Jackson v. Vose

USCA1 Opinion












September 30, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


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No. 93-2202

ANTOINE M. JACKSON,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

GEORGE A. VOSE,

Defendant, Appellee.


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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
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Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,
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Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
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Antoine M. Jackson on brief pro se.
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Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and
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Stephen G. Dietrick, Deputy General Counsel, Department of Correction,
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on brief for appellee.


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Per Curiam. Plaintiff Antoine Jackson appeals the
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district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of

defendants on Counts II and V of his amended civil rights

complaint.1 "We review the grant of summary judgment de
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novo, employing the same criteria incumbent upon the district
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court in the first instance," Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz,
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1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 17,298 at *3 (1st Cir. July 13, 1994.

Jackson is a prisoner at Massachusetts Correctional

Institution in Cedar Junction. He challenges the

constitutional adequacy of prison disciplinary hearings held

on January 17, 1990 and March 1, 1990, which followed two

discrete encounters between Jackson and correctional

officers. Both hearings resulted in guilty findings, and

sentences of 15 and 30 days respectively in isolation in the

Departmental Segregation Unit (DSU).

Jackson argues that his due process rights were

violated because he was denied the opportunity to call inmate

witnesses from the general prison population to testify in

person at each hearing. At the time of the hearings he was

housed outside of the general prison population in the upper

tier of the West Wing Segregation Unit (WWSU), which held





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1. The district court dismissed a third count for failure to
state a claim, and others were tried to a jury which returned
a verdict in favor of defendants. Plaintiff has not appealed
those decisions.

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disruptive inmates on "awaiting action" status.2 Jackson

had been transferred to WWSU for security reasons following

the second incident.3

Jackson initially named five general population

inmates whom he wished to call as witnesses at each hearing,

in addition to "the whole [cell] block." The subject of the

inmates' expected testimony was not revealed, however,

despite a specific request for a brief summary on the

official forms provided to Jackson for witness requests. A

second request for inmate witnesses, made through Jackson's

student attorney, named two general population inmates for

one hearing, and three for the other. Again, however, the

inmates' expected testimony was not described, although each

was identified as an eyewitness to the relevant incident.





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2. Another tier of the WWSU held prisoners sentenced to the
DSU following a disciplinary offense hearing and a finding of
guilt. The conditions of confinement for the two groups of
prisoners differed in that awaiting action prisoners had more
privileges and their status was reviewed every seven days,
rather than every 90 days. Jackson claims that he was
actually confined illegally under DSU conditions prior to his
hearings, but the conditions of his confinement within the
WWSU are immaterial to the issues before us. See infra p. 8.
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3. In the first incident Jackson was charged with
assaulting an officer, but he had remained, on awaiting
action status, confined to a cell within the general prison
population. When the second incident resulted in five
disciplinary reports from as many officers, charging Jackson
with threatening and disruptive behavior, and encouraging a
work stoppage, he was moved to WWSU.

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The chairman of the disciplinary board, defendant

Aho, allowed Jackson the opportunity to obtain and present

affidavits from the named inmates, but he denied the request

that the inmates' testimony be presented in person. Aho's

contemporaneous notes show that his decision was based on

security concerns, given the difference between Jackson's

housing in the prison and that of the inmates he sought to

call as witnesses. Aho explained, in a deposition and

affidavit submitted below, that he had decided that bringing

general population inmates into a hearing in WWSU, would have

been "unduly hazardous," particularly as Jackson had given

"no basis for determining the relevance or necessity of these

witnesses." Jackson's attorney, Aho said, accepted this

decision with an "okay." If Jackson or his attorney had

pressed the objection at the hearing (where the inmates'

affidavits were read aloud), or otherwise made a persuasive

case that Jackson needed additional evidence or live

testimony, Aho said, "I could have continued the hearing and

[explored] the possibility of relocating the hearing . . . ."



A prisoner's right to call witnesses and present

evidence at a disciplinary hearing is circumscribed by

competing concerns for institutional safety and other

correctional goals. See Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495
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(1985); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 539, 566 (1974); see
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also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 321 (1976) (a
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prisoner's right to confront and cross-examine adverse

witnesses in a disciplinary hearing is generally more limited

than the right to call friendly witnesses, but similar

interest balancing may be applied); Smith v. Massachusetts
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Dep't of Correction, 936 F.2d 1390, 1399 (1st Cir. 1991)
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(same). The presence of witnesses at the hearing may be

refused when it creates an undue risk of reprisal or

harassment, undermines authority, or otherwise creates undue

burdens on the safe administration of the prison. Ponte, 471
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U.S. at 495; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566; see also Ramer v. Kerby,
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936 F.2d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir. 1991) ("[L]egitimate

penological concerns include, but [are] not limited to,

safety or correctional goals, expense, staffing requirements

. . . and the danger of harassment."). When challenged,

prison administrators bear the burden of showing that the

reasons for the denial were not arbitrary. Ponte, 471 U.S. at
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497. They may make their reasons known at the time of the

disciplinary action or wait until the prisoner brings a legal

action. Ponte, 471 U.S. at 497; Smith, 936 F.2d at 1399-
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1400.

Our task is not to substitute our judgment for that

of the prison officials charged with conducting the

disciplinary hearing, but to determine whether the proof

offered to explain the refusal to call these witnesses



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satisfactorily carries defendants' burden of showing that the

decision was not arbitrary. Ponte, 471 U.S. at 497-99; see
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also Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 955 (2d Cir. 1986)
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(same), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 982 (1988). Defendants
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offered evidence that the decision was based on a weighing of

the known risks attendant on bringing general population

prisoners into the WWSU, the difficulties of relocating the

hearing, Jackson's failure to supply the requested

information, and the lack of any reason to believe that

affidavits would not supply Jackson's evidentiary needs. The

explanation is logically related to institutional goals and

clearly satisfies the due process requirements outlined in

the cases. See Ponte, 471 U.S. at 497 ("[S]o long as the
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reasons are logically related to preventing undue hazards . .

. the explanation should meet the due process requirements as

outlined in Wolff.").
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Jackson argues that his failure to provide a

description of the witnesses' testimony was an impermissible

factor in the decision because it was not a "knowing and

intelligent waiver" of his constitutional right to call

witnesses. The argument is beside the point. To enable

prison officials to evaluate a request for live testimony

against competing institutional concerns, obviously a

description of the nature of the expected testimony and any

other indicia of need for the testimony may be fairly



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required. Accord Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1274 (9th
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Cir. 1989). Only the prisoner can supply this information.

Having failed to supply a description despite official

requests therefor, Jackson is in a poor position to complain

that, on balance, the official charged with the decision

found that the known risks to institutional safety outweighed

the prisoner's undisclosed needs.4 We need not reach

Jackson's argument that a blanket proscription on the

testimony of all general population inmates would violate the

due process clause, because we do not read the board's

explanation as relying upon a blanket proscription.





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4. In rejecting the same argument below, the district court
placed emphasis on a clause in the published regulations that
was not added until after the disciplinary hearings in
question. 103 C.M.R. 430.14(4)(e) (1992) now expressly
includes a prisoner's failure to provide a witness summary
among the non-exclusive list of factors that may inform the
disciplinary board's decision. Despite Jackson's denial of
any responsibility for this error, it was invited by
Jackson's own memorandum in support of partial summary
judgment, which quoted the newer regulation as governing
authority.

In any event, based on a de novo review, we find no
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fault with the district court's conclusion, and no unfairness
under the regulation in effect at the time. The regulation
provided ample notice that a request to call witnesses would
be based on an evaluation of whether it would be "unduly
hazardous to personal safety or institutional security." 103
C.M.R. 430.14 (4) (1987). The non-exclusive list of
factors to be considered included "relevance," and whether
the evidence was "cumulative or repetitive." 103 C.M.R.
430.14 (4)(a)(b). Moreover, Jackson was given personal
notice, via the official request form, that the board
required information from him supportive of his requests.

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We also agree with the district court's conclusion

that there was no need to reach Jackson's argument that prior

to the disciplinary hearings he was actually confined,

illegally, in departmental segregation, rather than under the

less restrictive regimen afforded prisoners on awaiting

action status. First, the amended complaint cannot be

construed as stating an independent claim in this regard, no

matter how liberally it is read.5 Second, the conditions of

Jackson's confinement within the WWSU are not material to a

determination of the due process adequacy of the disciplinary

board's decision. The board's security concerns were based

on Jackson's housing within the WWSU, not the specific

conditions of his confinement. That the WWSU held both

awaiting action and DSU prisoners may have added to security

concerns, but it did not turn the board's decision into the

sort of bootstrap justification disapproved in Kenney v.
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Commissioner of Correction, 393 Mass. 28, 35, 468 N.E.2d 616,
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621 (1984) (where a prisoner was illegally transferred to

DSU, administrators may not rely on his illegal incarceration

as a justification for denying a request to call witnesses).

Lastly, we find no fault with the district court's

decision that the defendants were protected by qualified



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5. Jackson's argument that his first two pro se complaints
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may be reconstrued to state such a claim is irrelevant, and
in any event not properly before us because it is raised for
the first time in his reply brief.

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immunity from damages liability for their discretionary

decision. There was no proof that defendants violated any

"clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v.
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Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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For the reasons stated, the summary judgment in

favor of defendants on Counts II and V of the amended

complaint is affirmed.
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