Significant irregular events impaired Coulter's right to a fair trial
"A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to a fair trial
secured by the United States and Nevada Constitutions." Watters v. State,
129 Nev., Adv. Op. 94, 313 P.3d 243, 246 (2013) (internal quotations
omitted). The district court has a duty to "protect the defendant's right to
a fair trial" and to "provid[e] order and decorum in trial proceedings."
Rudin v. State, 120 Nev. 121, 140, 86 P.3d 572, 584 (2004) (internal
quotations omitted); see also United States v. Evanston, 651 F.3d 1080,
1091 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that the district court is to manage the trial
so as to avoid causing "a significant risk of undermining the defendant's
due process rights to a fair trial and impartial jury").
An occurrence that "[is] so intrinsically harmful [to the
concept of a fair trial] [constitutes a structural error that] require[s]
automatic reversal . . . without regard to their effect on the outcome [of the
proceeding]." Knipes v. State, 124 Nev. 927, 934, 192 P.3d 1178, 1182-83
(2008) (second and fifth alterations in original) (quoting Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)); see also Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013,
1024, 195 P.3d 315, 322 (2008) (observing that a structural error "affect[s]
the very framework within which the trial proceeds" (internal quotations
omitted)). Thus, an incident or incidents that significantly undermine a
defendant's right to a fair trial can be structural error and require
automatic reversal of a conviction.
In the present case, there were significant incidents that
potentially affected the fairness of Coulter's trial. Specifically, several
jury irregularities occurred, including a juror's outburst and contempt
proceedings, a juror's conversation with unknown individuals at a bar
about the other juror's contempt proceedings, and improper
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communication between Ross's mother and a juror. In the most
significant of these juror-related incidents, Ross's mother approached the
assembled jurors in the morning before that day's trial proceedings and
borrowed a juror's cell phone. Ross's mother then placed a call to a
prospective witness in the presence of multiple jurors. Finally, Ross's
mother attempted to pay the juror with one-half of a cigarette. The
district court did not remove any juror for this incident.
Subsequent to the incident involving Ross's mother, the
district court confiscated the juror's cell phone and held a hearing outside
of the jury's presence. During the hearing, the district court answered a
call placed to the confiscated cell phone. This call originated from the
number that Ross's mother had called, and the district court attempted to
speak with the caller. The district court then detained Ross's mother and
initiated contempt proceedings against her.
While none of these irregularities may have individually
impaired Coulter's right to a fair trial or the jury's ability to be fair and
impartial, they collectively undermined Coulter's right to a fair trial to the
point that they "affect[ed] the very framework within which the trial
proceed[ed]." Cortinas, 124 Nev. at 1024, 195 P.3d at 322; cf. Valdez v.
State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1195, 196 P.3d 465, 481 (2008) ("The cumulative
effect of errors may violate a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial
even though errors are harmless individually." (internal quotations
omitted)). Thus, because a series of irregularities occurred during
Coulter's trial, we necessarily reverse and remand Coulter's convictions.
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The district court abused its discretion by denying Coulter's motion to sever
his and Ross's trials
We review the district court's denial of Coulter's motion to
sever his and Ross's trials for an abuse of discretion. See Chartier v. State,
124 Nev. 760, 764, 191 P.3d 1182, 1185 (2008). Severance is appropriate
"if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific
trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a
reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." Id. at 765, 191 P.3d at 1185
(internal quotations omitted); see also NRS 174.165(1) (providing that
severance is appropriate to prevent prejudice to a defendant or the State).
One way that a joint trial may be prejudicial to a defendant is when
"defenses [are] antagonistic to the point that they are 'mutually
exclusive." Rowland v. State, 118 Nev. 31, 45, 39 P.3d 114, 122 (2002).
"Defenses are mutually exclusive when the core of the codefendant's
defense is so irreconcilable with the core of [the defendant's] own defense
that the acceptance of the codefendant's theory by the jury precludes
acquittal of the defendant." Marshall v. State, 118 Nev. 642, 646, 56 P.3d
376, 378 (2002) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
Here, Ross and Coulter each presented defenses based on the
theories that each was respectively not at the scene of the crime and did
not commit the crimes at issue. To support their respective theories, Ross
and• Coulter each developed evidence that the other defendant was the
person observed wearing a red beanie that was subsequently found near
the crime scene. Ross also attempted to develop evidence suggesting that
Coulter had possession of key pieces of physical evidence and was one of
the men who committed the crimes. Specifically, Ross testified that on the
day before the crimes, he lent his vehicle to Coulter and that Coulter did
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not return the vehicle's keys until the morning after the crimes were
committed. Ross's vehicle was found near the crime scene on the morning
after the crimes occurred. Ross also testified that when lending his
vehicle to Coulter, he advised Coulter that there was a handgun in the
vehicle. Evidence developed at trial suggested that this handgun was
used to murder Smalley.
In addition, Ross attempted to introduce evidence of
statements• purportedly made by Coulter in which Coulter admitted guilt
and exonerated Ross. Thus, because both defendants developed evidence
that the other was the person wearing the red beanie and Ross's theory of
defense was based on evidence that Coulter admitted guilt, exonerated
Ross, and had possession of the murder weapon and the vehicle found near
the crime scene, Ross's and Coulter's defenses were so antagonistic as to
be mutually exclusive. As a result, this mutual exclusivity caused "a
serious risk that [the] joint trial would. . . prevent the jury from making a
reliable judgment about guilt or innocence," Chartier, 124 Nev. at 765, 191
P.3d at 1185 (internal quotations omitted), because the acceptance of
Ross's theory would cause a risk that it would necessarily reject Coulter's
theory of defense. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by
denying Coulter's motion to sever the trials. As a result, reversal is
warranted, and we order the district court to sever Coulter's and Ross's
trials on remand.
Conclusion
Multiple irregular events involving jurors and the district
court significantly undermined Coulter's right to a fair trial and caused a
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structural error. In addition, the district court abused its discretion by
refusing to sever Coulter's and Ross's trials. Therefore, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction REVERSED AND
REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with
this order. 2
ige_gett , C.J.
Hardesty
—Ciask t
c- DO LA-0-1
14-s , J.
Parraguirre Doug
J.
Che Saitta
Gibbons Pickering
cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge
Christopher R. Oram
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
2 0n remand, we instruct the district court clerk to reassign this case
to a different department.
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