USCA1 Opinion
July 5, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 95-1336
MICHAEL T. ROSSMAN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges. ______________
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Michael T. Rossman on brief pro se. __________________
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Per Curiam. Complaining about a scheduling order, __________
which reassigned his case from Cambridge to Concord without
notice or hearing, plaintiff filed the present civil rights
action. Plaintiff contends that he has been denied due
process in the state court. Plaintiff emphasizes that he is
not challenging the ruling itself -- that is, the correctness
of the scheduling order -- but, rather, the lack of process -
- the absence of notice and hearing. This distinction, he
seems to believe, immunizes his case from dismissal under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 ______________ ______ ___________________
U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. _______________________________________
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). We disagree. See Phinizy v. _______ ___ _______
Alabama, 847 F.2d 282, 284 (5th Cir. 1988) (claim that _______
probate court's conduct of proceedings denied plaintiff due
process was inextricably intertwined with probate court's
judgment; consequently, under Rooker-Feldman, lower federal ______________
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the challenge).
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1. ________ ___