Zuleta Alvarez v. United States

USCA1 Opinion









November 3, 1992 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]


UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


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No. 92-1334




JOHN J. ZULETA ALVAREZ,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant, Appellee.


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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE



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Before

Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
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John J. Zuleta Alvarez on brief pro se.
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Richard S. Cohen, United States Attorney, and F. Mark
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Terison, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
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Per Curiam. Appellant John J. Zuleta-Alvarez
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appeals pro se from a district court order summarily denying
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his motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 to vacate his

sentence. We affirm on the ground that the issue raised on

this appeal was not raised below.

Background
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On August 16, 1989, following a jury trial, appellant

was convicted of conspiracy with intent to distribute in

excess of 500 grams of cocaine and possession with intent to

distribute cocaine. He was tried with three co-defendants.1

The district court applied the sentencing guidelines and

sentenced appellant to 121 months in prison, at the low end

of the applicable guideline imprisonment range. The base

offense level was 32, based upon a finding, contained in the

pre-sentence report (PSI) and adopted by the court, that "the

total scope of the conspiracy involved 6.762 kilograms of

cocaine." See U.S.S.G 2D1.1(a)(3) (base offense level of
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32 where the total amount of cocaine involved in the offense

is greater than 5 and less than 15 kilograms.)

At the sentencing hearing, the central issue was the

amount of cocaine used to calculate the base offense level.

Appellant argued that the amount of cocaine actually seized

by the government (769 grams) was the proper amount of

cocaine to use in calculating the base offense level. He



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1. The remaining six co-defendants named in the indictment
pled guilty or were fugitives at the time of trial.















objected to the PSI's inclusion of an additional amount,

5.960 kilograms, based upon "historical evidence" of amounts

distributed by co-conspirators. His objections were that the

evidence was unreliable and that including these amounts

resulted in double and triple counting.

Over objection, the sentencing judge permitted the

government to introduce transcripts of trial and grand jury

testimony by witnesses who were not available for cross-

examination at the sentencing hearing. Appellant and his co-

defendants appealed that ruling. This court affirmed. See
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United States v. Zuleta-Alvarez, 922 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1990),
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cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 2039 (1991). We held that
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the sentencing court did not err in denying defendants'

request for live witnesses and that there were "sufficient

indicia of reliability" to support the government's

calculation of the drug quantity.

On December 16, 1991, appellant filed a motion under 28

U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his sentence. Appellant challenged

the constitutionality of 21 U.S.C. 841, the statute under

which he was convicted. He argued that the minimum mandatory

penalties of that statute violated the Eighth Amendment's

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in that they

resulted in sentences disproportionate to the crime

committed. He also contended that the statute deprived him

of due process and equal protection of the law because it



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failed to take into account the purity of the drug involved,

the role of the defendant and the defendant's knowledge of

the amount of the drug involved. In an order dated March 2,

1992, the district court summarily denied appellant's motion.

Discussion
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On appeal, giving up his attack on the constitutionality

of the statute under which he was convicted, appellant argues

for the first time that the district court erroneously

applied the sentencing guidelines. Specifically, appellant

argues that the sentencing court erred in basing his sentence

upon the amount of cocaine involved in the entire conspiracy.



Relying upon Seventh Circuit case law interpreting

U.S.S.G., 1B1.3 and the commentary thereto, appellant

contends that the district court held him accountable for

conduct that was not "reasonably foreseeable" by him. He

argues that, while the conspiracy existed from July, 1988

until April, 1989, the evidence indicates that he did not

become involved until "late 1988 or early 1989." Therefore,

appellant asserts, the district court erred in calculating an

offense level based upon the amount of drugs involved in the

entire conspiracy.

Where an issue is raised for the first time on appeal,

our review is narrowly circumscribed:

We are . . . confined to determining whether or not
this is a case "'where a gross miscarriage of


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justice would occur' . . . . [and where] the new
ground [is] 'so compelling as virtually to insure
appellant's sucess.'"

Hernandez-Hernandez v. United States, 904 F.2d 758, 763 (1st
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Cir. 1990) (quoting Johnston v. Holiday Inns, 595 F.2d 890
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(1st Cir. 1979) (citations omitted)). In a recent decision

by this court, we held that "[a] sentence on a conspiracy

charge [cannot] be calculated by aggregating [drug

distributions made prior to defendant's entrance into the

conspiracy] because he was not a member of the conspiracy

when they took place." United States v. O'Campo, Nos. 91-1089
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and 91-1278, slip op. at 26 (1st Cir. Sept. 3, 1992). The

record in this case is unclear about the exact date when

defendant entered the conspiracy and whether subtracting drug

distributions which occurred before that date would reduce

his base offense level. Therefore, we are not able to

conclude that a gross miscarriage of justice occured or that

this newly raised issue is "so compelling as to virtually

insure appellant's success." Hernandez-Hernandez v. United
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States, 904 F.2d at 763 (citations omitted). Appellant is
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free to raise this issue in a new 2255 motion. We do not

now determine whether or not he would be entitled to relief.

Conclusion
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The dismissal of appellant's motion to vacate his

sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 is

Affirmed.
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