Farmington v. Tudor Insurnce Co.

USCA1 Opinion












[Not for Publication]
[Not for Publication]

United States Court of Appeals
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
For the First Circuit
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No. 94-1333

TOWN OF FARMINGTON, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

TUDOR INSURANCE COMPANY

Defendant, Appellee.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
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Before

Torruella, Boudin, and Stahl
Circuit Judges.
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Martica S. Douglas with whom Douglas, Whiting, Denham & Rogers
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was on brief for appellants.
Thomas V. Laprade with whom Philip M. Coffin III and Black,
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Lambert, Coffin & Rudman were on brief for appellee.
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September 2, 1994
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Per curiam. Plaintiffs Town of Farmington, its
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Board of Selectmen, and Steven S. Moore, the superintendent

of Farmington's sewage treatment plant (collectively, "the

Town") filed this diversity action seeking a declaration that

Tudor Insurance Co. ("Tudor") has a duty to defend the Town

against a suit brought by Cottle Enterprises ("Cottle").

Cottle, the developer of a mobile home park frustrated by the

Town's refusal to allow more than two sewer hook-ups a year

at the new park, sued the Town in state court seeking damages

because of the hook-up limitation. A magistrate-judge

recommended that the district court grant Tudor's motion for

summary judgment, reasoning that all of Cottle's claims fall

within the "inversion condemnation exclusion" clause of the

municipal liability insurance policy issued to the Town by

Tudor. The district court adopted the recommendation and

entered judgment in favor of Tudor. This appeal followed.

Because our independent analysis leads us to the conclusion

that Tudor is indeed "entitled to judgment as a matter of

law," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), we affirm.

I.
I.

The facts underlying this appeal are undisputed and

adequately laid out in the written opinion of the magistrate-

judge, see Town of Farmington v. Tudor Ins. Co., No. 93-0074-
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B (Jan. 31, 1994). The parties agree that Maine law governs





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the interpretation of the Town's insurance policy. The

language in dispute is the following:

[Tudor] shall not be liable to make
payment for Loss in connection with any
claim made against the Insureds
allegedly, based upon or arising out of .
. . inverse condemnation . . . .

II.
II.

The Town's first argument on appeal is that the

magistrate-judge failed to follow Maine law in determining

that the phrase "inverse condemnation" is unambiguous. We

disagree. Maine law favors the insured in construing

ambiguities in insurance contracts and encourages an

expansive view of the insurer's duty to defend. See, e.g.,
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Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Inhabitants of Topsham, 441 A.2d
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1012, 1015 (Me. 1982). Nonetheless, even if the boundaries

of "inverse condemnation" are not firmly settled, we believe

the phrase has an unambiguous core meaning, namely, "[a]

cause of action against a government agency to recover the

value of property taken by the agency, though no formal

exercise of the power of eminent domain has been completed,"

Black's Law Dictionary 740 (5th ed. 1979). Cottle's
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"confiscatory taking" claim (Count I of its complaint)

clearly fits within this category.

The Town next suggests that the magistrate-judge

incorrectly determined that the other counts in Cottle's

complaint are "based upon or aris[e] out of . . . inverse



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condemnation." Once again, we cannot agree. Like the

magistrate-judge, we think that Baywood Corp. v. Maine
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Bonding & Casualty Co., 628 A.2d 1029 (Me. 1993), provides
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the relevant framework for analyzing the merits of Tudor's

motion for summary judgment.1 In that case, Baywood, a real

estate developer, sought a declaration that Maine Bonding,

its insurer, had a duty to defend it against a lawsuit by a

condominium association representing buyers of units

developed by Baywood. The association alleged that Baywood

performed faulty work in designing the development's sewer

system, and sought compensation for the cost of replacing or

upgrading the system. While Maine Bonding would have had a

duty to defend Baywood against an allegation of property

damage, the insurance policy at issue specifically excluded

coverage for claims seeking the repair or replacement of

faulty work. See id. at 1031. The court held that because
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the association's claim was qualitatively different from the

type of third party claim covered by the policy at issue,

Maine Bonding had no duty to defend Baywood. See id. In
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reaching this conclusion, the court focused exclusively on

the type of harm alleged, attaching no importance to the fact

that the underlying complaint charged that Baywood's faulty



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1. We note with dismay that, although Baywood was cited
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prominently by the magistrate-judge, see Town of Farmington,
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slip op. at 5 n.2, the Town chose not to mention, much less
distinguish, the case in its brief.

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work amounted to a violation of various legal duties. See
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id. at 1030 (noting that the association had alleged
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"fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of warranty, breach of

contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and a

violation of the uniform fraudulent transfer act").

An analysis of the type of harm alleged in Cottle's

complaint leads to a similar conclusion in this case. Cottle

seeks compensation for the diminution in the value of his

land caused by the Town's regulatory actions. Although the

complaint alleges that the Town's regulatory maneuvers are

violative of a number of constitutional and common law

duties, each count seeks compensation for the same type of

harm alleged in the "confiscatory taking" count. In other

words, Cottle has not alleged any wrongful conduct that does

not "arise[] out of . . . inverse condemnation." Therefore,

the inverse condemnation exclusion clause and Maine law (as

expounded in Baywood) combine to preclude the Town's claim.
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III.
III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district

court's entry of summary judgment.

So ordered.
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