United States v. Pellerito

USCA1 Opinion




July 20, 1992 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]





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No. 92-1159

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

GUISEPPE PELLERITO,

Defendant, Appellant.


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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO


[Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
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Before

Selya, Cyr, and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
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Robert W. Odasz on brief for appellant.
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Daniel F. Lopez-Romo, United States Attorney, Robert S.
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Mueller, III, Assistant Attorney General, Mary Lee Warren,
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Bruce A. Pagel, Hope P. McGowan, and Marietta I. Geckos, U.
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S. Department of Justice, on brief for appellee.

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Per Curiam. Giuseppe Pellerito filed a petition in the
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district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, to vacate his

earlier guilty plea in a drug conspiracy case. The gist of

his claim was that his plea had been induced by ineffective

assistance of counsel. The district court, having heard and

rejected similar arguments by Pellerito three years ago,

denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, and

Pellerito appeals. We affirm.

The background facts can be stated briefly. Together

with more than 30 co-defendants, Pellerito was indicted in

1988 for conspiring to distribute heroin as part of a major

drug distribution ring. Many defendants pled but Pellerito

and one co-defendant went to trial on June 6, 1988. On the

following day, Pellerito reached agreement with the

government and entered a guilty plea to the single count

charged against him, and his co-defendant entered a guilty

plea on June 8. Pellerito's decision was prompted in part by

government evidence that threatened Pellerito with a possible

life sentence; the plea agreement capped his exposure at 20

years with a promised recommendation by the prosecutor of 18

years.

Eight weeks later, long after the jury had been

discharged and the government had released its witnesses,

Pellerito (now represented by new counsel) filed a motion

prior to his sentencing seeking to withdraw his guilty plea.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d). Pellerito urged as the basis for

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withdrawing his guilty plea that Ivan Fisher, his trial

counsel until shortly before the guilty plea, had been

inadequately prepared, and that Emanuel Moore, who took over

the defense shortly before trial, had lacked time to prepare.

After hearing testimony from both attorneys among others, the

district judge denied the motion and later filed an extensive

opinion. United States v. Pellerito, 701 F. Supp. 279
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(D.P.R. 1988). Pellerito was sentenced to 18 years in

prison.

Pertinently, in its decision the district court found

that Fisher and another lawyer who worked with him on the

case had not been shown to be inadequate: they had devoted

time to preparing the case, had filed motions, and had

conferred with Pellerito on a number of occasions. As for

Moore, he had entered the case only shortly before trial at

Pellerito's own request after Pellerito sought to replace

Fisher, but Moore was an experienced criminal trial attorney,

had a former United States Attorney as local counsel and had

some prior familiarity with the case. Moore had also assured

the trial court that he was ready for trial. On appeal this

court affirmed the district court's refusal to allow

withdrawal of the guilty plea by Pellerito. United States v.
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Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535 (1st Cir. 1989).
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On July 10, 1991, the present section 2255 action

was filed, Pellerito being represented by yet another



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attorney. In substance, Pellerito now claims that both

Fisher and Moore provided inadequate representation and that

this circumstance vitiated his guilty plea. Pellerito argues

for the first time that Fisher was himself under

investigation for federal tax law violations at the time he

represented Pellerito; and this, it is alleged, distracted

Fisher from preparation and even created a conflict of

interest. Moore himself has now furnished an affidavit

asserting that, on reflection, he believes that he was not

adequately prepared for trial in June 1988. Pellerito also

suggests (in an argument not made to the district court) that

Mario Malerba, counsel for Pellerito's co-defendant, assisted

Pellerito in connection with the plea agreement but had a

conflict of interest never properly examined. In an

unpublished opinion, the district court denied the section

2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing, and Pellerito now

seeks review in this court.

At the outset, the government contends that the merits

need not be reached. It says that Pellerito's present motion

merely reasserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

that this court reviewed and rejected in 1989 on Pellerito's

prior appeal. Correctly, the government points out that an

issue previously settled on direct appeal cannot be revived

by a collateral attack under section 2255. United States v.
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Butt, 731 F.2d 75, 76 n.1 (1st Cir. 1984); Dirring v. United
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States, 370 F.2d 862, 864 (1st Cir. 1967). On the other
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hand, this bar obviously does not apply to a new issue and in

addition the bar may be relaxed in certain circumstances,

notably where a defendant relies upon substantial new

evidence that he had no prior opportunity to present even

though it concerns an issue already addressed. See, e.g.,
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Giacalone v. United States, 739 F.2d 40, 42-43 (2d Cir.
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1984); Argo v. United States, 473 F.2d 1315, 1317 (9th Cir.),
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cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973).
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At least two of Pellerito's three main points arguably

pass muster under these cases. The attack on Fisher,

although the ineffective assistance of counsel label is

unchanged, is now supported with new facts concerning the tax

investigation of Fisher himself. By contrast, the Moore

affidavit adds almost nothing of importance and, standing

alone, would warrant a summary denial of the motion; but the

charges against the two lawyers overlap in some measure and,

to present a complete picture, it is convenient to address

them both. As for Malerba, Pellerito's claim appears to be

newly conceived and was not discussed in the earlier appeal.

We turn therefore to the question whether any of the

allegations warrants an evidentiary hearing and conclude that

none does.

It is familiar law that an evidentiary hearing is not

automatically required for a section 2255 petition. Rather,



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the petitioner needs to allege facts that, if established by

evidence, would justify relief. United States v.
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Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
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470 U.S. 1058 (1985). (Even then, no hearing is required

where the motion's allegations are patently incredible or are

conclusively disproven by the record. United States v. Butt,
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731 F.2d at 77; Dziurgot v. Luther, 897 F.2d 1222, 1225 (1st
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Cir. 1990)). What facts would warrant relief is, of course,

a matter of substantive law. Where a collateral attack is

made upon a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of

counsel, the Supreme Court has instructed us that two things

need to be shown: that counsel's representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a
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reasonable probability that "but for counsel's errors, [the

defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
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58-59 (1985).

Starting with Pellerito's charges against Fisher, there

was indeed a federal investigation of him that apparently

ended in 1989 with Fisher pleading guilty to three

misdemeanor counts. While the investigation must have been a

major concern to Fisher, the district court in its prior

proceeding in August 1988 listened to Fisher testify,

reviewed his case preparation, and concluded that his

representation of Pellerito had been adequate. United States
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v. Pellerito, 701 F. Supp. at 287-88, 291-92. Whatever
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distraction the federal tax investigation may have caused,

the ultimate test of adequate representation was what Fisher

did. That issue the district court has previously explored

and laid to rest. Pellerito's failure to establish that any

colorable defense was overlooked in 1988, a point discussed

below, makes the inadequate representation charge even less

plausible.

Two side issues relating to Fisher require less comment.

Pellerito's new claim that Fisher had a conflict of interest

because of the federal tax investigation takes him nowhere.

Even assuming that Fisher had an interest in pleasing the

federal prosecutor in Pellerito's case--which is something of

a leap--it was Moore and not Fisher who superintended

Pellerito's plea agreement. Pellerito also complains that

Fisher, having been supplanted by Moore at Pellerito's

insistence, failed to appear in court when Pellerito's guilty

plea was taken under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Pellerito's

colloquy with the district court at the time of the plea

makes clear that Pellerito was satisfied with Moore and his

local counsel and waived Fisher's presence. 701 F. Supp. at

283.

Turning to Moore, the claim that Moore was unprepared

for trial was also reviewed and rejected by the district

court when it declined in 1988 to allow withdrawal of the



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guilty plea. 701 F. Supp. at 292-93. Moore's hindsight

affidavit statement that he was not prepared, contradicting

his assurance to the trial judge in June 1988 that he was

ready for trial, deserves little weight absent new

information, and the affidavit offers nothing significant.

Moore now says that he was retained only one day before

trial, rather than four days (as he stated in 1988), but the

testimony taken in 1988 shows that he conferred with

Pellerito and began work four days before trial even though

he was formally retained only on the day before trial. 701

F. Supp. at 289. Moore's local counsel, the former United

States Attorney, has also filed an affidavit saying that he

himself was not prepared to try the case in 1988, but of

course he was never expected to do so.

In all events, it is independently fatal to Pellerito's

claim of constitutional error--whether directed against

Fisher's representation or Moore's--that no one has

demonstrated that a substantial defense was overlooked in

1988. We are now told in fairly general terms that a motion

should have been filed to suppress incriminating tapes and

that much of the tape evidence against Pellerito could have

been explained away. But there is no showing that any valid

ground of suppression was available, nor do sketchy

assertions that the tapes could have been interpreted

innocently even begin to demonstrate that Pellerito had a



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serious defense. Such claims by Pellerito are conclusions

rather than allegations of fact requiring a hearing. See
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Myatt v. United States, 875 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1989).
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Given the lack of a plausible defense, Pellerito could

not prevail on his claim even if he could show that counsel

was inadequate. Under the two-pronged requirement of Hill v.
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Lockhart, Pellerito must also allege facts that, if proved,
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create a "reasonable probability" that adequate counsel would

have led Pellerito not to plead guilty. 474 U.S. at 59. See
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also United States v. Ramos, 810 F.2d 308, 314 (1st Cir.
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1987). No such probability has been shown in this case where

Pellerito had ample incentive to plead guilty in 1988 (the

exposure to a life sentence if he went to trial) and even

today he cannot point to a plausible defense.

Finally, we turn to Pellerito's new allegation that he

relied heavily in deciding to plead on help from Mario

Malerba, counsel for Pellerito's co-defendant who was also

negotiating a plea. This, says Pellerito, was de facto dual
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representation with a potential for conflict of interest

between the clients; the threat of conflict was never

explored by the trial judge under Fed. R. Civ. P. 44(c) (see
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United States v. Mari, 526 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
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denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976)); and the co-defendant in fact
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received a lighter sentence. Since this argument was not

made to the district court it would normally be foreclosed on



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appeal (United States v. Michaud, 901 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir.
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1990)), and it might be foreclosed in any event for failure

to raise it at the time of the motion to withdraw the guilty

plea and the original appeal, absent a showing of good cause

for this failure. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167
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(1982).

In any event, the claim is answered by Cuyler v.
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Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, (l980), quoted by the district
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court in another connection: "[T]he possibility of conflict

is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction. In order to

demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, a

defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest

adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Plainly, the

mere fact of a different sentence for a co-defendant, whose

role, criminal history and other characteristics may be quite

different, does not even begin to suggest "an actual conflict

of interest adversely affect[ing]" Malerba's performance in

whatever help he provided to Pellerito.

The district court's judgment is summarily affirmed
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pursuant to Local Rule 27.l.













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