United States v. Rios

USCA1 Opinion









UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 92-2103
No. 92-2136

JUAN ARRIETA-AGRESSOT, REGULO RIOS,
JOSE ANTONIO BARROSO, ADALBERTO AGUILAR-EPIEYU,
ADALBERTO MONCARIS-BERMODEZ,
and DIEGO CALDAS-GONZALEZ,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant, Appellee.

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No. 92-2207

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

ADALBERTO AGUILAR-EPIEYU,

Defendant, Appellant.

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No. 92-2208

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

ALBERTO MONCARIS-BERMODEZ,

Defendant, Appellant.

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No. 92-2209

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JOSE ANTONIO-BARROSO,

Defendant, Appellant.

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No. 92-2210

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

REGULO RIOS,

Defendant, Appellant.

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No. 92-2211

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JUAN ARRIETA-AGRESSOT,

Defendant, Appellant.

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No. 93-1946

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

DIEGO CALDAS-GONZALEZ,

Defendant, Appellant.
















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APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Carmen C. Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

____________________

Before

Selya, Cyr and Boudin,

Circuit Judges.
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Rafael F. Castro-Lang, by Appointment of the Court, for
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appellants Adalberto Aguilar-Epieyu and Juan Arrieta-Agressot.
Frank D. Inserni, by Appointment of the Court, for appellants
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Jose Antonio Barroso, Regulo Rios and Diego Caldas-Gonzalez.
Joseph C. Laws, Jr., by Appointment of the Court, for appellant
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Adalberto Moncaris-Bermodez.
Ramon Garcia, by Appointment of the Court, on brief for appellant
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Regulo Rios.
Jeffrey M. Williams, by Appointment of the Court, Javier A.
____________________ __________
Morales Ramos and Indiano, Williams & Weinstein-Bacal on brief for
______________ ____________________________________
appellant Juan Arrieta-Agressot.
Yolanda A. Collazo Rodriguez, by Appointment of the Court, on
______________________________
brief for appellant Diego Caldas-Gonzalez.
Carlos A. Perez-Irizarry, Assistant United States Attorney, with
_________________________ _________________________________
whom Charles E. Fitzwilliam, United States Attorney, and Jose A.
_______________________ ________
Quiles Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, were on brief for the
________________
United States.



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September 8, 1993
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BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. The six appellants in this case
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were convicted in the district court in Puerto Rico of

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute while on

board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United

States. 46 U.S.C. App. 1903(a). The prosecutor made

inflammatory remarks to the jury, and we cannot say that the

evidence made conviction inevitable. We therefore vacate the

convictions and remand for further proceedings.1

Appellants were crew members aboard a fishing vessel

named the Jurango Kiss, which was intercepted by the U.S.
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Navy and accompanying U.S. Coast Guard personnel about 100

miles off the coast of Colombia and found to be carrying

approximately 11,885 pounds of marijuana. The government had

no direct evidence that the crew members knowingly possessed

the marijuana with intent to distribute, and the success of

its case lay in persuading the jury beyond a reasonable doubt

that the crew members must have had the necessary knowledge

and intent. This task was complicated by the testimony of

Pedro Silvio Croes-Vincente, the captain of the vessel, who

was tried and convicted along with the crew members but has

not appealed. Croes-Vincente testified that the crew members

came aboard the Jurango Kiss just before the voyage and did
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not know of the illicit cargo.




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1. The appeals from the convictions are Nos. 92-2207, 92-
2208, 92-2209, 92-2210, 92-2211, and 93-1946. The remaining
appeals, relating to the petitions under 28 U.S.C. 2255
(Nos. 92-2103 and 92-2136), are dismissed as moot.

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Throughout his closing argument the prosecutor urged the

jury to view this case as a battle in the war against drugs,

and the defendants as enemy soldiers. During his initial

closing remarks the prosecutor told the jury:

When the captain . . . and the rest of the
defendants departed Colombia they knew what was
inside the boat. They knew that the boat was full
with bales of marijuana, and they had no concern
for the youth. They had no concern for the people
that would have used the marijuana. They had no
concern for the people that would have been
addicted by the use of marijuana.

In his rebuttal argument the prosecutor returned to this

theme: Nobody has the right to poison the people
and poison our children. I can tell you
that I don't have an issue with that; but
I know the pain, the suffering that is
brought into many families by the use of
drugs, by the use of marijuana, by the
addiction to marijuana.

And you know that. You know that that is a real
problem. And we are here today because we want to
say no to drugs. We want to say no to what is
corrupting and disrupting the society, because
marijuana not only disrupts and corrupts our
society but it also corrupts and disrupts any
society in the world.

Later in his rebuttal, the government's lawyer continued:

But thank God at that time we had the Coast Guard
on board the [U.S.S.] SIMMS . . . . Because not
only they are [sic] protecting us; they are
protecting the people, they are protecting the
youth, they are protecting other societies.

That is why, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, they
were in the drug interdiction. To save you all
from the evil of drugs. Because the defendants are
not soldiers in the army of good. They are
soldiers in the army of evil, in the army which
only purpose [sic] is to poison, to disrupt, to
corrupt.


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We think it is crystal clear that inflammatory language

of this ilk falls well outside the bounds of permissible

argument. In United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 955 (1st
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Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 1094 (1990), a
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prosecuting attorney in Puerto Rico told the jury during his

closing statement that "[cocaine] is poisoning our community

and our kids die because of this." In United States v. Doe,
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860 F.2d 488, 494 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
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1049 (1989), a prosecutor from that same district argued to

the jury that marijuana is "poison that is destroying our

children in our schools [and] is bringing an end [to] our

youth . . . ." In both cases we sharply rebuked the

prosecutor for making these comments, because they "serve no

purpose other than 'to inflame the passions and prejudices of

the jury, and to interject issues broader than the guilt or

innocence of the accused.'" Machor, 879 F.2d at 956 (quoting
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Doe, 860 F.2d at 494).2
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Once again, we affirm our view that such arguments are

plainly improper. It is hard enough for a jury to remain

dispassionate and objective amidst the tensions and turmoil

of a criminal trial, and this is not the occasion for


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2. We went on to hold in Machor and Doe that the comments,
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though "totally unjustified," Doe, 860 F.2d at 495, did not
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warrant reversal because the evidence against the defendants
was "very strong," Machor, 895 F.2d at 956, and
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"overwhelming," Doe, 860 F.2d at 495, and because in Machor
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the remarks were made in rebuttal to similar comments by
defense counsel.

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superheated rhetoric from the government urging jurors to

enlist in the war on drugs. The Seventh Circuit appears to

have approved references to "society's drug problem" in a

prosecutor's argument, although milder in tone and briefer

than the remarks here. See United States v. Ferguson, 935
___ _____________ ________

F.2d 1518, 1530-31 (7th Cir. 1991). Still, it is remarkable,

in light of Machor, Doe and a slew of other recent cases in
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this circuit,3 that the government defends as proper its

closing argument in this case. However, defense counsel in

this case failed to object to any of the prosecutor's

remarks. Courts of appeals are reluctant to entertain claims

of error absent timely objections at trial. Most trial

judges are leary of sua sponte interventions, so the failure
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to object usually precludes a curative instruction, a warning

about further remarks, or some form of amelioration. And,

allowing such claims to be raised for the first time on

appeal may encourage strategic decisions by trial counsel to

remain mute in the face of error, reserving an issue for

appeal in the event of conviction.





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3. E.g., United States v. Moreno, 991 F.2d 943, 947 (1st
____ _____________ ______
Cir. 1993) (reference in closing argument to "protecting the
community that has been plagued by violence, senseless
violence, shootings and killings" was "patently improper");
United States v. Rodriguez-Cardona, 924 F.2d 1148, 1153-54
______________ _________________
(1st Cir.) (improper reference to "deadly trade of narcotics
trafficking" and to appellant's "evilness"), cert. denied,
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112 S. Ct. 54 (1991).

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For these reasons, we will reverse a conviction where no

objection was made at trial only in the rare case in which

the mistake rises to the level of "plain error." See Fed. R.
___

Crim. P. 52(b); Machor, 879 F.2d at 955. Most errors are
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plain after the event, and the phrase is something of a

misnomer: "[t]he plain-error exception to the

contemporaneous-objection rule is to be 'used sparingly,

solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of

justice would otherwise result.'" United States v. Young,
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470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456
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U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982)). Reversal is appropriate only if

the illegitimate argument "so poisoned the well that the

trial's outcome was likely affected." United States v.
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Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 274 (1st Cir. 1987).
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In making this post hoc judgment, a crucial factor is
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the weight of the evidence of the defendants' guilt or

innocence. See United States v. Santana-Camacho, 833 F.2d
___ ______________ _______________

371, 373-74 (1st Cir. 1987). We do not in such a case take

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government or

assume that credibility issues were resolved in its favor.

The jury may well have decided the issues in favor of the

government, but that jury decision may itself be tainted by

the improper remarks. Thus we will look at the evidence as a

whole and, despite the lack of objection, we will reverse if





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the error is manifest and if there is a substantial chance

that absent the error the jury would have acquitted.

In this case, a reasonable jury could on the evidence

offered have found the crew guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,

but there was also evidence that made acquittal a realistic

possibility. At trial, the government proved that on

December 7, 1987, the U.S.S. Simms was conducting drug
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interdiction patrols in the Caribbean Sea when it detected

the Jurango Kiss about 12 miles away, approximately 100 miles
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north of Colombia. A helicopter reported that the vessel was

fashioned to look like a fishing ship but had no outriggers,

nets or fishing poles; that it did not display a registration

number; and that it was headed northbound toward the passage

between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.

As the helicopter pilot approached the Jurango Kiss for
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the second time, he saw numerous burlap- or plastic-wrapped

bales floating in the water and, when he got closer to the

ship, saw a man on the deck throwing bales overboard. The

pilot also observed that the ship had completely changed

course and was now heading south. After a short time the

Simms came alongside the Jurango Kiss and, after
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unsuccessfully attempting radio contact, a small crew from









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the Simms boarded the suspect vessel and ordered the captain
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and his seven crewmen to congregate on the upper deck.4

The captain of the Jurango Kiss claimed not to know the
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vessel's country of registry and was unable to produce any

documentation. A protective sweep of the vessel revealed 146

bales containing a green leafy substance, most of which were

stacked in plain view below deck in the ship's compartment

and a few of which were on the deck. Another 17 identical

bales were found floating in the sea and brought aboard the

Simms. A field test of samples of the bales' contents was
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positive for marijuana. Members of the boarding party

described the Jurango Kiss as dilapidated and practically
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unseaworthy, carrying little by way of food or clothing,

having sleeping quarters for only two persons and smelling of

marijuana.

After the government rested, the defendants called

Croes-Vincente, the captain of the Jurango Kiss. The
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captain, virtually conceding his own knowledge of the drug

smuggling operation, told the jury that his crew was not

involved. He testified that six of his crewmen were brought

to the vessel shortly before it departed by "the people who

were running the show." The seventh was recruited from a

fishing vessel that happened to be in the vicinity of the



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4. One of the crew members pleaded guilty, leaving only the
captain and the six appellants to stand trial.

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Jurango Kiss on the morning of its departure. The crew did
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not participate in loading the cargo, and did not see the

cargo or even go below deck until after the vessel departed.

Croes-Vincente testified that the crewmen were never told the

nature of the voyage, and explained that they were

intentionally kept in the dark "so they cannot talk if they

get busted."

Despite this testimony, the government's evidence would

have been sufficient to support a verdict of guilty against

the crew members in a trial free from error. A jury might

reasonably choose to disbelieve the white-wash testimony of

Croes-Vincente, and infer from the circumstances that the

crew members must have known of and participated in the

smuggling. But what a reasonable jury might have done in a

trial free from error is not the issue. The question, at

least on direct appeal, is whether the prosecutor's repeated

appeals to impermissible considerations might well have

altered the verdict, thereby affecting appellants'

substantial rights. In this case, given the potency of the

misstatements and the presence of direct exculpatory

testimony, we think that the answer is yes.

In arguing to the contrary, the government says that

given the conspicuous stacks of bales and the smell of

marijuana, anyone aboard must have known that drug smuggling

was the task at hand. But this evidence was tempered by the



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captain's testimony that the crewmen were hired and brought

aboard "the moment that the boat was ready to leave" and had

no opportunity to view the cargo or inspect the ship prior to

setting sail. The government also stresses the jettisoning

of the cargo, but the captain testified that he ordered the

men to throw the bales overboard and they were merely

following his command. In weighing the captain's testimony,

the jury might also have considered that the testimony was

against the captain's own interest.5

On occasion, we have declined to find plain error where

the prosecutor's remarks were provoked by inflammatory

arguments by defendants' own counsel. E.g., Machor, 879 F.2d
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at 956. By and large, defense counsels' arguments in this

case were brief and confined to legitimate issues in the

case. Defendants' counsel did intimate during trial that the

Navy and Coast Guard intimidated the defendants with a show

of weaponry and military force. While that theme may have

justified the prosecutor's defense of the government

officers, it did not warrant his repeated references to the

war on drugs, corruption of society and "protecting the

youth." See Santana-Camacho, 833 F.2d at 375 (finding plain
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5. By testifying as he did the captain certainly forfeited
the benefit of any doubt the jury might have had regarding
his own participation. The captain's sole defense at trial
was that the Jurango Kiss was not a "vessel subject to the
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jurisdiction of the United States," which is an element of
the crime charged. 46 U.S.C. App. 1903(a).

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error where prosecutor's remark "was not made in response to

any improper statement made by the defense counsel").

The district court here read the standard instruction

informing the jury that arguments of counsel are not

evidence, and we have sometimes found that instruction enough

to counteract any lingering prejudice from an improper

summation. See, e.g., Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d at 274. Here,
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however, the danger was not so much that the jury would

consider the prosecutor's statements to be "evidence."

Rather, the threat was that the prosecutor's remarks would

excite the jury, invite a partisan response, and distract its

attention from the only issue properly presented by this
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case: whether the evidence established the crew members'

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Although the extent of the prejudice is the paramount

issue, we think it necessary to say that the nature of the

misconduct also plays a part in our judgment. Almost any

argument made in summation can be described as deliberate;

but the several paragraphs of 150-proof rhetoric in this case

overstep the bounds by a wide margin. Here, the prosecutor

was inexperienced at the time of trial, as he candidly told

us at oral argument, and we do not dwell further on personal

fault. In fact, the unhappy outcome in this case--including

the expense of retrial, the waste of the trial court's time,

and the burden on the appellants--is less a reproach to the



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individual assistant U.S. attorney than to those who

superintend young prosecutors in the district in question.

In sum, on review of the entire record, we are convinced

that "the prosecutor's misstatement[s] [were] no mere

incidental embellishment to an otherwise powerful case."

Santana-Camacho, 833 F.2d at 374. Here, the case was
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adequate but not overwhelming, and the jury may have been

swayed by the prosecutor's impermissible rhetoric. There is

ample basis for the prosecutor's view that the drug problem

facing this country is "corrupting and disrupting the

society." But federal prosecuting attorneys ought to be

mindful of the harm done when those in power ignore the rules

governing their own conduct while demanding strict compliance

from others.

The convictions are vacated and the cases remanded for
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further proceedings.





















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