USCA1 Opinion
February 8, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 93-1445
WILLIAM BART LLOYD,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Defendant, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
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William Bart Lloyd on brief pro se.
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Ann S. Duross, Assistant General Counsel, Richard J.
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Osterman, Jr., Senior Counsel, and Daniel H. Kurtenbach, Counsel,
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on brief for appellee.
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SELYA, Circuit Judge. William Bart Lloyd appeals from
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an order of the United States District Court for the District
of Rhode Island dismissing his suit against the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver for the
failed Capitol Bank and Trust Company, of Boston,
Massachusetts (the Bank), for want of jurisdiction.
Background
Background
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In November 1990, appellant purchased an apartment
building in Providence, Rhode Island from the Bank. Under
the sales agreement, the Bank undertook to provide financing
for both the acquisition and the renovation of the complex.
At the closing, appellant signed a promissory note, secured
by a mortgage on the property. In December 1990, the Bank
failed. The FDIC was appointed receiver. In June 1991, the
FDIC, as receiver, disaffirmed the original agreement to
finance renovations.
In due course, appellant filed a proof of claim with the
FDIC. The proof was not acted upon within the required 180-
day period, see 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(5)(A)(i). Nevertheless,
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the FDIC notified appellant on March 4, 1992, that it
intended to foreclose. On March 17, appellant responded by
filing this action in a Rhode Island state court. He sought
to enjoin the FDIC from proceeding with the foreclosure, and,
moreover, to reform or cancel the sales agreement, note, and
mortgage (based on an asserted mutual mistake).
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On March 30, 1992, the FDIC removed the case to the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
See 12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2)(B) (giving FDIC authority to
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remove action "to the appropriate United States district
court") & 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(6)(A) (giving "district or
territorial court of the United States for the district
within which the depository institution's principal place of
business is located or the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia" jurisdiction over any claim
disallowed by the FDIC). On April 2, the FDIC moved to
transfer the case to the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island "[f]or the convenience of parties
and witnesses." 28 U.S.C. 1404(a). The district court
transferred the case on April 23, 1992. Appellant's
administrative claim was finally denied on June 9, 1992.
Once the case had returned north, the FDIC moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
At the same time, the FDIC also argued that appellant's claim
for injunctive relief was barred by 12 U.S.C. 1821(j).1
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1. Subsection 1821(j) provides, in part:
Except as provided in this section, no
court may take any action, except at the
request of the Board of Directors by
regulation or order, to restrain or
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affect the exercise of powers or
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functions of the Corporation as a
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conservator or a receiver.
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The district court dismissed the case for want of
jurisdiction. This appeal followed.2
Discussion
Discussion
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A "district court lacks jurisdiction to enjoin the FDIC
when the FDIC is acting pursuant to its statutory powers as
receiver." Telematics Int'l, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp.,
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967 F.2d 703, 707 (1st Cir. 1992); see also 12 U.S.C.
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1821(j). The FDIC has the power as receiver to foreclose on
the property of a debtor. See 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(B)(ii)
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(giving FDIC power to "collect all obligations and money due
the [failed] institution"). Thus, the district court was
without jurisdiction to grant the injunctive relief appellant
seeks. See 281-300 Joint Venture v. Onion, 938 F.2d 35, 39
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(5th Cir. 1991) (injunction against receiver's foreclosure of
appellants' property barred by 1821(j)), cert. denied, 112
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S.Ct. 933 (1992).
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12 U.S.C. 1821(j) (emphasis supplied). According to the
FDIC, none of the statutory exceptions authorize injunctive
relief of the kind sought by appellant.
2. The district judge determined that the suit was barred
both because the court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to 12
U.S.C. 1821(d)(6)(A) and because it had no jurisdiction
over a case removed from a state court which itself did not
have jurisdiction over the original case. While it was once
settled law that a federal court's removal jurisdiction was
derived from the state court's jurisdiction, this rule has
been abolished by statute. See 28 U.S.C. 1441(e). Thus,
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we address only the effect of 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(6)(A) on
the district court's jurisdiction.
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Appellant's claims for equitable reformation and/or
cancellation of the contract fare no better. These claims
lie in the maw of the statute, for, in the statutory
parlance, the plaintiff's complaint "seeks a determination of
rights with respect to [] the assets of a[] depository
institution for which the Corporation has been appointed
receiver." 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(13)(D). By its terms, the
statute limits federal court jurisdiction over such claims to
those instances "otherwise provided" in section 1821(d).
Id.; see also Marquis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 965 F.2d
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1148, 1153 (1st Cir. 1992). We understand this to mean that
the federal courts are barred from asserting jurisdiction
over claims against the assets of failed depository
institutions except as expressly or impliedly permitted, see
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Marquis, 965 F.2d at 1153 (suggesting that, in addition to
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its express grants of jurisdiction, section 1821(d) also
implies the existence of jurisdiction in other
circumstances), by virtue of the various subsections of
section 1821(d). See Resolution Trust Corp. v. J.F. Assocs.,
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813 F. Supp. 951, 954 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Landmark Land
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Co. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 948 F.2d 910, 912-13
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(5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting similarly worded provision in
12 U.S.C. 1818(i)(1) as limiting jurisdiction). We further
understand the specific jurisdictional provision of section
1821(d)(13)(D) to control over the more general
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jurisdictional grant found in 12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2)(A).3
See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407 (1991)
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("[a] specific provision controls over one of more general
application") (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons,
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Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987)).
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Appellant seeks to find safe haven in the statute
itself: after all, section 1821(d)(6)(A) expressly confers
jurisdiction upon federal courts to entertain suits based
upon disallowed claims. The district court did not buy these
wares. Rather, Judge Lagueux, adopting a position urged by
the FDIC below, ruled that the only courts which had
jurisdiction over appellant's claims were the federal
district court for the district where the failed bank
maintained its principal place of business (here,
Massachusetts) and the federal district court for the
District of Columbia, see 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(6)(A).4
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3. Subsection 1819(b)(2)(A) provides, in part, that:
all suits . . . to which the [FDIC] is a party
shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the
United States.
12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2)(A).
4. The statute provides, in relevant part, that a claimant
may:
file suit on such claim (or continue an action
commenced before the appointment of the receiver)
in the district court or territorial court of the
United States for the district within which the
depository institution's principal place of
business is located or the United States District
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Lloyd's appeal attacks this ruling. And appellant has
acquired a rather surprising ally: reversing its field, the
FDIC now contends that section 1821(d)(6)(A) is not a
jurisdictional limitation, but is instead a venue provision
that can be waived (and which the FDIC has waived in this
instance). We think the FDIC was right the first time
around.
For one thing, the plain language of section
1821(d)(6)(A) indicates that it is a jurisdictional grant
limited to the federal district court for the district where
the institution has its principal place of business and the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
See id. (providing that either such court "shall have
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jurisdiction to hear such claim"). Accord J.F. Assocs., 813
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F.Supp. at 958. For another thing, while the reasoning of
the only court that, to our knowledge, has found section
1821(d)(6)(A) to be a venue provision supports the FDIC's new
position, the reasoning is not persuasive--and the holding is
not inconsistent, simpliciter, with reading the section as a
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jurisdictional provision. In Vinton v. Trustbank, Sav.,
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F.S.B., 798 F. Supp. 1055 (D.Del. 1992), the court held that
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section 1821(d)(6)(A) was not a grant of "exclusive
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Court for the District of Columbia (and such court
shall have jurisdiction to hear such claim).
12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(6)(A).
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jurisdiction" to the two listed courts and did not deprive a
third court of jurisdiction which it had previously
obtained.5 Id. at 1065. But section 1821(d)(6)(A) can be
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read as a grant of jurisdiction to two designated courts
without being read as a completely exclusive grant. Accord
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J.F. Assocs., 813 F. Supp. at 955. As we interpret it,
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section 1821(d)(6)(A) does not extend jurisdiction beyond the
two specified courts--but, by the same token, it does not
deprive a court of jurisdiction where, as in Vinton, that
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jurisdiction has a source independent of section
1821(d)(6)(A). See Marquis, 965 F.2d at 1152-54 (determining
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that subsections of section 1821(d) other than section
1821(d)(6)(A) permit federal courts to retain jurisdiction in
circumstances where a bank's failure postdates the
institution of the action).
In the instant case, section 1821(d)(6)(A) provides no
basis for jurisdiction in the United States District Court
for the District of Rhode Island. Nor has appellant or the
FDIC indicated any source of federal jurisdiction in section
1821(d) other than section 1821(d)(6)(A). Consequently, even
though, viewed simply from the perspective of policy, it
might seem sensible to allow for suits of this sort to be
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5. In Vinton, the United States District Court for the
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District of Delaware had obtained jurisdiction over the case
before the Resolution Trust Corporation took over as
receiver.
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tried in the district where the transactions occurred and
where the court is likely to be most familiar with any
applicable local law, the statutory language, especially that
of 1821(d)(13)(D), compels us, absent a more persuasive
argument to the contrary, to find that the district court
appropriately determined that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Lloyd's suit. See Massachusetts Financial
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Services, Inc. v. Securities Investor Protection, Corp., 545
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F.2d 754, 756 (1st Cir. 1976), ("a statute's plain language
is the primary indicator of its meaning"), cert. denied, 431
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U.S. 904 (1977).6
The normal remedy in these circumstances would be for
the district court to dismiss this case (as it did). Here,
however, a dismissal seems unfair since it would deprive
Lloyd, who is in effect a victim of the FDIC-inspired
transfer to the District Court for the District of Rhode
Island, of any means of redress. See 12 U.S.C.
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1819(d)(6)(B) (unless claimant requests review of
disallowance of claim within 60 days of determination,
"disallowance shall be final, and the claimant shall have no
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6. We note that, liberally construed, appellant's complaint
also invokes 12 U.S.C. 1821(e), a statute which provides
that the FDIC may repudiate contracts entered into before its
appointment as receiver, but affords an injured party a right
to compensatory relief. See, e.g., Howell v. Federal Deposit
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Ins. Corp., 986 F.2d 569, 571 (1st Cir. 1993). We do not
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decide whether the district court would have jurisdiction
under this section because appellant has explicitly disavowed
any intention of pursuing a breach of contract claim.
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further rights or remedies with respect to such claim").
Since the transferor court was not empowered to order the
transfer of this action to a court which lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over it, see 28 U.S.C. 1404(a)
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(transfer may only be to a district where the action "might
have been brought"), we think it more prudent that the
district court retransfer this action to the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia on the ground
that the transfer was improvidently granted. See Turner v.
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Kelley, 411 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Kan. 1976) (retransferring case
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to transferor court because transferee court lacked
jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. 552(a)); Majewski v. New York
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C. R. Co., 227 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mich. 1964) (retransferring
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case to transferor court because transferee court lacked
jurisdiction).
The dismissal is therefore vacated for the purpose of
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allowing the district court to enter such an order. No
costs.
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