USCA1 Opinion
May 19, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 92-2341
IN RE: ANDREW A. BUCCI,
Petitioner, Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Torruella and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
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Andrew A. Bucci on brief pro se.
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Per Curiam. The appellant, Andrew A. Bucci, is an
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attorney in Rhode Island. In 1976, Bucci was convicted of
making false declarations in a federal court, in violation of
18 U.S.C. 1623(a), and of conspiracy to present false
testimony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. Following the
conviction, the Rhode Island Supreme Court suspended Bucci
from practice in that state's courts for two years, after
which he would become eligible to apply for reinstatement.
Before Bucci became eligible for reinstatement, however,
he was convicted of practicing law without a license (that
is, while under suspension), in violation of R.I.Gen.Laws
11-27-10, and sentenced to a six-month prison term.
Following that conviction, in 1982, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court disbarred Bucci. Bucci was reinstated to the Rhode
Island bar in 1987.
During the period 1977-1982, the Local Rules of the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island
authorized that court to take disciplinary action against
attorneys who were convicted of crimes of moral turpitude,
but the Rules required a hearing and a vote of the judges
before sanctions could be imposed. The district court took
no such affirmative disciplinary action against Bucci
following either of his convictions. However, in 1984, the
district court adopted Local Rule 4(e)(4), which provides:
An attorney who is suspended or disbarred from
practice by the highest Court of the State in which
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he/she practices . . . shall be suspended from
practicing before this Court. . . .
Both the district court and Bucci appear to accept the
proposition that Rule 4(e)(4), upon its adoption, operated to
automatically suspend Bucci from practice before the district
court by virtue of his previous disbarment by the state
court.
In 1988, Bucci applied for readmission to the bar of the
district court. He renewed the application in 1990. The
district court held a hearing, at which Bucci appeared before
all three active judges. The judges then decided that
Bucci's "petition for readmission to the bar of this Court
should be denied because of the nature and seriousness of the
offenses which [he] committed." The judges expressed "the
opinion that any lawyer who has been convicted of a crime of
dishonesty should be permanently barred from practice in this
Court." The district court denied Bucci's request for
reconsideration and entered a judgment, and this appeal
followed. We affirm.
Bucci argues that the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
decision to reinstate him in 1987 required the district court
to follow suit. We disagree. Local Rule 4(e)(4) does not,
by its terms, create a door that must swing both ways. The
rule allowed the district court to follow the Rhode Island
Court's lead by disbarring Bucci automatically following his
disbarment in the state court, but it did not require the
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district court to accept as dispositive the Rhode Island
Court's assessment of Bucci's rehabilitation and current
fitness to practice law. Rather, the district court was
entitled to make its own judgment in that regard -- a
judgment that we can review only for abuse of discretion.
See In re Grievance Committee of United States District
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Court, 847 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Evans, 801 F.2d
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703, 706 (4th Cir. 1986); Standing Committee on Discipline v.
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Ross, 735 F.2d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 1984).
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Given the "nature and seriousness" of Bucci's criminal
offenses, we see no abuse of discretion here. The district
court had good reason to doubt Bucci's character. Bucci's
federal crimes -- making false declarations in a federal
court, and conspiring to do so -- were felonies. See 18
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U.S.C. 371 (penalty for conspiracy is not more than five
years imprisonment); 18 U.S.C. 1623(a) (penalty for making
false declarations is not more than five years imprisonment);
18 U.S.C. 1(1) (any offense punishable by more than one
year in prison is a felony). Permanent disbarment may be
premised upon a felony conviction. Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S.
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265, 273 (1883); In re Jones, 506 F.2d 527, 528 (8th Cir.
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1974); In re Braverman, 148 F.Supp. 56, 57 (D.Md. 1957).
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Bucci's state crime -- practicing law without a license
-- was a misdemeanor. See R.I.Gen.Laws 11-27-14 (maximum
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prison term of six months); 11-1-2 (defining misdemeanor
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and felony). However, the crime was directly related to, and
highly probative of, his fitness to practice law honestly and
ethically. See Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. at 273. And,
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disbarment is an appropriate sanction for a lawyer who
commits a misdemeanor "which imports fraud or dishonesty."
The district court obviated any potential due process
concerns by affording Bucci a hearing before deciding not to
readmit him to its bar.
Affirmed.
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