Calabria v. DuBois

USCA1 Opinion









May 24, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________


No. 93-1742


DANTE CALABRIA,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

LARRY E. DUBOIS, ETC., ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. A. David Mazzone, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Selya and Cyr,
Circuit Judges.
______________

____________________

Dante Calabria on brief pro se.
______________
Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and
____________________
Kathleen J. Moore on brief for appellees.
_________________


____________________


____________________

























Per Curiam. Plaintiff Dante Calabria, a
____________

Massachusetts inmate, appeals the dismissal of his pro se
___ __

1983 action for failure to state a claim. These facts appear

from the face of the complaint.

I
I
_

In November 1992, Calabria, a cook's helper at the

Old Colony Correctional Center ("OCCS"), was placing potatoes

in pans preparing to bake them as directed by correction

officer Borges, the head cook, when another correction

officer, Hurst, suggested to Calabria that, as the chicken

was to be baked, the potatoes be boiled. Calabria responded

that he had been ordered to bake the potatoes and resumed

work. Hurst repaired to Borges' office, to which Calabria

was soon summoned, whereupon Borges ordered Calabria to boil

the potatoes and then threw a radio belt at Calabria causing

blood to appear at the corner of his mouth. Calabria

received medical attention soon afterwards, during which time

Calabria claims to have been informed that Borges had a

significant history of assaultive behavior towards inmates.

Upon this recital, Calabria sued Borges, Dubois, the

Commissioner of the Department of Correction, and Murphy, the

superintendent of the OCCC, in their individual and official

capacities. The principal charge is that defendants

inflicted unnecessary and unjustified force and cruel and


















unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Calabria claims that Dubois and Murphy knew about Borges'

propensity for assaulting inmates, but were deliberately

indifferent to the danger in which plaintiff was placed

because Borges was allowed to work with inmates in an

unsupervised environment. Calabria seeks declaratory and

injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages for

physical pain, stress, and mental anguish.

Defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the

alternative, for summary judgment, presented a slightly

different version of the precipitating event, but the basic

facts were undisputed: while working in the kitchen, Calabria

was struck on the mouth by an object thrown by Borges; blood

appeared and medical attention was had. There was no

disturbance and no disciplinary report was filed. The

district court acknowledged some conflict in the parties'

versions of the event, but concluded that even if the court

were to assume that plaintiff's account was true, Calabria

had failed to state a claim for which relief could be

granted. We agree that the single blow described does not

state a cognizable cause of action under the Eighth Amendment

and Calabria could not possibly prove an excessive force

violation based on that recitation, indulging all reasonable

and plausible inferences in his favor.





-3-

















II
II
__

Calabria's chief premise on appeal is that the

district court, in dismissing his complaint, misapplied the

standard for Eighth Amendment excessive force claims

enunciated in Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992), and
______ _________

focused upon the extent of Calabria's injuries rather than

his allegations regarding the malicious and sadistic nature

of defendants' conduct. In this regard, Calabria appears to

argue that because institutional security was not at stake,

the force used was unnecessary, and the conduct alleged by

Calabria is sufficient to state a claim. Alternatively,

Calabria complains that the district court blindly accepted

defendants' version of the offending conduct, and that

because the parties' versions of that conduct vary greatly,

material issues of fact remain to be resolved. However, as

indicated above, the basic underlying facts are not disputed

and the district court accepted plaintiff's allegations as

true for the purpose of deciding the motion.

In arguing that dismissal for failure to state a

claim was proper, defendants chiefly rely on (1) the absence

of factual allegations showing unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain; and (2) Calabria's bare recital that he

was struck once during the normal course of daily activities,





-4-















reflects, under Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000, a de minimis use
______ __ _______

of physical force excluded from Eighth Amendment recognition.

III
III
___

Generally, an Eighth Amendment claimant must allege

and prove the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). Hudson v.
_______ ______ ______

McMillian extended Whitley, which involved a prison riot, to
_________ _______

any excessive force claim and held: "the core judicial

inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm." Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
______

Further, the Court decided that the "objectively harmful

enough" component of an Eighth Amendment claim is always

satisfied when prison officials use force maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm "whether or not significant injury

is evident." Id. at 999-1000. In deciding that the extent
___

of Hudson's injuries (bruises and swelling of face, mouth and

lip, loosened teeth and cracked dental plate) could result

from non-de minimis force for Eighth Amendment purposes, and
__ _______

were relevant to (but not determinative of) the "unnecessary

and wanton" Whitley inquiry, the Court nonetheless indicated
_______

that there was some quantum of physical force that was

necessarily excludable from Eighth Amendment recognition,

unless that use of force was otherwise repugnant. Id. at
___

1000. That not "every malevolent touch by a prison guard



-5-















gives rise to a federal cause of action," id., suggests that
___

merely superficial injury permits a reliable inference that

the accompanying force was not "harmful enough," Wilson v.
______

Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991), and is constitutionally
______

de minimis. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22 (inferences may
__ _______ ___ _______

be drawn from, among other factors, the extent of the injury

inflicted as to whether the use of force employed evidenced

wanton conduct); see also Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 701
___ ____ _____ ________

(6th Cir. 1993). Thus, to state a 1983 claim that he was

subjected to a malicious and sadistic attack in violation of

the Eighth Amendment, Calabria must allege wrongdoing that

reasonably and plausibly amounts to more than a de minimis
__ _______

use of force.

The conduct presented here -- a single blow caused

by a thrown object and resulting only in a bloody lip -- was

clearly de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes, and
__ _______

Calabria's complaint was properly dismissed as legally

deficient. See, e.g., Jackson v. Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699,
___ ____ _______ __________

700 (5th Cir. 1993) (spraying with fire extinguisher); Olson
_____

v. Coleman, 804 F. Supp. 148, 150 (D. Kan. 1992), aff'd, 1993
_______ _____

U.S. App. Lexis 10086 (10th Cir. 1993) (single blow to head

while handcuffed); Gabai v. Jacoby, 800 F. Supp. 1149, 1154-
_____ ______

55 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (shoved into chair); Candelaria v.
__________

Coughlin, 787 F. Supp. 368, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 979
________ _____

F.2d 845 (2d Cir 1992) (fist pushed against neck); see also
___ ____



-6-















Risdal v. Martin, 810 F. Supp. 1049, 1056 & n.12 (S.D. Iowa
______ ______

1993); cf. Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th
___ ___________ _______

Cir. 1992) (putting gun to inmate's head could be malicious

and sadistic precluding dismissal for failure to state a

claim). Nor can we say that there is any "meaningful

indication" that further pleading at this stage would make

any "dispositive difference." Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth
________________ _________

College, 889 F.2d 13, 23 (1st Cir. 1989).
_______

IV
IV
__

As a final matter, Calabria complains that the

district court erroneously removed a default judgment entered

against the defendants and permitted the late filing of an

answer. However, Calabria's motion for default was filed

three weeks after service on the defendants, the default

entered twelve days later, and defendants moved to remove the

default two weeks later, less than seven weeks from service

of the complaint. Under these circumstances, the district

court acted well within its discretion in allowing relief

from the default order. Cf., e.g., Clinkscales v. Chevron
___ ____ ___________ _______

U.S.A., 831 F.2d 1565, 1569 (11th Cir. 1987) (six month delay
______

in filing reply brief inexcusable).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
________









-7-