United States v. Garafano

USCA1 Opinion












UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 93-2379

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

GARY GARAFANO,

Defendant, Appellant.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge]
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Before

Boudin, Circuit Judge,
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Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Young,* District Judge.
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John A. MacFadyen for appellant.
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Margaret E. Curran, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
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Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, and Craig N. Moore,
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Assistant United States Attorney, was on brief for the United States.


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September 23, 1994
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*Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.















BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. In December 1992 a grand jury
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indicted Gary Garafano on one count of extortion under color

of official right under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. The

gist of the charge was that from spring 1989 to December

1990, Garafano, then an official in the Providence, Rhode

Island, Department of Public Works, had extorted payments

from a road paving firm doing work for the city, Forte

Brothers Construction Corporation ("Forte Brothers").

At a first trial in June 1993 the jury deadlocked. A

second trial was conducted in the fall. At trial, the

government offered testimony of James Forte, vice president

of Forte Brothers, that during 1988 and 1989 the firm was

engaged in road repair work for the city. In or about March

1989, said Forte, he met with Garafano and agreed to the

latter's demand for $8,000, without which Garafano threatened

to cease authorizing work to be performed by Forte Brothers.

Forte also testified that he gave the money to Steven Tocco,

the firm's supervisor for the road repair work, to deliver to

Garafano.

Tocco testified that he delivered the money to Garafano.

Tocco also testified that in response to further demands

from Garafano, Tocco made somewhere between 12 and 20

additional payments to Garafano between April 1989 and

December 1990, and that the total amount of the payments to

Garafano was around $100,000. Much of the money came from



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inflated billings by Forte Brothers on individual road repair

and other projects for the city. According to prosecution

testimony, Garafano authorized various of these projects and

expedited payments.

Garafano himself testified and denied demanding or

receiving any money from Forte Brothers. Various of

Garafano's subsidiary statements were contradicted by the

director of his city department but the director had no

direct knowledge of whether Garafano had received bribes. On

October 4, 1993, the jury in the second trial found Garafano

guilty. The verdict was a general verdict on the single

count charged and provided no indication of which episodes

the jury found to have occurred.

On December 14, 1993, the trial judge held a sentencing

hearing. At the hearing defense counsel took the position

that only the first payment of $8,000 in March 1989 had been

adequately supported by evidence and that Tocco's testimony

as to further payments was not credible. It was apparently

the defense position that after the first incident Tocco

himself had been stealing from the firm and claiming falsely

that the payments had been made to Garafano. This contention

was pertinent to sentencing in several respects.

The presentence report had proposed that Garafano be

sentenced under the November 1993 version of the Sentencing

Guidelines which was in effect at the time of sentencing.



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The report recommended that the court fix the base offense

level at 10, as provided by U.S.S.G. 2C1.1(a), and that it

add two levels as a specific offense adjustment because the

offense involved more than one bribe or extortion. Id.
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2C1.1(b)(1). In addition, the report recommended a further

six-level adjustment based on the amount of the payment

received by Garafano; the guidelines provide a table fixing

such an adjustment at six levels where the amount is greater

than $70,000. Id. 2C1.1(b)(2)(A), 2F1.1(b)(1)(G). A
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payment of $8,000 would have added only two levels. Id.
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Prior to November 1989, the guidelines did not included

the two-point adjustment for multiple bribes. Garafano's

counsel objected that without the additional payments

allegedly made through Tocco, the extortionate conduct would

have ceased prior to the effectiveness of that guideline

amendment. Counsel argued that if the conduct did cease

before the amendment, then ex post facto concerns required
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that the two points not be included. Our decisions confirm

that where a guideline amendment increases the sentence after

the offense, the guidelines in effect at the time of the

offense should be used. See e.g., United States v.
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Rodriguez, 26 F.3d 4, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1994).
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More important, if Tocco's testimony were disregarded,

then the total amount gained by the extortionate conduct

would be only $8,000. This would eliminate not only the two-



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point adjustment for multiple bribes (since there would be no

second bribe proved) but also the proposed six-point

adjustment based on "the loss or gain table". Of course,

Forte's testimony alone, not challenged at the sentencing

hearing, established that Garafano had solicited a bribe in

the amount of $8,000, whether or not Tocco delivered the

money; but a single $8,000 bribe would have reduced the

guideline range.

At the sentencing hearing defense counsel asked the

court to find that the 1989 version of the guidelines

applied, asserting that the jury may have based its verdict

only on the first $8,000 bribe, which counsel described as

"the only corroborated event" that the government had proved

to the jury. The court replied, "how can you ask me to

dissect what a jury has done?" Counsel responded that "[t]he

guidelines allow you exactly that power . . . ." Pressed as

to why the court should disbelieve Tocco, defense counsel

offered an example of an asserted contradiction between the

testimony of Tocco and other government witnesses.

The prosecutor replied that Tocco's testimony had been

corroborated, and then added: "I don't think the Court has

the discretion to piecemeal the jury's verdict in this case."

The court replied: "I quite agree with you," adding (to

defense counsel) that "the reasons [the prosecutor] stated

are ample in and of themselves." The court went on to say



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that it agreed that "the facts of the case reflect" that the

offense occurred between April 1989 and December 1990 and

showed the receipt of between 12 and 20 payments.

Accordingly the court rejected the ex post facto claim.
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Defense counsel then went on to argue at even greater

length that Tocco should not be believed. This time the

argument was to support counsel's claim that, in applying the

loss or gain table, the court should treat as proved only the

first $8,000. The court listened courteously to the argument

and then rejected it, saying that "there was substantial

evidence . . . [that] could convince a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt." Defense counsel then said that the jury

could have convicted solely on the basis of the $8,000 bribe.

The court replied: "I'm not going to dissect this jury's

verdict."

After other largely unrelated discussion, the court

heard final statements from defense counsel and Garafano. It

then summed up:

We have a base offense level of 10 in this case,
and since there was more than one bribe, two points
have to be added. And since the amount involved
approximately $100,000.00, that's an additional six
points, which gives a total adjusted level of 18.
He has a criminal history category of one, which
means the sentencing range is from 27 to 33 months.

Concluding that Garafano had been motivated by "sheer greed

and nothing else," the court imposed a sentence of 31 months

imprisonment and a $6,000 fine, together with an order



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requiring Garafano to make restitution of $100,000 to the

city. This appeal followed.

The only issue on appeal is the defense claim that the

district court erred because it allegedly refused to make an

independent assessment of the Tocco testimony and make its

own finding as to whether bribes of approximately $100,000

had been paid during a period extending to December 1990.

The government agrees that an independent determination was

required but says that the district court made such an

assessment. We agree with the government that the district

court probably did make an independent assessment but to

remove the shadow of uncertainty, we have decided to remand.

The uncertainty is apparent from our recitation of the

facts. Normally the trial court makes its own assessment of

the facts that pertain to sentencing, drawing on trial

evidence, the presentence report, any evidence offered at the

hearing, and other appropriate sources. See United States v.
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Tavano, 12 F.3d 301, 306-07 (1st Cir. 1993). Indeed, we have
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held that a judge may attribute conduct to a defendant for

"relevant conduct" purposes even where a jury has declined to

convict on counts pertaining to such conduct. United States
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v. Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70, 80 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
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S.Ct. 1644 (1994); United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13,
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16-17 (1st Cir. 1989).





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Whether the trial court could ever be bound at

sentencing by the jury's determination against a defendant

(e.g., through collateral estoppel) is an interesting issue
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but is irrelevant here: the government agrees that the jury

could in theory have convicted solely on the evidence

pertaining to the first $8,000 bribe solicitation; and since

the jury delivered a general verdict there is no way to tell

what it actually found as to the number of bribes. In sum,

even if a jury verdict against the defendant on a fact issue
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could ever constrain the sentencing judge, but cf. Tavano, 12
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F.3d at 305, 307, this jury verdict could not resolve the

amount and timing issues faced at sentencing.

We have read the sentencing transcript in full and are

inclined to think that the trial judge, an experienced and

respected jurist, fully understood that he could and should

decide himself when the offense ended and how much was paid.

Further, his statement quoted above ("the facts of the case

reflect . . .") is reasonably clear evidence that he did

resolve those issues against Garafano and was not relying

upon the jury verdict or any misinterpretation of it. Nor

does Garafano argue on appeal that the evidence at trial was

insufficient to support findings at sentencing that the

bribes continued to December 1990 and equaled about $100,000.

If this were all, we would affirm without a moment's

hesitation. But we agree with Garafano that the record is at



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least blurred by the agreement of the trial judge and the

prosecutor that the jury verdict could not be dissected.

Quite likely both meant only that peering into the verdict

was infeasible and served no purpose; but abstractly the

prosecutor's words could be taken as an argument that the

jury had resolved the issue of timing and amount against

Garafano and that this decision was binding.

The prosecutor's statement--"I don't think the Court has

the discretion to piecemeal the jury's verdict in this case"-

- happens to sound like a refutation of defense counsel's
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earlier argument to the court that "[y]ou [the court] have

the ability, the discretion in sentencing" to determine the

amount and timing of the loss. As government counsel

properly says on appeal, the prosecutor's statement was an

"unfortunate" choice of words. The district judge then

followed the prosecutor's statement by saying, "I quite agree

with you" and telling defense counsel that the prosecutor's

reasons were "ample" basis for rejecting the defense

position.

In saying that these colloquies leave a measure of

uncertainty, we do not intend the slightest criticism of

either the court or counsel. Court colloquies are not

scripted events like television commercials or public

speeches. Lawyers are usually trying to advance and explain

conflicting positions, and the judge is seeking to resolve on



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the spot often arcane issues and tangled factual disputes.

In this case, it is quite likely that there was no

misunderstanding whatever.

Still, the difference between a total offense level of

18, with a range of 27 to 33 months, and a total level of 12,

with a range of 10 to 16 months, is substantial; and the

latter's maximum 16 months is just about half of the sentence
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actually imposed. It takes very little effort to resolve the

uncertainty. Defense counsel suggested at oral argument a

remand for an entirely new sentencing hearing; the government

said that if any remedy were needed, this court could retain

jurisdiction and simply ask the district court to clarify the

record. We have in mind a third course.

We propose to vacate the existing sentence and remand

the matter to the district court for resentencing. The

district court has already given Garafano a chance to argue

his evidentiary position in full and no request was made by

defense counsel to offer new evidence; if the district court

did (at the earlier hearing)--or did not then but now does--

find (independently of the jury verdict) that bribes

continued until December 1990 and were around $100,000, the

court is free to say so summarily and to reimpose the same

sentence. No additional proceedings, or further explanation

or findings, are required. See United States v. Savoie, 985
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F.2d 612, 620-21 (1st Cir. 1993).



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Conversely, the district court is free to order any

further proceedings it deems appropriate before imposing

sentence. It may do so if there was an actual

misunderstanding at the original sentencing as to the

district court's authority, or merely because the court

thinks that this would be useful to it. But if the court

does change the factual premise on which it sentences

Garafano--and thereby alters the guideline range available--

we think that it would be within the spirit of the rules to

provide counsel and the defendant an opportunity to allocute

again.

The sentence, but not the conviction, is vacated and the
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case remanded for resentencing in accordance with this
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opinion.

























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