USCA1 Opinion
May 25, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-1152
J. DOE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
Defendant, Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
J. Doe on brief pro se. ______
Robert W. Iuliano, Office of the General Counsel, on brief for __________________
appellee.
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. Appellant J. Doe appeals the ___________
dismissal of her suit against Harvard University as
frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(d). Doe also alleges
that the district court erred in denying her request for an
extension of time to reply to the court order of December 20,
1994, requiring her to show cause, within twenty days, why
her case should not be dismissed. Finally, she asserts that
the district court judge should have recused himself from
this case.
Section 1915(d) provides the district court discretion
to dismiss an in forma pauperis action where, inter alia, the __ _____ ________ _____ ____
claim is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory."
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Watson v. _______ ________ ______
Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 539 (1st Cir. 1993). In the instant _____
case, each of the four claims raised by Doe was legally
meritless.
Two claims arise out of the same series of events which
formed the basis of Doe's previously dismissed action against
Harvard.1 Although Doe raises different legal theories in
the instant case, her claims are nevertheless barred by the
doctrine of res judicata since they involve the same parties ___ ________
and arise "from the same set of operative facts." Kale v. ____
Combined Insurance Co., 924 F.2d 1161, 1166 (1st Cir.), cert. _____________________ ____
____________________
1. This court affirmed the district court dismissal of Doe's
prior action in an unpublished opinion dated October 12,
1994.
denied, 502 U.S. 816 (1991). Repetitious actions are ______
appropriate for dismissal pursuant to section 1915(d). See, ___
e.g., Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992); ___ ____ _______
Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir.), cert. ______ _______ ____
denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989). ______
Doe's claim pursuant to the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act [FERPA], 20 U.S.C. 1232, is likewise
without legal merit since FERPA does not create a private
right of action. See, e.g., Fay v. South Colonie Cent. Sch. ___ ___ ___ ________________________
Dist., 802 F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 1986). ____
Finally, Doe's allegation that Harvard was guilty of
civil contempt for violating a court order issued in the
prior case cannot constitute an independent cause of action.
See, e.g., D. Patrick Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 8 F.3d 455, 459 ___ ___ ______________ _____________
(7th Cir. 1993) ("there is no such thing as an independent
cause of action for civil contempt") (quoting Blalock v. _______
United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir. 1988)). _____________
Furthermore, we find no error in the denial by the
district court of Doe's request for an extension of time in
which to file her response to the show cause order. Doe's
claim that the district judge should have recused himself is
neither supported by the record nor is it properly before
this court since it was not raised below. See In re Abijoe ___ _____________
Realty Corp., 943 F.2d 121, 126-27 (1st Cir. 1991) ____________
-3-
(dismissing disqualification claim not raised in district
court).
Affirmed. ________
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