United States v. Zuleta

USCA1 Opinion




September 22, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________


No. 92-2430

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

NERIO ZULETA,

Defendant, Appellant.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND


[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

____________________

Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
___________
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
______________

____________________

Nerio Zuleta on brief pro se.
____________
Edwin J. Gale, United States Attorney, and Zechariah Chafee,
_______________ _________________
Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.


____________________


____________________



























Per Curiam. Appellant Nerio Zuleta pleaded guilty
__________

to two counts of an indictment charging him with possession

with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or

more of cocaine all in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) &

(b)(1)(B), 846 and 18 U.S.C. 2. Appellant was sentenced to

an 87-month term of imprisonment, a supervised release term

of five years, a fine of $50,000 and was required to pay

$5,799.60 -- the cost of his supervised release. On direct

appeal, he challenged only a two-level enhancement to his

base offense level for his role as a "supervisor" in the

conspiracy. We affirmed his conviction in an unpublished

opinion.

Appellant then filed a motion, under 28 U.S.C.

2255, to remit or reduce his fine, alleging that he was

indigent and that prison officials would remove appellant

from rehabilitative activities if he did not pay the fine.

The district court denied the motion. On appeal, appellant

first alleges that the district court failed to consider the

factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3572(a) prior to making its

determination that appellant had the financial ability to pay

a fine. In addition, appellant argues that the court did not

explicitly discuss or provide support for its imposition of

the fine. Next, appellant argues that the provision

requiring the court to impose a fine to pay the government



















the cost of his supervised release is not authorized by the

Sentencing Reform Act or the terms of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).

Rather, he argues, the Commission was granted the power only

to study the question.
_____

Because appellant failed to raise the claim

concerning his fine on direct appeal, he faces a

significantly higher hurdle to obtaining relief. That is,

such nonconstitutional claims may not be presented for the

first time in a 2255 motion unless the alleged errors

amount to "`a fundamental defect which inherently results in

a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Davis v. United States,
_____ _____________

417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368
____ _____________

U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).

1. The $50,000 fine.
________________

Section 3572(a) lists the factors a court must

consider in determining whether to impose a fine and the

amount of the fine:

(1) the defendant's income, earning
capacity, and financial resources;

(2) the burden that the fine will
impose upon the defendant [or] any person
who is financially dependent on the
defendant . . . relative to the burden
that alternative punishments wold impose;

(3) any pecuniary loss inflicted upon
others as a result of the offense;

(4) whether restitution is ordered or
made and the amount of such restitution;




-3-















(5) the need to deprive the defendant
of illegally obtained gains from the
offenses. . . .
18 U.S.C. 3572(a).

Similarly, 5E1.2 of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines provides that "[t]he court shall impose a fine in

all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he is

unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any

fine." U.S.S.G. 5E1.2(a). The other factors listed in the

Guidelines relevant to the setting of a fine include the need

for the fine "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, . .

. to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment

and to afford adequate deterrence. . . ." Id. 5E1.2(d)(1).
___



We will not presume that the trial court failed to

consider the pertinent factors contained in 3752. See
___

United States v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., 953 F.2d 717, 719
_____________ _______________________

(1st Cir. 1992) (construing predecessor statute -- 18 U.S.C.

3622(a)). Nor is the district court required to make

"specific oral or written findings" relating to the

enumerated factors. See id. at 720; United States v.
___ ___ ______________

Hagmann, 950 F.2d 175, 185 (5th Cir. 1991) (considering
_______

3572(a)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 108 (1992). Finally, the
____________

burden is on appellant to establish his inability to pay a

fine. See United States v. Matovsky, 935 F.2d 719, 722 (5th
___ _____________ ________

Cir. 1991); United States v. Perez, 871 F.2d 45, 48 (6th
______________ _____

Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 910 (1989).
____________


-4-















Turning to the merits of appellant's claims, we

first note that the district court had before it financial

information included in the Presentence Report (PSI). This

information indicated that, as of November 30, 1990 (prior to

his arrest), appellant had an income of $1,000 per month and

expenses of $694 per month.1 Appellant points to another

part of the PSI which states that he has no "significant

assets." The court plainly considered this factor in its

decision to impose a fine. At the sentencing hearing, the

court stated:

I recognize that the pre-sentence report
indicates that you do not have
significant assets but, frankly, it's
difficult for me to understand or accept
that someone who has been dealing in the
amounts of cocaine that you have been
involved with doesn't have those assets.
That's a matter for you to take up, I
suppose, with the Bureau of Prisons when
the time comes.

Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, at 30.

We find that there was no defect in the sentencing

process which resulted in a "complete miscarriage of

justice." Indeed, the court acted well within its discretion

in imposing the $50,000 fine, especially given appellant's

role as a supervisor in the conspiracy and the need to make

sure he does not retain any illegally obtained gains. The



____________________

1. In the financial statement submitted by appellant with
his 2255 motion, he stated that prior to his arrest, he had
worked in a factory for $800 per month.

-5-















fact that the court imposed a fine that is only a fraction of

the maximum of $4,000,000 is further evidence that the court

considered appellant's ability to pay in setting the fine.

Finally, we do not agree with appellant that his

current financial state should have precluded the imposition

of any fine. The reference in 3572(a)(1) to "earning

capacity" makes plain that appellant's future ability to pay

is part of the equation. See Hagmann, 950 F.2d at 185-86 (a
___ _______

defendant's indigency at the time the fine is ordered does

not preclude imposition of a fine); Perez, 871 F.2d at 48
_____

(current assets do not determine whether defendant should be

excused from paying a fine mandated by the Sentencing

Guidelines). As we noted, supra, appellant was employed
_____

prior to his arrest and had a steady income which exceeded

his expenses. Should this prediction prove wrong and should

the government seek to punish or imprison appellant for non-

payment, there are administrative remedies to which he can

turn. See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 897 F.2d 596, 598
___ ____ _____________ ____

(1st Cir. 1990); Santiago v. United States, 889 F.2d 371,
________ _____________

373-74 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

2. Cost of supervised release.
__________________________

Section 5E1.2(i) provides that "the court shall

impose an additional fine amount that is at least sufficient

to pay the costs to the government of any imprisonment,

probation, or supervised release ordered." We reject



-6-















appellant's claim that justice has obviously miscarried here

because the Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize this

fine. Respectable authority holds to the contrary. See
___

United States v. Turner, No. 93-1148, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
_____________ ______

17472 (7th Cir. July 14, 1993) (fine for cost of imprisonment

authorized by Sentencing Reform Act); Hagmann, 950 F.2d at
_______

186 (fine derived from fine table under 5E1.2(b) and the

additional fine required under 5E1.2(i) both realize the

goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)). Although

appellant cites to a case in which the Court of Appeals for

the Third Circuit held that the Act did not authorize the

fines provided for in 5E1.2(i), see United States v.
___ ______________

Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155 (3rd Cir. 1992), we do not agree
___________

with the reasoning contained therein.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

district court is affirmed.
________





















-7-