UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4133
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILMER NAHUN CAMPOS-MEJIA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:10-cr-00292-HEH-1)
Submitted: September 10, 2015 Decided: September 18, 2015
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Acting Federal Public Defender, Frances H.
Pratt, Carolyn V. Grady, Assistant Federal Public Defenders,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United
States Attorney, S. David Schiller, Assistant United States
Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Wilmer Nahun Campos-Mejia appeals the district court’s
order revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 24
months’ imprisonment, above the Sentencing Guidelines’ policy
statement range. Campos-Mejia contends that his sentence is
plainly unreasonable. Specifically, he claims that his sentence
is procedurally unreasonable because the district court relied
on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) sentencing factors not enumerated
in the list of factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3853(e) (2012) to be
considered when imposing a revocation sentence. Campos-Mejia
also claims that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable in
light of the Government’s suggestion that increased punishment
was appropriate in order to ensure he was punished for the
crimes underlying the revocation of his supervised release. We
affirm.
“[T]he sentencing court retains broad discretion to impose
a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” United
States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (ellipsis
and internal quotation marks omitted). “We will not disturb a
district court’s revocation sentence unless it falls outside the
statutory maximum or is otherwise plainly unreasonable.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he [same] procedural
and substantive considerations that guide our review of original
sentences inform our review of revocation sentences as well.”
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Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, for this
initial inquiry, “[i]n determining whether a revocation sentence
is unreasonable, we strike a more deferential appellate posture
than we do when reviewing original sentences.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the
district court considered the advisory policy statement range
and the § 3553(a) factors applicable to supervised release
revocation. Id.; United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-40
(4th Cir. 2006). A sentence is substantively reasonable if the
district court stated a proper basis for concluding the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. “Only if a
revocation sentence is unreasonable must we assess whether it is
plainly so.” Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373.
We conclude that Campos-Mejia’s challenge to the procedural
reasonableness of his sentence based on the district court’s
reference to unenumerated § 3553(a) factors lacks merit.
Although the district court referenced unenumerated factors, it
does not appear from the record that the court primarily
considered or relied on them when determining Campos-Mejia’s
sentence. See United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641-42 (4th
Cir. 2013). Moreover, to the extent the court considered
unenumerated factors, we conclude that they were “relevant to,
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and considered in conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a)
factors” and, therefore, that reference to the omitted factors
did not render Campos-Mejia’s sentence procedurally
unreasonable. Id. at 642.
We likewise conclude that Campos-Mejia’s contentions
regarding the Government’s assertions at his revocation hearing
are meritless. Imposing a sentence for the purpose of punishing
the underlying conduct as a new offense, rather than for
breaking the court’s trust, might constitute plain
unreasonableness. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7,
pt. A(3)(b) (2014); United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058,
1063-64 (9th Cir. 2007); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437-38. However,
even if the Government’s reasoning at sentencing were taken to
imply that Campos-Mejia should be sentenced for a new offense,
we cannot attribute this reasoning to the district court on the
record before us. See United States v. Bell, 667 F.3d 431, 447-
48 (4th Cir. 2011). On the contrary, the record discloses that
the district court based the sentence it imposed on the advisory
policy statements and the factors enumerated in § 3583(e).
Because we conclude that Campos-Mejia’s revocation sentence
is not procedurally unreasonable and because he does not
challenge its substantive reasonableness, it is unnecessary to
determine whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.
Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
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of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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