USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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Nos. 94-1052
94-1322
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
LEO HAMEL,
Defendant, Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
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Boudin, Circuit Judge, and
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Barbadoro,* District Judge.
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Michael C. Bourbeau, Esq. with whom Bourbeau and Bourbeau was on
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brief for appellant.
Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, with whom Nadine
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Pellegrini, Assistant United States Attorney, was on brief for
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appellee.
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October 6, 1994
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*Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. After jury trial in the district court,
Per Curiam
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defendant Leo Hamel was convicted of violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 of
conspiracy to commit bank fraud and conspiracy to make false
statements for the purpose of influencing the actions of Dime Savings
Bank, a federally insured bank. He now appeals his conviction.
Defendant originally appealed on two grounds. In his
brief, he first argued that the government failed to prove as a matter
of law that Hamel knowingly made a false statement with intent to
influence a federally insured financial institution. As defendant's
counsel correctly conceded during oral argument, however, defendant's
argument on this point is precluded by this Court's recent decision in
United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 426 (1st Cir. 1994) ("It has
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been established that the government does not have to show the alleged
scheme was directed solely toward a particular institution; it is
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sufficient to show that defendant knowingly executed a fraudulent
scheme that exposed a federally insured bank to risk of loss.").
This concession leaves us with defendant's remaining
argument on appeal, that there was insufficient evidence as a matter
of law to convict him of conspiracy under 371. We have stated that
in assessing a sufficiency challenge, we examine the evidence "in the
light most flattering to the prosecution (in the process of drawing
all reasonable inferences in its favor) so that we may ascertain
whether the proof would have allowed a rational jury to determine
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the crime
charged." United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 711 (1st Cir. 1992),
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cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 1005 (1993). There are no
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specific requirements of proof of a conspiratorial agreement; we have
held that the agreement may be express or tacit, and may be proved by
direct or circumstantial evidence. United States v. Sep lveda, 15
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F.3d 1161, 1173 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct.
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2714 (1994).
Applying these standards for review of defendant's
conspiracy conviction, we easily find that there was sufficient
evidence to support a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt of an
agreement to defraud Dime Savings Bank and to present false statements
to Dime. For these reasons, we reject defendant's challenge and
affirm his conviction.
Affirmed.
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