Command v. B.J.'S Wholesale

USCA1 Opinion


                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 94-1853

COMMAND TRANSPORTATION INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

B.J.'S WHOLESALE CLUB INC.,
AMES DEPARTMENT STORES INC.,
MORSE SHOE INC., LIONEL LEISURE INC.,
AND HOME INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants - Appellees.

____________________

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellant.
____________________

ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this court issued on August 9, 1995 is
amended as follows:

The coversheet should read "Hon. W. Arthur Garrity, Jr.". ___






































UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 94-1853

COMMAND TRANSPORTATION INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

B.J.'S WHOLESALE CLUB INC.,
AMES DEPARTMENT STORES INC.,
MORSE SHOE INC., LIONEL LEISURE INC.,
AND HOME INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants - Appellees.

____________________

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellant.
____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Boudin, Circuit Judge, _____________
John R. Gibson* and Campbell, Senior Circuit Judges. _____________________
_____________________

David J. Daly, with whom John E. Lecomte, Timothy J. Daly ______________ _______________ ________________
and Lecomte, Emanuelson, Tick & Doyle, were on brief for _____________________________________
appellant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.
Kurt Terwilliger, with whom Richard D. Bickelman and Deutsch ________________ ____________________ _______
Williams Brooks DeRensis Holland & Drachman were on brief for _____________________________________________
appellee Command Transportation, Inc.

____________________

August 9, 1995
____________________
____________________

* Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge. Liberty Mutual JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge. ____________________

Insurance Company appeals from the district court's judgment

denying its counterclaims against Command Transportation, Inc. to

recover freight damage claims Liberty paid to Command's shippers

and to collect insurance premiums from Command. Liberty argues

that the district court erred: (1) in failing to reduce freight

damage claims Liberty paid Command's shipping customers by the

amounts the shippers owed Command for freight services; (2) in

denying its motions to substitute or add the Resolution Trust

Corporation as a defendant or third-party defendant; (3) in

denying relief on Liberty's breach of contract claim against

Command for unpaid insurance premiums; and (4) in ruling on

issues of disputed material fact. We affirm the district court's

judgment.

It is unnecessary that we detail the complex facts

underlying the relatively simple issues in this appeal. This

litigation began when Command, an interstate trucking company,

became insolvent and attempted to collect freight charges from

its shippers, including B.J.'s Wholesale Club, Inc.; Lionel

Leisure, Inc.; Morse Shoe, Inc.; and Ames Department Stores.

These shippers filed counterclaims against Command for freight

damage and losses.

In 1980, Command had purchased a Motor Truck Cargo

Policy from Liberty. As required by the Interstate Commerce Act,

the policy contained an endorsement for cargo liability, commonly

referred to as a "BMC-32 endorsement." 49 U.S.C. 10927

(a)(3)(1988). Under the BMC-32 endorsement Liberty was required













to pay directly any freight damage claims of Command's shippers

for which Command may have been liable. Further, the BMC-32

endorsement provided, in part:

The insured agrees to reimburse [Liberty]
for any payment made by [Liberty] on
account of any loss or damage involving a
breach of the terms of the policy and for
any payment that [Liberty] would not have
been obligated to make under the
provisions of the policy, except for the
agreement contained in this endorsement.


The policy terminated on October 1, 1988, and was replaced by a

similar policy issued by Home Insurance Company. Command sued

Liberty and Home for breaching the insurance contract by failing

to pay shippers directly for their lost or damaged freight.

Although Liberty admittedly received the freight claims (and, in

fact, paid some), Liberty argued that it was entitled to

Command's accounts receivable from the shippers. Liberty alleged

that a surety relationship existed between Command and Liberty by

virtue of Liberty's payment of freight damage claims directly to

the shippers under the BMC-32 endorsement. As surety of an

insolvent principal, Liberty contended that it could set off

Command's freight charge claims against Liberty's obligation to

pay the shippers' freight damage claims.

In 1986, Command entered into a revolving finance

agreement with Comfed Savings Bank. The agreement granted Comfed

a security interest in certain of Command's assets, including

Command's accounts receivable.




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By April 1989, Command was insolvent. Command sold its

assets to Munson Transportation and paid the proceeds to Comfed.

In December 1990, the RTC was named as conservator for Comfed,

and, in September 1991, the RTC was appointed receiver. Liberty

claimed that the RTC was the real party in interest which must be

substituted for Command or added as a third-party defendant.

During the litigation, the district court denied

Liberty's motions to substitute the RTC for Command or to add the

RTC as a third-party defendant. The court rejected Liberty's

arguments that the RTC, through Comfed, was the real party in

interest.

Ultimately, the parties resolved all their respective

claims, except for Liberty's counterclaims against Command for

setoff and for breach of contract.

The district court ordered that Command and Liberty

file an agreed stipulation of facts. The parties could not agree

to a joint stipulation of facts, so each party submitted its own

proposed stipulation of facts. The proposed stipulations were

almost identical except each party included some facts that the

other party either disagreed with or did not address.

After a hearing on March 28, 1994, the district court

denied Liberty's counterclaims. Command Transportation Inc. v. _______________________________

B.J's Wholesale Club, Inc., Civ. No. 90-10188-G, slip op. at 16- __________________________

17 (D. Mass. June 23, 1994). The court determined that the BMC-

32 endorsement obligated Liberty to pay shippers directly for

freight damage and loss. The court ruled that although this


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obligation may supersede other provisions of the insurance

policy, "the endorsement must be read in conjunction with, not in

lieu of, the policy." Id. at 9. The court based this ruling on ___

the endorsement, which stated: "[A]ll terms, conditions, and

limitations in the policy to which this endorsement is attached

are to remain in full force and effect." After discussing two

cases considering earlier versions of the BMC-32 endorsement, In __

re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 362 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1966), and ____________________________

Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. J. Transport, Inc., 880 F.2d ______________________________________________________

1291 (11th Cir. 1989), the court distinguished obligations

arising from the policy and obligations arising from the

endorsement. The court concluded that Liberty could be a surety,

entitled to a setoff only for payments it made to shippers

"solely" under the endorsement, and that Liberty failed to prove

that it made payments solely under the endorsement. Slip op. at

13. The court determined that Liberty failed to classify its

payments to shippers as an obligation from the endorsement or as

an obligation from the policy. The court pointed out that

Liberty omitted the cargo policy as an exhibit to the Stipulation

of Facts, and attached only a one-page form: "Motor Truck Policy

- Gross Receipts," which did not explain Liberty's obligation to

pay claims under the policy. Id. The court ruled that Liberty ___

was not entitled to set off freight damage claims with Command's

accounts receivable. The court acknowledged that Liberty could

have a valid setoff claim "to the extent that its payments

represent deductibles it would not have been obligated to pay


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under the policy." Id. at 14. Once again, however, the court ___

concluded that Liberty failed to prove entitlement to a setoff.

The court referred to an affidavit submitted by Liberty, to which

Command did not stipulate, listing Liberty's total payments to

each shipper. Id. Because the affidavit showed only total ___

payments, the court could neither determine if Liberty had

already reduced the amount by the deductible, nor calculate the

date, amount, or number of losses. Accordingly, the court

concluded that there was no basis for ruling that Liberty was

entitled to a setoff for the deductible amount. Id. at 14-15. ___

Liberty also claimed subrogation rights arising from

indemnity agreements between it and Command, whereby Command

agreed to indemnify Liberty for any monies paid by Liberty in

connection with "bonds, undertakings and/or obligations of

suretyship or guarantee" issued on behalf of Command. Because

Liberty's recovery under this provision depended on proving a

surety relationship, the court did not address Liberty's claim of

subrogation. Id. at 15. The court explained that a further ___

obstacle to Liberty's claims existed because a non-party, the

RTC, held a secured interest in Command's accounts receivable.

Id. at 16. ___

Finally, the court held that Liberty failed to prove

its breach of contract claim. Id. The court reasoned that the ___

sole item of evidence, a September 20, 1989, Statement of

Account, did not prove that Command owed Liberty premiums under

the policy that lapsed in 1988. Without the terms of the policy,


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including proof of coverage dates, the court refused to speculate

whether Command had failed to pay premiums due. Id. at 17. ___

Liberty filed a motion to amend judgment. At a hearing

on a different motion, Liberty's counsel stated that he did not

expect the court to enter judgment on the basis of stipulated

facts but thought there would be a trial. The district court

judge found this statement inconsistent with his recollection of

the March 28, 1994 proceedings when Liberty's counsel remained

silent after Command's counsel stated he expected the court to

enter judgment on the basis of the stipulated record. The court

construed Liberty's silence as assent. The district court denied

Liberty's motion, and Liberty appeals.

I. I.

In its reply brief, Liberty contends that the parties

did not authorize the district court to decide disputed material

facts. Liberty asserts that although the parties wanted the

district court to decide the case based on stipulated facts, the

parties did not agree to stipulated facts. Arguing that the

standard governing the granting of a summary judgment motion

applies, Liberty contends that the district court erred by ruling

on material issues of genuine fact without a trial.

Liberty agreed, however, for the district court to

decide the case on the record before it. The first paragraph in

Liberty's memorandum submitted to the district court in support

of judgment in its favor states:

The following memorandum is submitted
pursuant to the agreement between

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[Command] and [Liberty] that all
remaining issues in this case be decided
by the Court based upon a Stipulation of
Facts. No final agreement on the
Stipulation of Facts was reached by the
deadline imposed by the Court, so the
references in this memorandum are to the
"Stipulation of Facts" filed by Liberty
on March 23, 1994. Liberty also relies
on its previous briefs filed with respect
to this matter.

The record of the March 28 proceedings also shows that

Liberty expected the court to decide the case based on the record

before it. At the hearing, the district court judge asked:

"What are we doing here this afternoon?" The judge questioned

whether the proceedings were pretrial, cross motions for summary

judgment, or trial of the case. Command's counsel responded that

the court directed the parties to submit a stipulation of facts

and brief the issue of liability on Liberty's counterclaims. The

court then explained that it was unsure where to turn for

evidence of the payments, receipts and dates, and asked if the

submitted filings identified the amounts that Liberty, or anyone

else, paid the shippers. Command's counsel answered that

Liberty's affidavit showed the amounts Liberty paid and that

Command did not intend to submit further documentation.

Liberty's counsel agreed that he addressed every issue Command

raised in its briefs. After discussing the merits of various

issues, the court asked Liberty's counsel what he sought.

Liberty answered: "any monies which went to Command or may go to

Command in the future which were subject to the shipper's right

to setoff."


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Furthermore, the district court's June 23, 1994,

decision made twenty-three findings of fact, incorporating all of

the stipulations of facts submitted by Liberty in its March 24,

1994 filing, except for Liberty's proposed stipulation that

Command had not paid certain premiums due. Liberty's argument in

this appeal does not identify a disputed issue of material fact

it claims to be wrongly decided by the district court.1 We

therefore reject Liberty's argument that the district court erred

by deciding this case and, indeed, are left with the impression

that Liberty has been less than candid in urging this position.

II. II.

Liberty argues that the BMC-32 endorsement created a

surety relationship between Liberty and Command, and that the

district court's finding of no suretyship is clearly erroneous.

Liberty contends that, as Command's surety, it is entitled to

assert the shippers' right to set off unpaid freight charges.

The case law unequivocally supports the district

court's view that the mere existence of the BMC-32 endorsement

does not give rise to a surety relationship entitling Liberty to

set off its obligation to pay freight damage claims. A

suretyship is created only after the insurer makes a payment

____________________

1 Having failed to identify any material factual dispute,
Liberty's arguments that the district court should have viewed
the proceedings as cross-motions for summary judgment and held a
trial on the merits are contradictory. See Boston Five Cents ___ __________________
Sav. Bank v. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 768 F.2d 5, 11-12 _____________________________________________
(1st Cir. 1985) (discussing difference between decisions based on
cross-motions for summary judgment and those based on a
stipulated record).

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required solely under the endorsement, in other words, a payment

the insurer "would not have been obligated to make under the

provisions of the policy."

The Second Circuit considered an earlier version of the

BMC-32 endorsement in In re Yale Express, 362 F.2d 111. That ___________________

endorsement required the carrier to reimburse the insurer "for

any payment that the [insurer] would not have been obligated to

make under the provisions of the policy, except for the agreement

contained in the endorsement." Id. at 113. After the carrier ___

went bankrupt, the shippers asserted claims for lost and damaged

freight. Id. The carrier and insurer asserted conflicting ___

positions. The carrier demanded that the shippers pay all

freight charges to it. Id. The insurer asserted that it could ___

set off freight damage claims with the carrier's claims against

the shippers for unpaid freight. Id. The Second Circuit held ___

that the insurer was a surety only for the claims it paid solely

under the endorsement, not to those claims it paid also required

by the policy. Id. at 114. The court explained that suretyship ___

exists when "'one person has undertaken an obligation and another

person is also under an obligation or other duty to the obligee,

who is entitled to but one performance, and as between the two

who are bound, one rather than the other should perform.'" Id. ___

(quoting Restatement of Security 82 (1941)). The court

reasoned that, although the insurer and carrier were both

obligated to the shipper, the carrier's promise to reimburse the

insurer for any payments made solely by virtue of the endorsement


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made the carrier, not the insurer, the principal who "should

perform." Id. The court distinguished claims that the insurer ___

paid under the endorsement exceeding the deductible: "[the

insurer's] position under the endorsement differs wholly from its

status with respect to claims exceeding [the deductible]; as to

the latter it is an indemnitor," not a surety. Id. at 114 n.1. ___

Because the deductible is an amount which the insurer would "not

otherwise be obligated to pay" except for the endorsement, the

insurer had surety status only for the deductible amount. Id. ___

The Eleventh Circuit rejected the very argument Liberty

makes here in Empire Fire & Marine, 880 F.2d 1291. The court _____________________

remanded that case, in part, for a determination of whether the

insurance policy covered the loss at issue. Id. at 1298. ___

Likewise, in American Inter-Fidelity Exch. v. American Re- __________________________________________________

Insurance Co., 17 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit _____________

interpreted language virtually identical to the BMC-32

endorsement, concluding that an insurer is a surety only for the

deductible under the endorsement, the amount it would not have

been obligated to pay under the policy. Id. at 1022. Accord ___ ______

Ford Motor Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 41 B.R. 433, 439 (E.D. ________________________________________

Mich. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 795 F.2d 538 (6th Cir. ________________________

1986). Cf. Eastern Freight Ways, Inc. v. Seaboard Surety Co., ___ ___________________________________________________

577 F.2d 175, 180 n.9 (2d Cir. 1978) (surety relationship

established because of issuance of bonds for cargo claims).

Because Liberty may be a surety only to the extent its

payments to shippers represent payments required "solely" under


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the endorsement, we have no difficulty rejecting Liberty's

argument that the district court erred in requiring it to

distinguish between policy and endorsement obligations. Liberty

contends that Command did not allege that Liberty's liability

arose from anything other than the endorsement. Liberty points

out that, when it was called on to directly pay the shippers,

Command had already cancelled and replaced the cargo policy.

Thus, Liberty contends that the district court erred in requiring

proof that Liberty had no obligation to pay the shippers under

the policy.

Liberty's argument is circular. The endorsement, just

as in Yale Express and Empire Fire & Marine, specifically limits ____________ ____________________

Liberty's right to reimbursement from Command to payments Liberty

would not have been obligated to pay under the policy, and

Liberty bore the burden of proving entitlement to setoff.

Reliance Steel Prod. Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 880 F.2d 575, __________________________________________________

577-78 (1st Cir. 1989). Liberty neglected to specify whether its

payments to shippers were also obliged under the policy. See In ___ __

re Yale Express, 362 F.2d at 114 n.1 (insurer not a surety for _______________

amounts in excess of deductible under endorsement); American ________

Inter-Fidelity Exch., 17 F.3d at 1022 (insurer is a surety only ____________________

for deductible under endorsement).

We similarly reject Liberty's argument that suretyship

and insurance cannot co-exist and that, therefore, its right to

setoff is not subject to the insurance provisions of the cargo

policy. This argument is inconsistent with the cases


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interpreting the BMC-32 endorsement and irreconcilable with the

language of the endorsement providing that "all terms,

conditions, and limitations in the policy . . . remain in full

force and effect." See Empire Fire & Marine, 880 F.2d at 1298 ___ _____________________

(regulations which require the endorsement "do not alter or

affect the obligations between the insured and the insurer");

American Inter-Fidelity Exch., 17 F.3d at 1022 (same). _____________________________








































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III. III.

Liberty next argues that the district court clearly

erred in finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove

Liberty's counterclaim for premiums owed by Command under the

policy.

Liberty sought $656,330.04 in premiums allegedly owed

by Command under the cargo policy. The district court noted that

the "only policy before the Court is the Motor Truck Policy . . .

issued on November 1, 1980 and numbered K01-712-001357-04." Slip

op. at 16-17. The district court found that the only evidence

offered by Liberty to support its breach of contract claim was a

September 20, 1989, Statement of Account. Id. at 16. The ___

Statement of Account listed several policy numbers, and the only

policy number in the two-page statement which corresponded to the

policy number on the face of the policy differed by one digit and

listed a "Retro Adjustment" in the amount of $186,159. The

district court concluded that the evidence did not show that

Command continues to owe premiums under the policy which

terminated in 1988, only that Liberty made a "retro adjustment"

to that policy.

During the hearing, the district court asked counsel

which page of the policy defined "premiums owed under the

policy." Liberty's counsel remained silent when counsel for

Command stated that "it's not [Command's] burden" but "if there

is an answer to that question I would guess it would be located

in the policy."


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On appeal, Liberty explains only that a "retro

adjustment is an increased premium owed by an insured based on

the cost to the insurer as shown by actual experience," and that

the "retro adjustment amounts listed on the Statement of Account

are 'Payable on Receipt.'" Liberty explains that the total

retroadjustments reflected in the Statement of Account are all

premiums for policies that are part of the cargo policy and,

therefore, Liberty should be awarded $444,262 on its breach of

contract claim. The shortfall of Liberty's contentions is that

it has presented no evidence to explain how it calculated the

"retro adjustment" or why Command still owes premiums under the

1988 insurance policy.2 Therefore, the district court did not

err in concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support

Liberty's breach of insurance contract claim.

IV. IV.

Finally, Liberty alleges numerous errors in the

district court's refusal to substitute the RTC as the real party

in interest or to add the RTC as a party under Fed. R. Civ. P.

17(a), 19, and 20. Liberty alleges that Comfed, and subsequently

the RTC, is the real party in interest. Liberty also contends

that the RTC, acting through the corporate shell of Command,

attempts, through this litigation, to force Liberty to pay the

shippers' claims so that the RTC may collect the full accounts
____________________

2 Liberty's citation to Truck Ins. Exch. v. Webb Transfer Line, ________________________________________
Inc., 432 S.W.2d 25, 26 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968), is unpersuasive. In ____
that case, the parties did not dispute the computation of the
total amount of premiums payable, and the insurer presented
testimony as to the premium computation. Id. ___

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receivable due from the shippers free from Liberty's right to set

off. Liberty contends that the RTC's collection without

affording notice or the opportunity to be heard deprived Liberty

of its property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Because Liberty failed to prove entitlement to a setoff

against Command's bankruptcy estate, Liberty's efforts to make

the RTC a party necessarily fail. In any event, we are persuaded

that a number of other reasons support the district court's

refusal to substitute or add the RTC as a party or a third-party

defendant, including Liberty's failure to exhaust administrative

remedies, see, e.g., Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 1151 (1st ___ ____ ________________

Cir. 1992), or to explain the superiority of its alleged

interest. See In re Yale Express, 362 F.2d at 117. ___ __________________

We affirm the district court's judgment. ______
























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