USCA1 Opinion
February 26, 1993
[Not for Publication]
[Not for Publication]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 92-1828
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
DWIGHT ERIC CHADBOURNE,
Defendant, Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Torruella, Cyr and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
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Jerome B. Goldsmith for appellant.
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Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, with
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whom Richard S. Cohen, United States Attorney, and James L. McCarthy,
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Assistant United States Attorney were on brief for appellee.
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Per Curiam. Defendant asserts that the district court
Per Curiam.
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committed reversible error in its bench-trial ruling precluding
the following inquiry of defendant's expert:
Doctor, could that severe manic episode
you testified Eric suffered from at the time
of the offense have caused him to have been
unable to appreciate the nature and quality
or the wrongfulness of his acts?
For several reasons, we believe the issue defendant attempts to
raise on appeal need not be reached.1
First, though it sustained the government's Rule 704(b)
objection, the district court did not preclude the quoted inqui-
ry. Rather, the court went on to state: "You can ask the
question for whatever weight the Court wishes to give it. . . ."2
Second, and more to the point, the district court
expressly found that there was insufficient evidence that defen-
dant suffered from "a severe mental disease or defect" when he
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1The sole basis for the appeal is that the district court
misapplied Federal Evidence Rule 704(b), which provides:
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to
the mental state or condition of a defendant in a
criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental
state or condition constituting an element of the crime
charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues
are matters for the trier of fact alone.
Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).
2The Court further explained: "The point being that it's
the trier of fact that makes that ultimate factual decision and
not the expert under 704."
robbed the bank. Absent an appellate challenge to the district
court's predicate finding, and there is none, there can have been
no error in the exclusion of defense counsel's hypothetical
question.
Third, all else aside, the ruling is firmly rooted in
Rule 702, which empowers the court to allow expert testimony if
it could "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue. . . ." Fed. R. Evid. 702. As the
trier of fact, the district court judge simply determined that
the proffered expert testimony would not aid its determination of
the ultimate issue. There could be no abuse of discretion in its
Rule 702 exclusion, particularly in view of its invitation to
proceed with the testimony for whatever weight the court might
decide to give it.
Affirmed.
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