United States v. Abrahams

USCA1 Opinion









July 6, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT





____________________

No. 94-2132

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

DOUGLAS ABRAHAMS,

Defendant, Appellant.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Cyr, Boudin and Lynch,
Circuit Judges. ______________


____________________

Roger A. Cox on brief for appellant. ____________


____________________


____________________



















Per Curiam. Douglas Abrahams pled guilty to ___________

conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and

to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846 and was

sentenced to serve 92 months in a federal prison. He

appealed from his sentence. After this court appointed

Attorney Roger Cox as appellate counsel, Cox filed a brief

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), on the ______ __________

ground that he had been unable to identify any meritorious

ground for appeal. Cox also filed a motion to withdraw as

Abrahams' counsel, notifying Abrahams of his right to file a

separate brief. Abrahams has not filed a brief, and the

deadline for doing so has now passed.

We agree that this appeal presents no meritorious

issues, and so we affirm the sentence. The record indicates

that Abrahams did not believe that he should receive the

enhanced base offense level accorded career offenders under

the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual 4B1.1 (Nov.

1993). Relying on Abrahams' previous convictions for robbery

in Maine and for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon

in Massachusetts, the probation officer found that Abrahams

was a career offender within the meaning of 4B1.1 and so

enhanced Abrahams' base offense level under that guideline.1




____________________

1. The convictions were a June 25, 1984 conviction for
robbery in Cumberland County, Maine, and an April 15, 1988
conviction for assault and battery by means of a dangerous
weapon in Newburyport, Massachusetts.













In a letter to the probation officer, Abrahams' counsel

objected to the use of those convictions to establish

Abraham's career offender status. According to counsel,

Massachusetts had reneged on a plea agreement promising

Abrahams a concurrent sentence on the Massachusetts charge if

he pled guilty to both the Maine and Massachusetts charges.

Counsel also stated that no mittimus had ever been filed in

the Massachusetts conviction.

At sentencing, counsel reasserted his objection

based on Massachusetts' alleged violation of its plea

agreement with Abrahams, although his objection may have been

limited to the Maine conviction. Citing Custis v. United ______ ______

States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1735-36, 1738-39 (1994), the court ______

overruled the objection because Abrahams had been represented

by counsel in those convictions. In Custis, the Supreme ______

Court held that the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.

924(e), did not specifically permit any such collateral

attack, and it declined to imply any such right under the

statute. Id. at 1735-36. The Court also held that ___

defendants could attack a prior state court conviction used

for sentence enhancement under the Constitution only if they

had not been represented by counsel at all in connection with

the prior conviction. Id. at 1738. ___

The district court correctly found that Custis ______

foreclosed any constitutionally based collateral attack on



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Abrahams' prior state convictions at his sentencing.

According to the presentence report, Abrahams had been

represented by counsel in both the Maine and Massachusetts

convictions. His counsel affirmed that fact at the

sentencing hearing. In addition, the Sentencing Guidelines

do not independently permit collateral attack on prior state

convictions used to establish career offender status under

guideline 4B1.1. Guideline 4A1.2 applies in counting

convictions under 4B1.1. See USSG 4B1.2, comment. (n.4). ___

Application note 6 of that guideline states that "this

guideline and commentary do not confer upon the defendant any

right to attack collaterally [in a current sentencing

proceeding] a prior conviction or sentence beyond any such

rights otherwise recognized in law[.]" At sentencing,

counsel did not assert that any other statute, rule or

regulation independent of the Guidelines gave Abrahams any

such right, and, as noted, the Constitution conferred no such

right on Abrahams here. See United States v. Munoz, 36 F.3d ___ _____________ _____

1229, 1337 (1st Cir. 1994) (the constitutional question

resolved in Custis is the same under the sentencing ______

guidelines as under the Armed Career Criminal Act), cert. _____

denied, 115 S. Ct. 1164 (1995). ______

Accordingly, the court did not err in accepting the

probation officer's determination that Abrahams was a career

offender within the meaning of 4B1.1. See United States v. ___ _____________



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Garcia, 42 F.3d 573, 578-81 (10th Cir. 1994); United States ______ _____________

v. Jones, 28 F.3d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1994) (both concluding, on _____

the basis of application note 6 in the 1993 USSG Manual, that

a defendant, who had been found to be a 4B1.1 career

offender had no right to collaterally attack his prior

convictions where he had been represented by counsel in those

convictions and had not pointed to any other law that would

authorize such a challenge); compare United States v. Isaacs, _______ _____________ ______

14 F.3d 106, 109-10 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1994) (after 1990,

application note 6 precluded collateral review of prior

convictions at sentencing), limitation on other grounds ______________________________

recognized in United States v. Cordero, 42 F.3d 697, 701 (1st _____________ _____________ _______

Cir. 1994).

We have reviewed the transcripts of Abrahams' plea

hearing and sentencing hearing carefully and have found no

error that would warrant this appeal. Since Cox has complied

with all requirements of Loc. R. 46.4(a), we hereby grant his _____

motion to withdraw as counsel and affirm Abrahams' sentence. ______

It is so ordered. _________________















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