(a)(1). 4 1 a directed organ donation with rights that can be vindicated in a 2 private party's lawsuit sounding in the common law tort of 3 conversion or through a private right of action inferred from the 4 New York Public Health Law?" -- in the negative. The Court 5 concluded that in light of its answer to question no. 1, it was 6 not required to answer questions no. 2 -- "Does New York Public 7 Health Law immunize either negligent or grossly negligent 8 misconduct?" -- or no. 3 -- "If a donee can bring a private 9 action to enforce the rights referred to in question 1, may the 10 plaintiff recover nominal or punitive damages without 11 demonstrating pecuniary loss or other actual injury?" Id. 12 ("[U]nder the circumstances of this case, certified question No. 13 1 should be answered in the negative, and certified question Nos. 14 2 and 3 not answered as academic."). 15 This leaves us a single further question for 16 resolution. The Court of Appeals, as a basis both for answering 17 our first question and deciding that the other two questions need 18 not be addressed, assumed -- understandably, in light of the 19 facts and the language of our prior opinion -- that Lucia's 20 kidneys were incompatible with Colavito's immune system, thus 21 preventing the organs from being successfully transplanted to 22 Colavito. That assumption underlies the Court of Appeals' 23 conclusion that Colavito had no common law property right in the 24 incompatible kidney (common law conversion) and did not "need" it 25 (New York Public Health Law). But neither the district court in 26 Colavito I, nor we in Colavito II, ever actually decided whether 5 1 there was a "genuine issue" of "material fact," Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 56(c), that would require a trial as to whether Lucia's kidneys 3 and Colavito's immune system were compatible. See Colavito I, 4 356 F. Supp. 2d at 240; Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 223. Colavito 5 himself refused to concede that a successful transplant was 6 impossible. See Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 223 ("Although he will 7 not concede the point, the evidence strongly suggests that 8 neither of Peter Lucia's kidneys was, it turned out, suitable for 9 implantation in Colavito's body."). We cannot decide the 10 propriety of the district court's grant of the defendants' motion 11 for summary judgment without determining whether compatibility 12 remains a genuine issue of material fact in this case. 13 Ordinarily, we "will not review an issue the district 14 court did not decide." Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 15 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 16 106, 120-21 (1976)). However, "whether we do so or not is a 17 matter within our discretion." Id. 18 We think this is an appropriate case in which to 19 exercise our discretion to decide this issue in the first 20 instance. Colavito's contention throughout has been that 21 compatibility is immaterial. See Colavito I, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 22 240 (recognizing that Colavito "does not outright dispute 23 [compatibility] but instead argues that incompatibility has no 24 bearing on the fact that defendants misappropriated the second 25 kidney"); Colavito III, 8 N.Y.3d at 48, 860 N.E.2d at 716, 827 26 N.Y.S.2d at 99 (stating that Colavito maintains "that 6 1 incompatibility is irrelevant to his claim"). We have 2 nonetheless noted that "the evidence strongly suggests that . . . 3 the Lucia kidneys were . . . useless to" Colavito. Colavito II, 4 438 F.3d at 223. Indeed, there is ample evidence to that effect. 5 See, e.g., Burke Dep. 7:22-12:7, May 10, 2004; Gaston Aff. ¶¶ 6- 6 10, May 13, 2004. At the same time, Colavito himself presented 7 no evidence to the district court that would have raised a 8 genuine issue with respect to compatibility. The notion that 9 Lucia's second kidney might have been successfully transplanted 10 to Colavito is, on the evidence in the district court record, 11 speculative at best. A party may not defeat a Rule 56 motion 12 based on conjecture alone. See McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137, 13 144 (2d Cir. 2006). 14 Because we conclude as a matter of law that Colavito 15 could not have derived a medical benefit from the organ and did 16 not "need" it, we also conclude that in light of the New York 17 Court of Appeals' answer to our first certified question, he had 18 no cause of action under either the New York common law of 19 conversion or the New York Public Health Law. The defendants 20 were therefore entitled to summary judgment.2 2 Chief Judge Jacobs, who subscribes to this analysis, adheres to the view (expressed in his dissent from the certification opinion) that Colavito could not in any event have had a medical "need" under the statute for both of Lucia's kidneys, and that the defendants therefore had no duty to hold the second (or transport it to Colavito) to hedge the risk that the first would be damaged or incompatible. See Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 234. 7 1 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of 2 summary judgment to the defendants on all of Colavito's claims. 8