Greco v. Fitzpatrick

USCA1 Opinion









June 23, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT




____________________


No. 94-2248

FRANK A. GRECO, M.D., Ph.D.,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

MARY C. FITZPATRICK, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Frank A. Greco, M.D., Ph.D., on brief pro se. ___________________________
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and Rebecca P. McIntyre, __________________ _____________________
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees.


____________________


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Per Curiam. We affirm the judgment substantially for __________

the reasons recited in the district court's decision of

November 10, 1994, adding only the following comments.

In objecting to the district court's reliance on the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., ______________ ___ ______ ___________________

263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. _____________________________________

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), plaintiff argues that he is not _______

seeking to overturn any state court judgment per se and that,

in fact, many of the challenges here advanced to the probate

court proceedings were never pursued in the state court

system. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that a ______________

federal district court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review

a state court judgment. See, e.g., id. at 482-86; Gash ___ ____ ___ ____

Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, Ill., 995 F.2d 726, 728-29 _______ __________________________

(7th Cir. 1993); Lancellotti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 17 (1st ___________ ___

Cir. 1990). What plaintiff fails to recognize is that such

"impermissible appellate review may occur when a district

court is asked to entertain a claim that was not even argued

in the state court but is 'inextricably intertwined' with the

state court judgment." Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 753 ______ ____

(7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16), _______

cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 694 (1994); accord, e.g., Keene _____________ ______ ____ _____

Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 296-97 (8th Cir. 1990). The _____ ____
















multiple claims here presented--alleging violations of such

matters as due process, equal protection, and the right to

counsel--are sufficiently "intertwined" with the probate

court proceedings so as to fall within the Rooker-Feldman ______________

doctrine's embrace. Plaintiff's remedy is to appeal within

the state court system and then, if necessary, to petition

the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.

We add that plaintiff's various allegations would falter

even if the merits were to be considered. To list just some

of the infirmities affecting his complaint: In order to

state a cause of action under the second clause of 42 U.S.C.

1985(2), plaintiff was required to allege class-based,

invidiously discriminatory animus, see, e.g., Hahn v. ___ ____ ____

Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 469 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 _______ ____________

U.S. 904 (1976); divorced fathers seeking custody of their

children do not form a protected class under 1985. No

Sixth Amendment right to counsel obtains in civil proceedings

of this nature. See, e.g., Wilson v. State of New Hampshire, ___ ____ ______ ______________________

18 F.3d 40, 41 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Unauthorized

conduct that cannot be foreseen and controlled does not

constitute a due process violation "until and unless [the

state] ... refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation

remedy," Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); no such ______ ______

showing has been made here. With respect to those claims

that were or could have been presented in state court,



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relitigation thereof would be barred on preclusion grounds.

See, e.g., Willhauck v. Halpin, 953 F.2d 689, 705 (1st Cir. ___ ____ _________ ______

1991). The judicial defendants would be immune from most if

not all of the damage claims here presented. See, e.g., ___ ____

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam). And the _______ ____

Commonwealth and the probate court (along with the private

defendants in their official capacities) are not "persons"

within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1983. See, e.g., Hafer v. ___ ____ _____

Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1991); Will v. Michigan Dep't of ____ ____ _________________

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 62-70 (1989). ____________

Affirmed. _________































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