United States v. McHatton

USCA1 Opinion









February 14, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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No. 93-2335


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

LEO A. McHATTON,

Defendant, Appellant.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Nathaniel B. Gorton, U. S. District Judge]
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Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,
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Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
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John C. McBride and McBride & Associates on brief for
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appellant.
Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Joseph F.
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Savage, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for
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appellee.

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Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Leo A. McHatton stands
Per Curiam.
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convicted on six counts charging him with violating 26 U.S.C.

7206(1) by filing false federal income tax returns for the

calendar years 1986 through 1991.1 The district court made a

disputed guidelines calculation as to the amount(s) of tax evaded

and sentenced appellant to one year in prison on each count;

fined him $10,000; imposed a one-year term of supervised release;

and levied a $50 special felony assessment on each count, see 18
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U.S.C. 3013 (1988). McHatton appeals from the judgment. We

affirm.

In our view, the concurrent sentence doctrine obviates

any need to resolve the dispute about the guideline calculation

in this appeal and requires that we affirm the judgment below.

Under the concurrent sentence doctrine, the existence of one

valid conviction "make[s] unnecessary the review of other

convictions when concurrent sentences have been given, provided

there is no adverse collateral consequence to not reviewing the

concurrent sentence." United States v. Hudacek, 7 F.3d 203, 204
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n.1 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,
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788-89 (1969); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 105
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(1943); United States v. Nightingale, 703 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir.
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1983); United States v. Tashjian, 660 F.2d 829, 840 (1st Cir.),
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cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981). Here, all the conditions
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1McHatton went to trial on a twelve-count indictment. He
was acquitted on the non-tax counts. The counts of conviction
are counts 7 (1986), 8 (1987), 9 (1988), 10 (1989), 11 (1990),
and 12 (1991).

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necessary to animate the doctrine are present. The district

court made the prison sentence and fine concurrent on all counts

and appellant has not argued that the sentence on count 7 (a

non-guidelines count) can be overturned on appeal.2 That ends

the matter, for no adverse collateral consequence looms on the

horizon.

To be sure, the term of supervised release is geared

only to certain appealed counts, viz., counts 8-12. But
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defendant does not argue against his conviction on those counts;
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he argues instead that he is entitled to a milder sentence.

Thus, even if appellant's point is well-taken and we do not

think that it is, see infra the term of supervised release will
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not be abated. See U.S.S.G. 5D1.1(b); U.S.S.G. 5D1.1 comment.
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(n.2) ("[T]he court may impose a term of supervised release in

cases involving imprisonment for a term of one year or less.")
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(emphasis supplied). By like token, the six $50 per count

special felony assessments do not require that we allow this

appeal to go forward. Under the controlling statute, 18 U.S.C.

3013(a)(2)(A), it is the fact of a defendant's felony conviction,

not the fact of incarceration or the length of sentence, that


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2Since count 7 covered a year (1986) that antedated the
effective date of the sentencing guidelines, we cannot visualize
any basis for an appeal of the sentence imposed on that count.
See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (explaining
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that, prior to the advent of the guidelines, "a sentence imposed
by a federal district judge, if within statutory limits, is
generally not subject to review"); United States v. Ruiz-Garcia,
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886 F.2d 474, 477 (1st Cir. 1989) (explaining that, in the pre-
guidelines era, sentencing appeals were infrequent and "[w]hen
appeals were taken, success was hen's-teeth rare").

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dictates imposition of the assessment. See generally United
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States v. Luongo, 11 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1993). Hence, a change in
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the duration of appellant's sentence will not affect either the

number or aggregate amount of the special assessments.

Although the concurrent sentence doctrine is completely

dispositive of this appeal, we add that, in all events, the

evidence in the record supports the district court's

approximation of the amount(s) of unreported income and

underpayments of tax, and, therefore, the amount of loss. After

all, a sentencing court's calculations in these respects need not

be infinitely precise. See, e.g., United States v. Tardiff, 969
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F.2d 1283, 1288 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Bachynsky, 949
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F.2d 722, 731-33 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 150
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(1992). The facts underlying a guideline calculation of this

genre "may be inferred from any reasonably reliable information

available, including the scope of the operation." U.S.S.G.

2B1.1, comment. (n.3); see also United States v. Skrodzki, 9
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F.3d 198, 203 (1st Cir. 1993) & cases cited therein. And,

moreover, the guidelines explicitly recognize that in some tax

cases, "the amount of the tax loss may be uncertain," with the

result that the court must then "simply make a reasonable

estimate based on the available facts". U.S.S.G. 2T1.1,

comment. (n.2). Once the trial court has performed this task, a

dissatisfied party, on appeal, "must carry the heavy burden of

persuading the court of appeals that the lower court's conclusion

is clearly erroneous." Tardiff, 969 F.2d at 1288.
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Appellant has not satisfied the devoir of persuasion

here. Rather, our review of the record persuades us that the key

calculation the district court's approximation of appellant's

unreported income for the years 1974-1985 is within "the

universe of acceptable computations." Id. The evidence showed
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that appellant earned some income as an electrician during that

period; it also showed that he failed to report such income.

Under those circumstances, the court supportably could

extrapolate from the stipulated facts concerning later years to

arrive at an estimate for the earlier years. Cf., e.g., United
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States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 111-14 (1st Cir. 1990).
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Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1.
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