USCA1 Opinion
June 16, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 95-1162
PAUL LITTLE,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, WARDEN, ETC., ET AL.,
Respondents, Appellees.
_________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Martin F. Loughlin, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________
_________________________
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Cyr, Circuit Judge. _____________
_________________________
Paul J. Twomey, with whom Twomey & Sisti Law Offices was on _______________ __________________________
brief, for appellant.
Joseph N. Laplante, Assistant Attorney General, with whom ___________________
Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellees. _________________
_________________________
_________________________
SELYA, Circuit Judge. Petitioner-appellant Paul Little SELYA, Circuit Judge. _____________
asked the federal district court to invoke its habeas corpus
powers, 28 U.S.C. 2241-2254 (1988), and set aside a sentence
imposed in a New Hampshire state court.
The historical facts are largely undisputed. The
parties entered into an agreement for a "naked plea," i.e., a ____
guilty plea that would merit a mutually agreed sentencing
recommendation by the prosecutor without purporting to bind the
sentencing court to accept the recommendation. The state
initially failed to make the agreed recommendation and the
superior court levied a more severe sentence. On appeal, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court vacated the sentence. Petitioner was
resentenced before a different judge, and a prosecutor who was
new to the case represented the state at resentencing. In
petitioner's view, she gave mere lip service to the state's
promise and thereby deprived petitioner who again received a
stiffer sentence than the state had agreed to suggest of due
process. When petitioner appealed, the state supreme court
refused to set the sentence aside. This habeas corpus proceeding
followed. The gravamen of Little's petition is his charge that
the state, having agreed to recommend a specific sentence in
exchange for petitioner's guilty plea, effectively subverted the
bargain.
We share petitioner's major premise: the Due Process
Clause proscribes not only the explicit repudiation of a
prosecutor's assurances to the defendant, but also forbids end-
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runs around those assurances. See, e.g., United States v. ___ ____ ______________
Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 269-70 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. ______ _____________
Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 377-78 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. _____ _____________
Voccola, 600 F. Supp. 1534, 1537 (D.R.I. 1985); see generally _______ ___ _________
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). We disagree, __________ _________
however, with petitioner's conclusion that the state violated
this tenet on resentencing.
We will not tarry. The district court, in a thoughtful
rescript, declined to issue the writ. See Little v. Cunningham, ___ ______ __________
No. C-94-523-L (D.N.H. Dec. 29, 1994). We have previously
stated, and today reaffirm, that when a district judge produces a
well-reasoned opinion that reaches the correct result, a
reviewing tribunal should not rush to write at length merely to
put matters in its own words. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont ___ ____ _____________________
Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993). So it ________________________
is here. Consequently, we affirm the district court's dismissal
of petitioner's habeas application for substantially the reasons
set forth in that court's rescript.
We add only a decurate comment. The jurisprudence of
habeas corpus demands that a federal court cede substantial
deference to the state courts' subsidiary findings of fact. See ___
28 U.S.C. 2254(d) (stipulating presumption of correctness that
attaches to state court findings of fact in federal habeas
proceedings); see also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112-15 ___ ____ ______ ______
(1985). The issue that petitioner raises here whether the
second prosecutor, although mouthing the agreed recommendation,
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simultaneously subverted it is peculiarly fact-sensitive. The
record, interpreted one way, is capable of supporting
petitioner's view. But interpreted another way, the record is
equally capable of supporting the state courts' findings. Both
interpretations are reasonable. Neither interpretation is
compelled. That ends the matter: where, as here, the record in
a habeas case supports plausible but conflicting factbound
inferences, we think that the state courts' choice between them
is entitled to the presumption of correctness. See Neron v. ___ _____
Tierney, 841 F.2d 1197, 1200 (1st Cir.) (holding that the _______
presumption of correctness "attaches in full flower" where a
state court's factual determinations are "`fairly supported by
the record'") (quoting 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(8)), cert. denied, 488 _____ ______
U.S. 832 (1988).
We need go no further. The judgment below must be
Affirmed. Affirmed. ________
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