USCA1 Opinion
March 29, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 94-1005
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH LUSSIER,
Defendant, Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
Joseph Lussier on brief pro se. ______________
Loretta C. Argrett, Assistant Attorney General, Robert E. ____________________ ___________
Lindsay, Alan Hechtkopf, Michael E. Karam, Attorneys, Tax Division, _______ _______________ _________________
Department of Justice, and Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, __________________
on brief for appellee.
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____________________
Per Curiam. Appellant was adequately advised of his ___________
right to proceed pro se and his right to an appointed
attorney.1 He was further properly told that unless he
waived the latter right, he would not be permitted to proceed
pro se and an attorney would be appointed. Tuitt v. Fair, ______________
822 F.2d 166, 167 (1st Cir.) (trial court may "insist that
the right to go pro se be conditioned upon an express and
unequivocal waiver of counsel"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 ____________
(1987). Appellant refused to waive his right to counsel.
Consequently, the district court did not err in appointing
counsel for him.
Moreover, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to permit Peter Van Daam to sit at
counsel table, United States v. Lussier, 929 F.2d 25, 28 (1st ________________________
Cir. 1991) ("no infirmity in the district court's exclusion
of lay counsel from the proceedings"), or in not requiring
appointed counsel to consult with Van Daam.
We have considered all of defendant's arguments and do
not find any merit in his appeal.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1. ________ ___
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1. In referring to appellant's right to be represented by an
attorney, the district court at some times used the word
"counsel" and at other times "attorney." The words were
interchangeable in the particular context. To the extent
appellant is contending otherwise, we find the argument
specious.