USCA1 Opinion
September 10, 1992
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 92-1227
DINHORA QUINTERO de QUINTERO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
AWILDA APONTE-ROQUE, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Selya, Cyr and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
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Luis F. Abreu Elias on brief for appellant.
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Anabelle Rodriguez, Solicitor General, and Vannessa Ramirez,
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Assistant Solicitor General, Department of Justice, on brief for
appellees.
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SELYA, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from an order
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
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of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico granting summary judgment in the defendants' favor on
qualified immunity grounds. Because the plaintiff has failed to
show that the defendants' actions violated any clearly
established right assured by federal constitutional or statutory
law, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-appellant Dinhora Quintero de Quintero
(Quintero), a citizen of Colombia, was hired on September 2, 1986
by the Department of Public Education (DPE) of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico as a speech therapist. Ten days later, Quintero
was unceremoniously cashiered. Her superiors justified the
firing by reference to a local statute making United States (or
Puerto Rico) citizenship an indispensable requirement for teacher
qualification in the Commonwealth's public schools.1
In May of 1987, appellant sued. Invoking 42 U.S.C.
1983 (1988), she alleged discrimination on the basis of national
origin in violation of the federal Constitution. Her complaint
named as defendants three ranking DPE officials. Both sides
moved for summary judgment. The district court issued a Pullman
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stay in early 1989, see Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
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1The statute in question provides that all "[c]andidates to
obtain a teacher's certificate" shall "be . . . citizen[s] of the
United States of America or of Puerto Rico." P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
18, 264(1) (1989). It is undisputed that the position for
which Quintero was hired requires certification. Moreover,
Quintero does not contend that the position differs materially
from other teaching positions in the public schools.
2
496 (1941), because an arguably related case was pending before
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court. That case was decided on June 30,
1989. See Paz Lisk v. Aponte Roque, 89 JTS 69 (1989). After
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mulling the matter for a considerable period of time, the
district court entered summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. This appeal followed.
II. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
II. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial
responsibility of suggesting the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
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(1986); Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.
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1990). The opposing party "must then document some factual
disagreement sufficient to deflect brevis disposition." Mesnick
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v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991), cert.
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denied, 112 S. Ct. 2965 (1992). When, as in this case, the
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material facts are undisputed, the question on a motion for
summary judgment becomes one of law. Appellate review of the
district court's ensuing decision is plenary. See id.; Garside,
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895 F.2d at 48.
In appraising summary judgments, we are not limited to
the district court's reasoning. Instead, the court of appeals
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may "affirm the entry of summary judgment on any independently
sufficient ground made manifest by the record." United States v.
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One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992).
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III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Government officials exercising discretionary authority
are entitled to qualified immunity in respect to claims under
section 1983 "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
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U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To be "clearly established," the "contours
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Thus,
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the operative inquiry is not whether the defendants actually
abridged the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The fact that a
violation occurred is not enough to pierce the shield of
qualified immunity "unless it is further demonstrated that [the
defendants'] conduct was unreasonable under the applicable
standard." Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 190 (1984); accord
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Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 751 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
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111 S. Ct. 713 (1991).
In essence, then, the defense of qualified immunity
offers sanctuary not only to government officials who act with
impeccable propriety, but also to those who err but could not
reasonably have understood that their actions infracted a
prospective plaintiff's federally assured rights. See, e.g.,
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Amsden, 904 F.2d at 752; Brennan v. Hendrigan, 888 F.2d 189, 192
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(1st Cir. 1989); see also Collins v. Marina-Martinez, 894 F.2d
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474, 478 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that "a plaintiff who is
entitled to prevail on the merits is not necessarily entitled to
prevail on the issue of qualified immunity"). Definitively, the
touchstone of an inquiry into qualified immunity is whether the
state actor's behavior was objectively reasonable, as a matter of
federal law, at the time and under the circumstances then
obtaining. See Amsden, 904 F.2d at 751.
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A court embarking on an inquiry into qualified immunity
must invariably determine whether some right emanating from
federal constitutional or statutory law was "clearly established"
at the time of the alleged violation. See id. at 752. This
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examination sometimes calls into question whether the plaintiff
has asserted a violation of a right at all. See Siegert v.
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Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991); Morales v. Ramirez, 906
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F.2d 784, 787 (1st Cir. 1990). When a defendant moves for
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, it is the
plaintiff's burden to demonstrate the infringement of a federally
assured right. See Castro-Aponte v. Ligia-Rubero, 953 F.2d 1429,
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1430 (1st Cir. 1992). If she fails to do so, the movant
prevails. Id. at 1431.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM
In the case at hand, appellant claims that, by
terminating her employment solely on the basis of alienage, the
defendants violated a clearly established right which should have
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been apparent to reasonable school officials in September of
1986. She points to the federal Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause as the principal source of the claimed right. Whatever
one may think of the local statute in question, which is no
longer in force, we believe appellant's view of the Equal
Protection Clause has been largely discredited by Supreme Court
case law that we are bound to respect.
A.
A.
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Although it has long been held that resident aliens
fall within the purview of the Equal Protection Clause, see
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Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs
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v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (1976); Graham v.
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Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
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33, 39 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886), the
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rule is not without its recognized exceptions. A State and
Puerto Rico, for purposes of the exception discussed in this
opinion, is to be treated at least as generously as a State
can, "in an appropriately defined class of positions, require
citizenship as a qualification for office" without departing from
the constitutional restraints of the Equal Protection Clause.
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). States are
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permitted to define these classes so as "to preserve the basic
conception of a political community." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
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U.S. 330, 344 (1972). Exempt classes may, therefore, include
"persons holding state elective or important nonelective
executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who
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participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of
broad public policy perform functions that go to the heart of
representative government." Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647. The key
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is whether a plausible nexus exists between citizenship and the
demands of a particular position in the public sector. Phrased
another way, a State may justify its exclusion of aliens "by a
showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought
to be protected and the limiting classification." Foley v.
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Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978). To find if this governmental
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function exception applies in a given instance, a reviewing court
must ask whether the "position in question . . . involves
discretionary decisionmaking, or execution of policy, which
substantially affects members of the political community." Id.;
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accord Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1982).
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B.
B.
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In respect to teachers, the case of Ambach v. Norwick,
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441 U.S. 68 (1979), provides luminous authority. There, the
Court examined a New York law allowing exclusion of aliens from
employment as public school teachers. In determining whether
teaching in public schools constitutes a governmental function
within the sweep of the Sugarman doctrine, the Court first
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acknowledged the importance of public schools in our democracy:
"'Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. . . . It is the very foundation of
good citizenship.'" Id. at 76 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ.,
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347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). The Court then focused on the nature
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of public education and the degree of responsibility thrust upon
teachers in the due performance of their mission. See id. at 78-
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80. Teachers, Justice Powell wrote, "play a critical part in
developing students' attitude toward government and [their]
understanding of the role of citizens in our society." Id. at
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78. He also observed that a teacher possesses wide discretion as
to how course material is communicated to students; that he or
she inevitably serves as a role model; and that, "through both
the presentation of course materials and the example he [or she]
sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the attitudes of
students toward government, the political process, and a
citizen's social responsibilities." Id. at 79.
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On this basis, the court concluded that public school
teachers, as a class, come within the governmental function
exception and, therefore, "the Constitution requires only that a
citizenship requirement applicable to teaching in public schools
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest."
Id. at 80. The Court concluded that the New York statute was
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narrowly tailored to serve its purpose because it excluded only
those aliens who refused to obtain United States citizenship.
Id. at 80-81.
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C.
C.
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In light of Ambach, we think that, in September of
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1986, it did not violate any clearly established federal
constitutional right for an education official to terminate a
teacher's employment in conformity with a statute barring aliens
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from holding teaching positions. While it is at least arguable
that the Puerto Rico statute has a somewhat broader reach than
its New York counterpart, approved in Ambach,2 the Court has not
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hesitated to uphold statutes that barred aliens totally from
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serving in certain government positions. See, e.g., Cabell, 454
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U.S. at 441-42 (deputy probation officers); Foley, 435 U.S. at
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299-300 (state troopers); see also Cervantes v. Guerra, 651 F.2d
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974, 981-82 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a community action
agency's bylaws excluding aliens from service on the board of
directors did not deny equal protection); cf. Campos v. FCC, 650
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F.2d 890, 893-94 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that a statute
prohibiting the Federal Communications Commission from granting
commercial radio operators' licenses to aliens did not violate
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause). Moreover, the Ambach
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Court itself suggested that a State may exclude from its
political functions "all persons who have not become part of the
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process of self-government." Ambach, 441 U.S. at 74 (emphasis
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supplied). We conclude, therefore, that the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.
V. MISCELLANEOUS ARGUMENTS
V. MISCELLANEOUS ARGUMENTS
We pause briefly to address two other contentions
advanced by the appellant. First, Quintero asseverates that her
discharge was actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because it
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2Whereas aliens not yet eligible for citizenship were exempt
from the New York statute considered by the Ambach Court, see 441
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U.S. at 70, Puerto Rico's statute prohibits all aliens from
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obtaining certification. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 18, 264(1).
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transgressed the Puerto Rico Constitution and, thus, transgressed
federal law. We disagree. The notion that the Puerto Rico
Constitution should be considered a federal law for this purpose
flies in the teeth of this court's earlier opinions. See, e.g.,
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United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1985).
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By the same token, the fact that the Puerto Rico Constitution
itself prohibits discrimination on the basis of alienage does not
assist appellant. A federal court may not order state officials
to conform their behavior to state law. Pennhurst State School
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and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984). To the
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extent that appellant seeks relief based on Puerto Rico law, her
remedy, if any, lies in the courts of the Commonwealth.
Appellant's last argument questions whether the
district court erred in abstaining under Pullman. That issue,
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however, is moot. Whether or not error inhered a subject on
which we take no view there is no effective relief that we now
can provide. Courts are without jurisdiction to address academic
questions.3 See In re Stadium Management Corp., 895 F.2d 845,
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848 (1st Cir. 1990) (dismissing appeals as moot because court
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3We note in passing that the district court's decision to
abstain was quite possibly an appealable event, see, e.g., Moses
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H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 8-13
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(1983) (concluding that, on particular facts, a district court's
Pullman stay order was appealable); Idlewild Liquor Corp. v.
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Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962) (per curiam) (order of
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district court staying proceedings, premised on Pullman
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abstention, held to be immediately appealable); Bridge Constr.
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Corp. v. City of Berlin, 705 F.2d 582, 583 (1st Cir. 1983)
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(discussing the appealability issue in the context of Pullman
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abstention), yet appellant eschewed any attempt to effectuate an
immediate appeal. Her effort to raise the issue at this late
date is, therefore, especially unbefitting.
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could provide no meaningful relief).
VI. CONCLUSION
VI. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. Although the plaintiff's plight
may evoke a certain amount of sympathy, the undisputed fact is
that
her dismissal implicated no breach of a clearly established
federal constitutional or statutory right.
The judgment below is summarily affirmed. See 1st Cir.
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R. 27.1. Costs to appellees.
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