United States v. Caraballo Cruz

USCA1 Opinion






February 10, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT




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No. 92-2316

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

WALTER CARABALLO-CRUZ,

Defendant, Appellant.

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No. 92-2319

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JOSE IVAN MONTA EZ-ANAYA,

Defendant, Appellant.

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APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. H ctor M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
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Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Torruella and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
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Miguel A.A. Nogueras-Castro, Assistant Federal Public
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Defender, with whom Benicio S nchez-Rivera, Federal Public
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Defender, was on brief for appellant Walter Caraballo-Cruz.
Francisco M. Dolz-S nchez for appellant Jos Iv n Monta ez-Anaya.
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Carlos A. P rez-Irizarry, Assistant United States Attorney,
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with whom Charles E. Fitzwilliam, United States Attorney, and
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Jos A. Quiles-Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, were on brief
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for appellee.



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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Defendants Walter Caraballo-
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Cruz ("Caraballo") and Jos Iv n Monta ez-Anaya ("Monta ez") were

convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with the intent to

distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846,

and of aiding and abetting the possession with the intent to

distribute cocaine in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2. Caraballo

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him and

Monta ez appeals the district court's refusal to reduce his

sentence for being a minimal or minor participant. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
I. BACKGROUND

The alleged conspiracy in this case involved a plan to

smuggle twenty-nine kilograms of cocaine into the continental

United States by concealing the drugs in luggage placed on

commercial flights departing from San Juan, Puerto Rico.

According to the evidence in the record viewed in the light most

favorable to the government, United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d
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675, 676 (1st Cir. 1993), the conspiracy proceeded as follows.

On May 4, 1992, Caraballo and Monta ez, along with

their two codefendants, Orlando Enrique Monroy-Pedrosa ("Monroy")

and Jules Delgado-Valencia ("Delgado"),1 and several unindicted

coconspirators, delivered a total of nine separate pieces of

luggage to the American Airlines desk at Luis Mu oz Mar n

International Airport in Isla Verde, Puerto Rico. The defendants

checked in the luggage under a variety of assumed names using a

series of airline tickets purchased at the same time from the

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1 The appeals of Monroy and Delgado have been dismissed.

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same travel agency. In addition, Monta ez purchased two tickets,

also under an assumed name, at the airport.

The operation was first detected when United States

Customs Service Inspector V ctor Ramos observed Monta ez and

Monroy each carrying a suitcase with United States Department of

Agriculture ("USDA") inspection stickers on them despite the fact

that neither had passed through the USDA facility where X-ray

inspections are conducted.2 Monta ez and Monroy proceeded to

the American Airlines counter where Monroy checked the bags onto

a flight to New York under an assumed name.

Upon further surveillance, Inspector Ramos noticed a

woman, Gladys Eliana Marulanda-Mar n ("Marulanda"),3 deliver,

and then check with the airline, two suitcases that were

identical to the luggage delivered by Monroy and Monta ez.

Marulanda also checked in her bags under an assumed name.

Inspector Ramos alerted other Customs Service officials

to this suspicious behavior. The officials then brought in a

canine unit to investigate the suspect luggage. The canine unit

gave a positive alert for narcotics as to each of the four

suitcases. Meanwhile, Customs Inspectors Mar a del Carmen Rabell

and H ctor Cab n, who had also observed Monta ez, Monroy, and

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2 At the Luis Mu oz Mar n airport, all passengers with baggage
to be checked in on flights to the continental United States must
first pass through one of several USDA inspection facilities
located at the entrance to the terminal. After checking each bag
with an X-ray machine, USDA officials affix an inspection sticker
on the bag to indicate that it has passed inspection and may be
accepted for check-in by the airlines.

3 The government declined to prosecute Marulanda.

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Marulanda deliver their suitcases, followed Monroy to an airline

gate where they watched him board his plane with Marulanda. When

informed of the positive alert by the police dogs, Rabell and

Cab n entered the plane and arrested Monroy and Marulanda.

Following these arrests, the two Inspectors returned to

the American Airlines area where they observed two unattended

suitcases with USDA inspection stickers on them. As the

Inspectors looked on, Caraballo and another individual grabbed

the suitcases, exited the terminal building, and placed them in

the trunk of a car which then left without Caraballo and his

companion.

Soon thereafter, Inspectors Rabell and Cab n observed

Monta ez again enter the terminal and carry two more suitcases to

the American Airlines counter. Monta ez purchased two plane

tickets with cash and checked in his luggage. A few moments

later, the Inspectors saw Caraballo, together with Delgado,

carrying three suitcases. According to Inspector Rabell, two of

the three suitcases appeared to be the same ones that she had

previously seen Caraballo and his companion place inside the

trunk of a car. Rabell did not, however, specify which of the

three suitcases Caraballo was carrying. After checking their

luggage, again under assumed names, Caraballo and Delgado met

with Monta ez who was waiting for them in front of a gift shop.

Monta ez gave Delgado the flight jacket he was wearing after

which Caraballo and Delgado proceeded to the airline gate to

board their flight.


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Inspector Rabell followed Caraballo and Delgado and,

after receiving word that all five suitcases were given a

positive alert by the canine unit, arrested them on the airplane

jetway as they attempted to board their plane. Government agents

later found several USDA inspection stickers and sticker

fragments in Caraballo's wallet. Inspector Cab n arrested

Monta ez and seized passenger tickets and boarding passes from

him which corresponded to two suitcases that were later found to

contain cocaine.

All nine of defendants' suitcases triggered positive

alerts for narcotics when presented to the canine unit; however,

only five -- Government's Exhibits 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7 -- actually

contained cocaine. The first two suitcases, Exhibits 1 and 2,

were the ones carried to the American Airlines counter by Monroy

and Monta ez and checked in by Monroy. The last suitcase,

Exhibit 7, was carried and checked in by Monta ez under the

assumed name of Diego Rivera.

The record contains conflicting evidence, however, as

to who carried and who checked in the other two suitcases

containing cocaine, Exhibits 5 and 6. Inspector Rabell testified

that these were the two suitcases that Caraballo and another

individual originally placed in the trunk of a car. Nothing in

the record indicates whether, at that point, the two suitcases

contained the cocaine that was later found inside them. Rabell

also testified that these suitcases, along with a third suitcase

that did not contain cocaine, were later carried to the airline


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counter by either Caraballo or Delgado. According to the airline

records, however, Exhibits 5 and 6 were actually checked in under

the name Mario Arzuaga, one of the aliases used by Monta ez when

Monta ez purchased his airline tickets and checked in his

luggage. The confusion is compounded by the fact that the claim

tickets for these two suitcases, Exhibits 5 and 6, were found on

Delgado when he was arrested, even though Delgado had checked in

only one bag under a completely different alias.

The government tried to suggest that Monta ez really

checked in Exhibits 5 and 6 and then gave Delgado the claim

checks for these suitcases when he handed Delgado his flight

jacket. The government never explained, however, the discrepancy

between this version of events and Inspector Rabell's testimony

that either Delgado or Caraballo carried Exhibits 5 and 6 to the

airline counter after Monta ez had already checked in two

separate pieces of luggage.

At the very least, however, the evidence indicates that

Monta ez carried a total of at least two suitcases with cocaine

to the airline counter (Exhibits 1 or 2 and 7), checked in at

least one suitcase with cocaine (Exhibit 7), and purchased and

possessed an airline ticket that corresponded to two additional

suitcases that were found to contain cocaine (Exhibits 5 and 6).

As for Caraballo, the suitcase checked in under his alias,

Exhibit 10, did not contain cocaine. Nevertheless, Caraballo was

seen carrying suitcases (Exhibits 5 and 6) which contained

cocaine at some point, although not necessarily while he was


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carrying them, either out of or back into the airport.

Drug Enforcement Agency officials found a total of

twenty-nine kilograms of cocaine in the five suitcases with an

estimated street value of $493,000 to $841,000. The cocaine

found in each suitcase was packaged in the same manner and each

package was elaborately wrapped to avoid detection.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

A. Conspiracy

Caraballo challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his conspiracy and aiding and abetting convictions

under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846 and 18 U.S.C. 2. Upon review

of the jury verdict, we examine the evidence in its entirety in

the light most favorable to the government to determine whether a

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The government gets the

benefit of all legitimate and favorable inferences and can prove

its case by circumstantial evidence without having to exclude

every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Echeverri, 982 F.2d at
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677; United States v. Akinola, 985 F.2d 1105, 1109 (1st Cir.
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1993); United States v. McLaughlin, 957 F.2d 12, 18 (1st Cir.
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1992).

In order to prove a defendant is guilty of conspiracy

under 21 U.S.C. 846, the government must show, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily

participated in an agreement to violate the law and that the

defendant did so with the intent to commit the underlying


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substantive offense. United States v. Sep lveda, No. 92-1362,
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slip op. at 7 (1st Cir. Dec. 20, 1993); Akinola, 985 F.2d at
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1110; United States v. Clifford, 979 F.2d 896, 897-98 (1st Cir.
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1992); United States v. Tejeda, 974 F.2d 210, 212 (1st Cir.
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1992). In this case, the underlying offense was possession with

the intent to distribute cocaine. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The

government is not required to prove that the defendant knew

about, or took part in, all aspects of the conspiracy; it need

only establish the essential nature of the plan and the

defendant's connection to it. United States v. Benevides, 985
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F.2d 629, 633 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Rivera-Santiago,
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872 F.2d 1073, 1079 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 910
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(1989).

Caraballo argues that the record contains no evidence

that he knew about or willfully agreed to participate in the plan

to transport cocaine. We disagree. Caraballo was travelling

under an assumed name with a plane ticket that was purchased at

the exact same time and place as the tickets used by his

codefendants who were found to be transporting cocaine. During

the execution of the smuggling operation on May 4, 1992,

Caraballo was continuously in the company of other conspirators.

He carried suitcases and boarded a plane with one conspirator who

possessed claim checks for suitcases containing cocaine. One

customs inspector testified that Caraballo and the conspirator

carried two suitcases that were later found to contain cocaine.

Caraballo also met with another conspirator who had carried and


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checked in at least one suitcase with cocaine.

One crucial aspect of the conspiracy involved placing

USDA inspection stickers on suitcases with cocaine in order to

bypass the agricultural inspection facility. Customs inspectors

saw Caraballo carry at least one suitcase with a USDA inspection

sticker from inside the terminal back outside the airport and

place it into the trunk of a car. That suitcase was later found

to contain cocaine. More significantly, Caraballo was carrying

USDA inspection stickers and sticker fragments in his wallet.

From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude

that Caraballo agreed to help smuggle cocaine into the

continental United States by carrying several of the suitcases

used in the operation, by assisting in bypassing the agricultural

inspection facility, and by flying to the cocaine's destination

with his coconspirators to assist in the completion of the

delivery. In particular, Caraballo's possession of USDA

inspection stickers and his act of removing luggage already

marked with such stickers from the terminal to a waiting

automobile indicate that Caraballo knowingly executed an agreed

upon plan to avoid detection of the cocaine in the suitcases.

Caraballo attempts to characterize the evidence against

him as sufficient only to establish his "mere presence" at the

scene of the crime. He emphasizes that the suitcase he checked

in did not contain any drugs, the government never established

that he carried cocaine at any time, and the inspection stickers

in his wallet were a different color than the ones used on the


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suitcases. Because of this evidence, Caraballo contends, his

behavior can only be interpreted as a series of "innocent acts".

Although a defendant's mere presence at the scene of a

crime is not alone sufficient to prove his membership in a

conspiracy, United States v. Ocampo, 964 F.2d 80, 82 (1st Cir.
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1992); United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 712 (1st Cir. 1992),
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cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1005 (1993), the circumstantial evidence
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or simply the attendant circumstances can be enough to convince a

rational jury that "the 'mere' is lacking." Echeverri, 982 F.2d
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at 678; Tejeda, 974 F.2d at 213; Ortiz, 966 at 711-12.
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In Caraballo's case, there are both circumstantial

evidence and attendant circumstances to support the jury's

conclusion that Caraballo was participating in the conspiracy and

not merely present in the airport for the purpose of travelling

to the States. Caraballo's actions on May 4, 1993, demonstrate

an effort to evade inspection of certain suitcases which later

were found to contain cocaine. The jury could infer that

Caraballo removed suitcases from the terminal after they had been

inspected precisely because he knew those suitcases would later

be used to transport cocaine. In addition, the fact that

Caraballo's tickets were purchased together with the other

conspirators, and the fact that Caraballo checked in his bags and

boarded his flight with another conspirator indicates he

willfully associated himself with the venture.

That the inspection stickers found in Caraballo's

wallet were a different color than the ones found on the


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suitcases does not compel the jury to believe Caraballo's

explanation that the stickers were merely "souvenirs" that he

collected. Instead, the jury could infer that Caraballo had

prepared several alternative methods to evade the USDA inspection

before choosing the one he actually implemented. Caraballo's

reliance on the lack of proof that he ever possessed cocaine or

carried a suitcase with cocaine is of little help to him in this

case. No such proof is required if the evidence can otherwise

show that he participated in the conspiracy with the intent to

accomplish its unlawful objective. See, e.g., United States v.
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De La Cruz, 996 F.2d 1307, 1311-12 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114
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S. Ct. 356 (1993); Akinola, 985 F.2d at 1110; United States v.
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Clifford, 979 F.2d 896, 898 (1st Cir. 1992); Tejeda, 974 F.2d at
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213.

B. Aiding and Abetting

Caraballo also challenges his conviction for aiding and

abetting under 18 U.S.C. 2. "For the conviction to stand, the

government must prove that defendant associated himself with the

underlying venture, participated in it as something he wished to

bring about, and sought by his actions to make it succeed."

Clifford, 979 F.2d at 899 (citing Nye & Nissen v. United States,
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336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)); Ortiz, 966 F.2d at 711 n.1. The
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evidence that Caraballo, using an assumed name, checked onto a

flight using a ticket purchased together with the other

conspirators, carried suitcases and remained in the company of

other conspirators, and took actions designed to avoid USDA


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inspection of suitcases containing cocaine amply supports the

jury's conclusion that Caraballo knowingly and willfully agreed

to associate himself with the plan to smuggle cocaine into the

continental United States and sought to bring about its success.














































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III. SENTENCING
III. SENTENCING

At his sentencing, Monta ez requested a reduction in

his offense level by two to four points pursuant to U.S.S.G.

3B1.2(a) or (b) for minimal or minor participation in the

conspiracy. He argued that his only role in the offense was

carrying three suitcases and handing claim tags to Delgado and

thus, as a courier, he was the least culpable participant.

Monta ez further pointed out that the presentence investigation

report, although asserting that Monta ez was not a minor

participant, identified Delgado as the "leader/organizer of the

overall criminal activity," identified Monroy as the "second most

culpable defendant," and concluded that the "remaining defendants

are viewed as less culpable." The district court denied

Monta ez' request because it found him to be a "substantial

player" in the conspiracy. The court sentenced Monta ez to 172

months in prison and Monta ez appealed.

A reduction in a defendant's offense level for minimal

participation under 3B1.2(a) "is intended to cover defendants

who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved."

U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(a) comment note 1. A reduction for minor

participation under 3B1.2(b) applies to "any participant who is

less culpable than most other participants." U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b)

comment note 3. It is well established that no defendant is

automatically entitled to a reduction as a minimal or minor

participant, even if the defendant happens to be less culpable

than his or her codefendants and even if the court found the


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defendant was only a courier. United States v. L pez-Gil, 965
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F.2d 1124, 1131 (1st Cir.), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 2959,
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cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 484 (1992); United States v. Valencia-
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Lucena, 925 F.2d 506, 514 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Paz
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Uribe, 891 F.2d 396, 399 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
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951 (1990). The sentencing court has broad discretion in

determining whether this downward adjustment is appropriate and

we will reverse only if the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates

that the defendant played a part that makes him substantially

less culpable than the average participant in the convicted

offense such that the court's decision was clearly erroneous.

L pez-Gil, 965 F.2d at 1131; United States v. Gregorio, 956 F.2d
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341, 344 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330,
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333 (1st Cir. 1990).

The district court was well within its discretion in

finding that, even though less culpable than Delgado and Monroy,

Monta ez was still a "substantial player" and not a minor, let

alone minimal, participant. Monta ez carried at least two

suitcases containing cocaine to the airline counter and checked

in at least one such suitcase with the airline. In addition,

Monta ez purchased, in cash, two tickets under assumed names

which corresponded to three pieces of luggage that were found to

contain cocaine. Monta ez also accompanied Monroy while Monroy

was carrying still another suitcase with cocaine and while Monroy

checked in two suitcases that contained cocaine. In fact,

Monta ez was connected in some way with every piece of luggage


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used to transport cocaine.

Furthermore, Monta ez met with coconspirators Delgado

and Caraballo immediately after checking in his luggage and the

evidence supports the inference that he handed Delgado the claim

checks for two of the suitcases which were later found to contain

cocaine. These activities demonstrate significant involvement in

a large smuggling operation that depended for its success upon

the coordinated actions of several individuals, including

Monta ez.4

Even if Monta ez was the least culpable of the charged

defendants, it does not mean he performed a minor role in the

offense. United States v. Daniel, 962 F.2d 100, 103 (1st Cir.
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1992). In our view, Monta ez' role in the smuggling operation

can best be described as average. He carried several suitcases,

purchased two plane tickets, and passed along some claim checks.

If the sentencing judge, who is better situated to assess the

facts of the case, found Monta ez' actions more than minor, we

cannot, on these facts, convincingly find otherwise.

Consequently, we uphold the district court's refusal to adjust

Monta ez' offense for playing a minimal or minor role in the

conspiracy.

Affirmed.
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4 The considerably large amount of cocaine transported by
Monta ez, who carried or controlled at one point a large portion
of the twenty-nine kilograms of cocaine involved in the
conspiracy, also militates strongly against any downward
adjustment. See United States v. Rodr guez Cort s, 949 F.2d 532,
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547 (1st Cir. 1991).

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