USCA1 Opinion
March 16, 1993
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 92-2056
ERIC APONTE and ELBA GARCIA,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
PUERTO RICO MARINE MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Torruella and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
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Guillermo Ramos Luina with whom Harry Anduze Montano was on brief
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for appellants.
Rafael Cuevas Kuinlam with whom Cuevas Kuinlam & Bermudez was on
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brief for appellee.
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Per Curiam. Eric Aponte and Elba Garcia, the
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plaintiffs in this diversity case, filed a complaint in which
they claimed that Puerto Rico Marine Management (1) violated its
contract with Aponte by improperly dismissing him from his
position of General Manager, and (2) in the process,
"intentionally and maliciously misinformed the press" about
events related to the dismissal. The defendant pointed out that
Puerto Rico's "Law 80", see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, 185a et
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seq., limits damages for wrongful dismissal to an amount well
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below the federal diversity jurisdiction minimum of $50,000, see
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28 U.S.C. 1332. It moved for summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P.
56, and, alternatively, to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The plaintiffs concede
that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in
respect to their claim for wrongful dismissal, but they appeal
its decision dismissing their separate libel claim.
We agree with the plaintiffs that the district court
should not have dismissed the libel claim. Our reason is that
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, read in conjunction
with the memorandum or law which supports it, does not appear to
seek summary judgment on that claim. Rather, the defendant, in
that motion, says that it seeks dismissal for the reasons that
(1) the "additional damages requested by the plaintiff[s] . . .
are not recoverable as a matter of law;" (2) Puerto Rico's "Law
80" limits wrongful discharge damages to about $12,000; and (3)
even assuming attorney's fees were awarded, the amount
recoverable under the complaint would not satisfy the $50,000
jurisdictional requirement. It assumes that the libel count,
rather than setting forth a separate cause of action, simply
seeks extra damages for a wrongful dismissal.
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It may well be that defendant intended to move to
dismiss all of the causes of action in the complaint, contending
that both the discharge-related libel claims and the wrongful
discharge claims were preempted by the exclusive remedy set forth
in "Law 80." However, if this was the intention, it was not
clearly expressed by the defendant's motion, especially when that
motion is read in conjunction with the accompanying memorandum of
law, which largely limits itself to discussion of "wrongful
discharge" law. As a consequence, we believe the plaintiffs
could reasonably have considered the defendant's motion for
dismissal or summary judgment to have referred only to the
"wrongful dismissal" claim, not to the "libel and slander" claim.
That being so, the plaintiffs need not have responded by
"set[ting] forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue
for trial" with regard to the libel claim. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e). Rather, they could simply have pointed out to the court
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that the summary judgment motion and memorandum had ignored their
separate libel claim. And, that is what the plaintiffs did.
The plaintiffs may themselves be partly to blame for
the failure of the defendant's motion to refer to their libel
claim as a separate cause of action, distinct from their wrongful
discharge claim. Their complaint says at the outset, in a
separate section entitled "nature of the action," that the
nature of the action is for the recovery
of contractual damages caused to
plaintiffs as a result of defendant's
wrongful and discriminatory termination
of employment.
Someone reading these words alone might have concluded that the
plaintiffs meant their later allegations of libel to refer to
damages caused by the wrongful dismissal, not to a separate cause
of action. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs, in a separate section VI
of their complaint, do set forth the elements of a libel claim.
They state, for example, that the defendant "maliciously provided
journalists with . . . erroneous information [about Eric Aponte's
responsibility for financial irregularities] with . . . full
knowledge of its falsity" or "with negligent disregard for
truth." They specify the way in which these alleged actions
harmed the plaintiffs. And, most importantly, they entitle the
paragraphs of section VI the "Second Cause of Action." Later
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developments in the case should have further alerted the
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defendant that the complaint purported to set out a separate
cause of action for libel. In their response to the motion for
summary judgment, plaintiffs refer to "their cause of action for
libel and slander which is based . . . on acts of defendant
separate and distinct" from "the actual termination of
employment." And, the court's "initial scheduling conference
order" refers to the libel and slander action as a "cause of
action" separate from the cause of action for "unjust
termination." Under these circumstances, we believe it necessary
to treat the complaint as setting forth a separate cause of
action for libel and slander. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f); Conley
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v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (complaint should be
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interpreted liberally to accord with concepts of notice
pleading).
Without knowing the specific facts upon which the
allegations of libel and slander rest, we cannot know whether
Puerto Rico's laws governing claims for libel and for "unjust
dismissal" permit or forbid recovery. On remand, the defendant,
of course, remains free to move for summary judgment in respect
to the libel and slander claim; in response, the plaintiffs will
likely have to particularize their factual showing.
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The judgment of the district court dismissing the
plaintiffs' claim for libel and slander is vacated and this case
is remanded with instructions to reinstate that claim.
So ordered.
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