Muniz-Cabrero v. Ruiz

USCA1 Opinion












United States Court of Appeals
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
For the First Circuit
____________________

No. 93-2099

MANUEL MUNIZ-CABRERO,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

DR. ALEJANDRO RUIZ, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO


[Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
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____________________

Before

Cyr, Circuit Judge,
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Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
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Jesus E. Cuza with whom Vicente & Cuebas was on brief for
_______________ _________________
appellant.
James D. Noel, III with whom Ledesma, Palou & Miranda was on
___________________ __________________________
brief for appellees.


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May 18, 1994
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Stahl, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Manuel
_____________

Muniz Cabrero appeals the district court's grant of summary

judgment in favor of defendants-appellees Dr. Alejandro Ruiz

("Ruiz"), Dr. Karen Soto ("Soto"), Dr. Olga Hernandez

("Hernandez"), and Edmundo Carrero ("Carrero"). Because we

agree with the district court's finding that plaintiff's 42

U.S.C 1983 action is time-barred, we affirm.

I.
I.
__

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
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The following facts are uncontested. In July 1982,

plaintiff was hired to work at the Sports Complex at the

state-run University of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez Campus

("University"). From 1983 to present, plaintiff has served

as the Sports Complex's "Executive Official I," a career

position roughly equivalent to the more familiar title of

Director.1 Plaintiff is also an active member of the New

Progressive Party ("NPP"), whose gubernatorial candidate lost

the general election in November 1984.

In August 1990, Ruiz, an active member of the

Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"), was appointed Chancellor of

the University. Three months after assuming office, Ruiz met




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1. Under Puerto Rico law, employees with career status enjoy
property rights in their continued employment. See Rivera-
___ _______
Ruiz v. Gonzalez-Rivera, 983 F.2d 332, 334 (1st Cir. 1993);
____ _______________
Kauffman v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1173 (1st
________ _____________________
Cir. 1988).

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with the University's Administrative Board2 to propose a

reorganization plan. Under the plan, the Sports Complex,

which had always operated as an independent department under

the direct control of the Chancellor, was to be merged with

the Physical Education Department at the University's Arts

and Sciences College.

On November 15, 1990, the Administrative Board

unanimously approved the proposal to be effective December 1,

1990, and subject to review at the conclusion of the 1990-91

academic year.3 On or about November 30, 1990, plaintiff

met with Ruiz and Hernandez, Dean of the Faculty of the

College of Arts and Sciences, to discuss the reorganization.

At that meeting, Ruiz informed plaintiff that, under the new

structure, plaintiff would report to Soto, Director of the

University's Physical Education Department and, in her

absence, to Carrero, Associate Director of Physical

Education. Ruiz also gave plaintiff a letter dated November

30, 1990, which formally detailed the new arrangement.

Between December 1, 1990, and February 20, 1991,

plaintiff missed forty-seven days of work. In his absence,

Soto and Hernandez temporarily took over his

responsibilities, including the review of mail addressed to



____________________

2. Both Ruiz and Hernandez are members of the Administrative
Board.

3. The second semester ended in May 1991.

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plaintiff. On April 12, 1991, plaintiff wrote to Soto

stating that although he returned to work as of February 20,

1991, he had not been assigned any tasks. Plaintiff also

complained that the duties he used to perform were now

discharged by Soto and Carrero. Five days later, in a letter

dated April 17, 1991, Soto provided plaintiff with a detailed

description of his responsibilities under the new structure.

In that letter, Soto remarked that the duties as outlined

"follow the provisions of the [personnel form] you signed

with the Campus." Thereafter, on May 1, 1991, plaintiff,

Soto and Carrero met to clarify the functions described in

the April 17 letter. In his final relevant correspondence, a

May 9, 1991, letter to Soto, plaintiff wrote: "After having

evaluated the duties assigned to me it is easy to interpret

that I have been demoted from my position and functions." In

closing, plaintiff noted that he would continue to perform

his duties as assigned. Thereafter, plaintiff continued to

serve as Executive Director I, occupying his same office and

suffering no reduction in salary.

On June 26, 1992, plaintiff filed a complaint under

42 U.S.C. 1983, charging Ruiz, Hernandez, Soto and Carrero

with political discrimination in violation of plaintiff's

First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff

charged, inter alia, that he was the victim of "illegal
_____ ____

activity" since November 1984, such activity intensifying in



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August 1990 when the four defendants, all allegedly members

of the then-ruling PDP or some unspecified party other than

the NPP, plotted to effect the reorganization, thereby

attempting to demote plaintiff solely because of his

membership in the NPP. Plaintiff's complaint sought both

monetary damages and injunctive relief.

On February 25, 1993, defendants filed a motion for

summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that the 1983 action
_____ ____

was time-barred. Plaintiff filed an opposition to

defendants' motion on April 21, 1993. In an opinion and

order dated May 24, 1993, the district court granted

defendants' motion, finding among other things, that the

purported discrimination occurred outside of the statute of

limitations period. The district court further found that

plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to suspend the

limitations period under a "continuing violations" theory.

It is from these rulings that plaintiff appeals.

II.
II.
___

STANDARD OF REVIEW
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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Summary judgment is appropriate when the record

reflects "no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . .

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "In this context, `genuine' means

that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party."



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Rodriguez-Pinto v. Tirado-Delgado, 982 F.2d 34, 38 (1st Cir.
_______________ ______________

1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted). As

always, we review grants of summary judgment de novo,
__ ____

indulging all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor.

See Levy v. FDIC, 7 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1st Cir. 1993).
___ ____ ____

Nonetheless, the nonmovant may not rely upon "unsupported

allegations; rather, [s/]he must set forth specific facts, in

suitable evidentiary form, in order to establish the

existence of a genuine issue for trial." Rivera-Muriente v.
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Agosto-Alicia, 959 F.2d 349, 352 (1st Cir. 1992). "A party
_____________

opposing a summary judgment motion must inform the trial

judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment

should not be entered. If it does not do so, and loses the

motion, it cannot raise such reasons on appeal." Rodriguez-
__________

Pinto, 982 F.2d at 41 (internal quotations and citations
_____

omitted). Finally, "Rule 56 may be used to determine the

applicability of a statutory time bar to a particular set of

facts." Id.
___

III.
III.
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DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
__________

Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in

finding that his complaint was time-barred. In essence, he

argues that the Administrative Board did not have the power

to effect the reorganization, that his "demotion" was

therefore invalid, and that any and all repercussions



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stemming from this "illegal demotion" constituted separate

and actionable "continuing violations" of plaintiff's

constitutional rights, each restarting the limitations clock.

We do not agree.

A. Statute of Limitations
A. Statute of Limitations
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"Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, an aggrieved individual

may sue persons who, acting under color of state law, abridge

rights, immunities, or privileges created by the Constitution

or laws of the United States." Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943
_______ _________

F.2d 104, 108 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 948
_____ ______

(1992). Whereas the personal injury statute of limitations of

the forum state governs in 1983 actions, see, e.g. Owens v.
___ ____ _____

Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 236 (1989), the date of accrual, i.e.,
_____

the date on which the limitations clock begins to tick, is

determined by reference to federal law. Rivera-Muriente, 959
_______________

F.2d at 352. Puerto Rico's applicable statute, P.R. Laws

Ann. tit. 31, 5298 (1991), prescribes a one-year

limitations period beginning on the date of accrual. Id.
___

Under federal law, the limitations "period in a 1983 case

ordinarily starts when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to

know, of the harm on which the action is based." Id. at 353
___

(collecting cases).

We begin by noting that if any civil rights

violation occurred here, it occurred on December 1, 1990,

when the Administrative-Board-approved merger became



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effective. Plaintiff, by his own testimony, knew of the full

impact of the transfer, at the very latest, in May 1991 when

plaintiff wrote to Soto that he would perform his duties as

assigned even though he believed he had been demoted.

Therefore, plaintiff's one-year limitations period commenced

at the very latest in May 1991 and terminated in May 1992, a

full month before the filing of plaintiff's complaint.

Moreover, as the district court found, plaintiff has failed

to allege sufficient facts to suspend the limitations period

under a continuing violation theory.

B. "Continuing Violation" Theory
B. "Continuing Violation" Theory
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To establish a continuing violation, plaintiff

"`must allege that a discriminatory act occurred or that a

discriminatory policy existed' within the period prescribed

by the statute." Johnson v. General Elec., 840 F.2d 132, 137
_______ _____________

(1st Cir. 1988) (quoting Velazquez v. Chardon, 736 F.2d 831,
_________ _______

833 (1st Cir. 1984)). There are two varieties of continuing

violations: serial and systemic. Kassaye v. Bryant College,
_______ ______________

999 F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir. 1993). Serial violations are

"composed of a number of discriminatory acts emanating from

the same discriminatory animus, each act constituting a

separate [actionable] wrong." Jenson v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517,
______ _____

522 (1st Cir. 1990). Plaintiff bears the burden of

demonstrating that at least one discriminatory act occurred

within the limitations period. See id.; Mack v. Great Atl.
___ ___ ____ __________



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and Pac. Tea Co., 871 R.2d 179, 183 (1st Cir. 1989);
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Velazquez, 736 F.2d at 833. It is not enough to show that
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plaintiff is merely feeling the effects of some earlier

discriminatory action. In other words, there is a "critical

distinction between a continuing act and a singular act that

brings continuing consequences in its roiled wake." Johnson,
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943 F.2d at 108 (internal citations omitted); see also Mack,
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871 F.2d at 182 ("In any such analysis, it is imperative that

we distinguish between the occurrence of a discriminatory act

and the later effects of that act."); Goldman v. Sears,
_______ ______

Roebuck & Co., 607 F.2d 1014, 1018 (1st Cir. 1979) ("A
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continuing violation is not stated if all that appears from

the complaint is that the plaintiff continues to suffer from

the ongoing effects of some past act of discrimination."),

cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980). Systemic violations, on
_____ ______

the other hand, "need not involve an identifiable discrete

act of discrimination transpiring within the limitation

period." Jenson, 912 F.2d at 523. Rather what must be shown
______

is that plaintiff has been harmed by the application of a

discriminatory policy or practice and that such policy
______ ________

continues into the limitations period. Id.
___

First, plaintiff has failed to show that any of the

actions that allegedly occurred within the year prior to the

filing of the complaint, i.e. Soto's (1) refusal, purportedly

for reasons of building security, to give plaintiff new



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master keys to the Sports Complex, (2) opening of mail

addressed to plaintiff, (3) hiring of a Sports Complex

employee, and (4) representations that she was the Director

of the Sports Complex, constituted separate and actionable

1983 violations.4 Rather, these incidents are natural and

foreseeable consequences of the 1990 merger (which made Soto

responsible for the overall management of the Sport's

Complex), and plaintiff's subsequent 47-day absence from

work. See generally Kassaye, 999 F.2d at 603 (private
___ _________ _______

college's request that professor vacate his office was merely

an effect and not an independent incarnation of past alleged

discriminatory refusal to grant tenure on basis of race); De
__

Leon Ortero v. Rubero, 820 F.2d 18, 20 (1st Cir. 1987)
____________ ______

(defendants' refusal to reinstate plaintiff "was not a

separate act of discrimination, but rather a consequence of

his initial demotion"); Velazquez, 736 F.2d at 833 (demotion
_________

followed by defendant's repeated refusals to reinstate

plaintiff did not constitute a continuing violation).


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4. Plaintiff has failed to refute any of the statements
proffered by defendants in defense of their actions. For
example, plaintiff has not contradicted Soto's sworn
statement that she denied plaintiff (and others) master keys
to the Sports Complex for security reasons, that she opened
plaintiff's mail because he was absent from work, or that her
assignment of plaintiff's duties mirrored his job description
as set forth in his personnel form. Moreover, plaintiff
alleged that Soto represented herself as the "Director" of
the Sports Complex on letters dated December 4, 1991 and May
28, 1992. A review of the letters shows that Soto signed
"Dr. Soto, Director." At the time Soto signed these letters,
she was the Director of the Physical Education Department.
___

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Secondly, because plaintiff has failed to identify

any discriminatory policy or practice in effect during the

statutory period, he fares no better under the systemic

violation theory. Instead of "alleg[ing] facts which would

enable a jury to conclude that [he] had suffered from

political discrimination in the year before [he] filed suit,"

Velazquez, 736 F.2d at 834, plaintiff has simply alleged that
_________

every time Soto carried out her position as supervisor, she

resurrected a general political plot designed by defendants

to harm and humiliate plaintiff. This is not enough.5

Plaintiff has failed to proffer any evidence that he was

treated differentlythan members ofparties other thanthe NPP.6


____________________

5. Plaintiff's evidence of discriminatory animus consists of
the following:

Close to the date in which Carlos Romero
Barcelo lost the elections [November
1984], Dr. Karen Soto came to me and
asked me what was I going to do now that
the New Progressive Party had lost.

Plaintiff has neglected to show how this dated and
inconclusive statement evidences a policy of discrimination
which continued into the limitations period, or how it could
support "a finding that [plaintiff was] treated differently
than [he] would have been treated had [he] belonged to
[defendants'] political part[ies]." Id. at 836.
___

6. Plaintiff further contends that because the original
reorganization was illegal, any fallout from the merger
constituted an independent act of demotion. We are not
persuaded. Under plaintiff's novel theory, any demoted
employee with a potential cause of action could wait an
indefinite period of time before bringing a 1983 action
because every day s/he went to work, s/he was affected. This
is absurd. Statute of limitations are designed to keep stale
claims out of court. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
___ ___________________ _______

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Because "`the proper focus [in continuing violation

analysis] is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the
______________ ___

point at which the consequences of the act become painful,'"
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Mack 871 F.2d at 182 (quoting Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S.
____ _______ _________

6, 8 (1981) (per curiam) (emphasis in original)), and because

the allegedly discriminatory act here happened more than one

year prior to the filing of the complaint, plaintiff's action

is time-barred.

To the extent that plaintiff challenges other

portions of the district court's ruling, "it does so in a

perfunctory manner, without any attempt at developed

argumentation". Alan Corp. v. International Surplus Ins.
___________ ___________________________

Co., No. 93-1697, slip op. at 12 (1st Cir. Apr. 22, 1994)
___

(collecting cases). Such arguments are deemed waived. Id.
___

IV.
IV.
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CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

district court is

Affirmed.
Affirmed.
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U.S. 363, 380 (1982). Plaintiff's interpretation of the
continuing violation theory would reduce this purpose to a
nullity.

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