USCA1 Opinion
United States Court of Appeals United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit For the First Circuit
____________________
No. 94-2154
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL T. CHAPMAN,
Defendant, Appellant.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Stahl, Circuit Judge. _____________
____________________
Peter B. Krupp, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for appellant. ______________
Jeanne M. Kempthorne, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom ____________________
Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee. _______________
____________________
July 25, 1995
____________________
STAHL, Circuit Judge. Appellant Michael T. Chapman STAHL, Circuit Judge. _____________
pled guilty to one count of transporting child pornography in
interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1)
and was sentenced to thirty-three months incarceration.
Chapman appeals his sentence, challenging the district
court's application of a five-level "pattern of activity"
enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(4).1 We vacate the
sentence imposed by the district court and remand for
resentencing.
I. I. __
From November 1993 until at least January 1994,
Chapman, of Southbridge, Massachusetts, subscribed to the
America On-Line (AOL) computer information network. During
that time, Chapman communicated via computer and telephone
with an AOL subscriber in Michigan (a cooperating witness
referred to by the government as "Dan") about Chapman's
sexual interest in children. Chapman told Dan about having
had sexual relations with children as young as seven years,
and discussed with Dan the possibility of abducting a young
girl, bringing her to Michigan where both men would have sex
with her, and then killing her. Chapman also told Dan that
he possessed a "snuff film" depicting the rape and murder of
a ten-year-old girl, as well as other child pornography.
____________________
1. All references to the Sentencing Guidelines, unless
otherwise noted, are to the 1993 Guidelines Manual.
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On December 2, 1993, Chapman sent Dan three
photographs via the computer network, each with a different
file designation. Two of the pictures depicted nude or
partially nude girls, while the third depicted a young girl
engaged in sex with a man. A nurse employed by the FBI told
investigators that in her opinion, the girl depicted in the
third photograph was less than ten years old. On December
29, 1993, Chapman told Dan that he was going to scan and send
to Dan a photograph of Chapman having anal intercourse with a
twelve-year-old girl. Chapman then sent to Dan over the
computer network a photograph depicting a man2 having anal
intercourse with a young female who an FBI nurse later stated
appeared to be under eighteen years old.
A search of Chapman's residence and computer on
February 16, 1994, pursuant to a warrant obtained by the FBI,
turned up no "snuff films," other child pornography or
scanning equipment. Chapman told investigators that his
statements to Dan about sexually abusing children and
possessing a snuff film were not true but were simply
fantasy. Investigators were unable to verify that Chapman
had actually engaged in the sexual acts with children that he
had described to Dan. Chapman admitted, however, that he had
exposed himself to minors and that he had shown a
____________________
2. The photograph showed the man's lower torso but not his
face.
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pornographic film to children, although the record does not
make clear when these events occurred.
On March 22, 1994, Chapman was indicted in the
Eastern District of Michigan on four counts, each charging
interstate computer transmission of child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1). On June 17, 1994,
Chapman pleaded guilty in the District of Massachusetts to
Count One of the indictment, which involved the December 2,
1993, transmission of the photograph depicting a ten-year-old
girl in a sexually explicit act.
Following Chapman's plea, the U.S. Probation
Department prepared Chapman's presentence report (the "PSR").
In addition to the information set forth above, the PSR
stated that Chapman told investigators that he had obtained
about fifty pornographic images over the computer network,
and had engaged in sexually graphic correspondence with
hundreds of computer network subscribers over the preceding
two months. Chapman objected to these statements in the PSR,
maintaining that he had simply told investigators that he had
access to fifty pornographic images over the computer network ______
and that he had seen hundreds of names listed on AOL and
other bulletin boards of people interested in sexually
graphic correspondence. Chapman also claimed in response to
the PSR that he had never "downloaded" the photographs sent
to Dan, that in fact he had never viewed them himself, and
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that the December 29 photograph depicted neither him nor a
minor.
The PSR also indicated that Chapman had prior
convictions in Massachusetts for rape and for lewd and
lascivious behavior arising from acts involving young
children. In addition, in 1981, Chapman had admitted to
facts warranting a finding of guilt on a charge of indecent
exposure; that charge was continued with supervision and
eventually dismissed. Furthermore, the PSR stated that there
was credible evidence that Chapman had made a series of
obscene phone calls in 1988 to the twelve-year-old daughter
of one of his friends; Chapman disputed this allegation.
At Chapman's sentencing hearing on September 27,
1994, the only legal issue in dispute was the application of
U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(4), which, under the category of
"Specific Offense Characteristics," states: "If the
defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving the
sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor, increase by 5
levels." The PSR recommended the application of the pattern-
of-activity enhancement to Chapman because he had transmitted
three sexually explicit photographs of minors on December 2
and a fourth on December 29. The district court agreed and
applied the enhancement to Chapman, stating that it based its
decision on "[t]he entire record, the prior record, the other
conduct, the 1988 incident, the entire record that I have
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before me, with the exception of [the December 29 photo],
which I accept [defense counsel's] argument on." The court
imposed a sentence of thirty-three months, the minimum under
the applicable guideline range.3 This appeal followed.
II. II. ___
Chapman argues that the district court erred in
applying 2G2.2(b)(4) to him because the guideline does not
permit consideration of past sexual abuse or exploitation
that is unrelated to the offense of conviction, and because
the transmission of child pornography by computer is not
"sexual abuse or exploitation" within the meaning of the
guideline. Thus, Chapman challenges the district court's
interpretation of the meaning and scope of the guideline,
which we review de novo. United States v. Powell, 50 F.3d _______ _____________ ______
94, 102 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Thompson, 32 F.3d _____________ ________
1, 4 (1st Cir. 1994).
We first consider whether the transmission of child
pornography by computer may constitute a "pattern of activity
involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor" under
____________________
3. The district court arrived at Chapman's sentence in the
following manner: The Base Offense Level for Chapman's
offense was 15. He received a two-level increase under
2G2.2(b)(1) because one of the photographs he sent involved a
prepubescent minor, and a five-level increase under
2G2.2(b)(4). The court subtracted three levels for
acceptance of responsibility pursuant to 3E1.1(b), bringing
Chapman's adjusted offense level to 19. Chapman's criminal
history placed him in category II, making his applicable
guideline sentencing range thirty-three to forty-one months.
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2G2.2(b)(4). The commentary to 2G2.2 explains that the
quoted phrase "means any combination of two or more separate
instances of the sexual abuse or the sexual exploitation of a
minor, whether involving the same or different victims."
U.S.S.G. 2G2.2, comment. (n.4). "Sexual abuse" and "sexual
exploitation," however, are not defined in either the
relevant sentencing guidelines or their corresponding
statutory provisions. The government does not argue that
trafficking in child pornography, by itself, is sexual abuse;
the question for us to decide is whether it may be considered
sexual exploitation of a minor.
The most nearly relevant dictionary definition of
"exploitation" is "an unjust or improper use of another
person for one's own profit or advantage." Webster's Third _______________
New International Dictionary (1986). In a broad sense, ______________________________
anyone who chooses to look at child pornography has
"improperly used" the child depicted in the materials and
thus has exploited that child -- a trafficker in such
materials, whether recipient or sender, all the more so. We
do not think that Congress,4 or the Sentencing Commission,
____________________
4. The Sentencing Commission added subsection (b)(4) and
application note 4 to 2G2.2 in 1991 pursuant to a
congressional mandate. See U.S.S.G. App. C., Amendment 435; ___
Treasury, Postal Service and General Government
Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-141, 632. The
legislative history sheds little, if any, light on what
Congress intended the pattern-of-activity enhancement to
mean. Senators Helms and Thurmond, the amendment's sponsors,
focused on the need for higher base offense levels for
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intended for the word "exploitation" in 2G2.2(b)(4) to
carry this all-encompassing meaning. We reach this
conclusion based on the interaction of subsection (b)(4) with
other guidelines provisions, and on the Sentencing
Commission's use of "exploitation" in other contexts.
The first clue to the meaning of the phrase "sexual
exploitation" is provided by the disparate titles of the
guidelines punishing violations of 18 U.S.C. 2251-52. See ___
Berniger v. Meadow Green-Wildcat Corp., 945 F.2d 4, 9 (1st ________ __________________________
Cir. 1991) (titles may aid in construing any ambiguities in a
statute). The title of U.S.S.G. 2G2.1, applicable to
crimes related to the production of child pornography, is: __________
Sexually Exploiting a Minor by Production ___________________________
of Sexually Explicit Visual or Printed
Material: Custodian Permitting Minor to
Engage in Sexually Explicit Conduct:
Advertisement for Minors to Engage in
Production
(emphasis added). The title of 2G2.2 is:
Trafficking in Material Involving the ________________________
Sexual Exploitation of a Minor; ______________________
Receiving, Transporting, Shipping, or
____________________
purveyors and possessors of child pornography (the base
offense levels for possessors and recipients of child
pornography were, respectively, 10 and 13 at the time), and
on the link between child pornography and sexual abuse. See ___
137 Cong. Rec. S10322-33 (daily ed. July 18, 1991)
(statements of Senators Helms and Thurmond). In relevant
part, section 632 of the Act ordered the Sentencing
Commission to amend 2G2.2 "to provide a base offense level
of not less than 15 and to provide at least a 5 level
increase for offenders who have engaged in a pattern of
activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a
minor."
-8- 8
Advertising Material Involving the Sexual
Exploitation of a Minor; Possessing
Material Involving the Sexual
Exploitation of a Minor with Intent to
Traffic.
(emphasis added). The title of 2G2.1 clearly indicates
that the acts to which that guideline applies are themselves ______________
sexual exploitation of a minor; the title of 2G2.2 suggests
that while the material "involves" sexual exploitation of a ________
minor, trafficking in such material does not. If subsection
(b)(4) of 2G2.2 were meant to include the trafficking
offenses punishable by that very same guideline, one would
expect that the Sentencing Commission -- either in subsection
(b)(4) itself or in application note 4 -- would have used
language that more obviously included those offenses. For
example, application note 4 could have defined "pattern of
activity" as "any combination of two or more acts involving
the sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a minor, or the ______
trafficking in, or transportation or receipt of, material _____________________________________________________________
involving such exploitation." Cf. U.S.S.G. 2G2.4(b)(2) ____________________________ ___
(increasing offense level of defendants convicted of
possession of child pornography "if the offense involved
possessing ten or more books, magazines, periodicals, films,
video tapes, or other items, containing a visual depiction
involving the sexual exploitation of a minor"). By limiting
"pattern of activity" to "instances of the sexual abuse or
the sexual exploitation of a minor," in the context of a
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guideline that by its own terms differentiates itself from _________________
another guideline that does explicitly apply to the sexual ____
exploitation of minors, the Sentencing Commission has
provided at least a strong initial clue that it does not
understand "exploitation" to include trafficking offenses.
The relevant statutory provisions make a similar
distinction. The title of 18 U.S.C. 2251, which applies to
persons directly involved in the production or advertisement
of child pornography, is "Sexual exploitation of children,"
while 18 U.S.C. 2252 is titled "Certain activities relating
to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors."
Thus, Congress apparently intended to draw a distinction
between those directly engaged in sexually exploiting minors
and those who were engaged in "certain activities related to
material involving" such exploitation.
The government argues that if we are going to look
to titles in interpreting the guideline, then we should look
to the title of Chapter 110 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, in
which all of the relevant child pornography statutes are
grouped -- "Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children"
-- or to the heading of Part 2G2 of the Guidelines, under
which both 2G2.1 and 2G2.2 are grouped -- "Sexual
Exploitation of a Minor." These broad headings, the
government argues, suggest that the term "sexual
exploitation" has a broader meaning than simply those
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activities described in 18 U.S.C. 2251 or U.S.S.G. 2G2.1.
We agree that there are some activities not described in
those provisions that may be considered sexual exploitation
for purposes of 2G2.2(b)(4); we do not agree, however, that ___
any activity subsumed within Chapter 110, including ___
trafficking, necessarily constitutes sexual exploitation of a
minor. For example, the statute prescribing record-keeping
requirements for the producers of sexually explicit material,
18 U.S.C. 2257, is intended to protect minors but does not _______
require any involvement with minors for its violation. Yet
it is placed within Chapter 110 of Title 18, and its
corresponding guideline, 2G2.5, is placed under the broader
heading of "Sexual Exploitation of a Minor." By the
government's reasoning, violations of 2257 would constitute
"sexual exploitation of a minor" for purposes of
2G2.2(b)(4) even though the violator of that statute might
never have had any involvement with children, directly or
indirectly.
To be sure, the use of titles has its limits in
statutory interpretation,5 and we do not rely exclusively on
____________________
5. We recognize, for instance, that neither the title of 18
U.S.C. 12251A ("Selling or buying of children") nor the
title of Guidelines 2G2.3 ("Selling or Buying of Children
for Use in the Production of Pornography") expressly states
that the acts addressed by those provisions constitute the
sexual exploitation of a minor. We would be loath to say,
however, that the buying or selling of children for sexual
purposes -- whether or not for use in the production of child
pornography -- could not be considered part of a pattern of
-11- 11
titles to interpret the provision at issue here. Indeed,
were there no other indicators of the Commission's intent, we
might be inclined to agree with the government. But there
are other indicators, and we find them to be dispositive.
Direct evidence that the Sentencing Commission
differentiates between sexual exploitation of a minor and
trafficking in materials depicting such exploitation is
provided by Amendment 372 to the Guidelines. That amendment
inserted a new guideline, 2G2.4, to address offenses
involving the receipt or possession of child pornography, as
distinguished from the trafficking offenses covered by
2G2.2.6 The new guideline contained, and still contains,
cross references to both 2G2.1 and 2G2.2. See U.S.S.G. ___
2G2.4(c)(1)-(2). The Commission explained:
Offenses involving receipt or
transportation of [child pornography] for
the purpose of trafficking are referenced
to 2G2.2 on the basis of the underlying
conduct (subsection (c)(2)). Similarly,
offenses in which the underlying conduct _________________________________________
is more appropriately addressed as sexual _________________________________________
exploitation of a minor are referenced to _________________________________________
that guideline (subsection (c)(1)). ______________
U.S.S.G. App. C., Amendment 372 (emphasis added). "That
guideline" referred to in the quoted passage's last sentence
is 2G2.1; the Commission could not have been much more
____________________
activity of sexual exploitation.
6. Receipt offenses are now covered by 2G2.2, and 2G2.4
applies only to possession offenses.
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clear in distinguishing "trafficking" offenses from those
"more appropriately addressed as sexual exploitation of a
minor." Yet, the government argues that we should now
ascribe to the Commission an intention to include trafficking _______
offenses within the meaning of sexual exploitation for
purposes of 2G2.2(b)(4), even though the Commission has
clearly differentiated the two on a previous occasion. We ______________
are unable to find any clear evidence that the Commission in
drafting subsection (b)(4) intended to abandon its prior
differentiation, and we therefore will not ascribe to it any
such motive.
Application note 5 to 2G2.2 delivers the defining
answer to the government's argument. It states:
If the defendant sexually exploited or
abused a minor at any time, whether or
not such sexual abuse occurred during the
course of the offense, an upward
departure may be warranted. In
determining the extent of such a
departure, the court should take into
consideration the offense levels provided
in 2A3.1, 2A3.2, and 2A3.4 most
commensurate with the defendant's
conduct, as well as whether the defendant
has received an enhancement under
subsection (b)(4) on account of such
conduct.
If we were to adopt the government's argument that the
computer transmission of child pornography is sexual
exploitation, then the first sentence of this note would mean
that a court may depart upward from the guideline sentencing
range for the very same act of "exploitation" -- i.e., the ___________________________________
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transmission of a photograph -- that led to the conviction.7
The Commission might as well draft a sentencing guideline
applicable to bank robberies, and then state in an
application note that "if the defendant robbed a bank at any
time, an upward departure may be warranted." This is not how
the guidelines are meant to operate; departures are permitted
only if "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists
that was not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines and that
should result in a sentence different from that described."
18 U.S.C. 3553(b). Yet the application note says nothing
about an aggravating circumstance; if trafficking is sexual
exploitation, then trafficking alone, without any aggravating _______
circumstances, permits a judge to depart upward. This makes
no sense: An offense specifically punishable under the
guideline cannot at the same time be "an aggravating . . .
____________________
7. The Commission inserted the words "exploited or" in the
first sentence of application note 5 in 1991, at the same
time it added subsection (b)(4) to the guideline. See ___
U.S.S.G. App. C., Amendment 435 (effective Nov. 27, 1991).
It did not amend the second clause of that sentence ("whether ___
or not such sexual abuse . . . "), nor did it insert in the _________________
following sentence a reference to the guideline applicable to
sexual exploitation. One might argue that the Commission
omitted any such reference intentionally, intending for
sexual exploitation to include more crimes than those listed ____
in 2G2.1. We do not believe, however, that the Commission
intended to open the door for departures based on any ___
activity that might conceivably be labeled sexual
exploitation; it had something more specific in mind. Our
best estimate of what "something more specific" encompasses
is guided by the Commission's past usage of the term.
-14- 14
circumstance . . . not adequately taken into consideration"
by the Commission; indeed, if the offense may also, by
itself, warrant an upward departure, then the guideline
serves no useful purpose. Thus, we must conclude that
"sexually exploited," as used in application note 5 of
2G2.2 to warrant an upward departure, must mean something ____
different than the substantive offenses punishable under that
guideline.
The government argues that the interpretation of
subsection (b)(4) that we adopt will render the pattern-of-
activity enhancement virtually useless, and that therefore we
should breathe life into it by assigning it some other
meaning. For example, a defendant convicted of a trafficking
offense, but whose offense involved a pattern of production-
related activity sufficient under our interpretation to
warrant the enhancement under subsection (b)(4), would, in
accordance with the cross reference of 2G2.2(c)(1), be
sentenced under the guideline applicable to production
offenses, 2G2.1, if his resulting offense level were
greater than that under 2G2.2. Section 2G2.1 carries a
base offense level of 25, compared to a base offense level of
just 15 under 2G2.2; the only way a trafficker could ever
receive a higher offense level under 2G2.2 than under
2G2.1 would be if his offense involved distribution (five-
level increase; 2G2.2(b)(2)) and the material involved ___
-15- 15
portrayed sadistic or masochistic conduct (four-level
increase; 2G2.2(b)(3)), and he received the five-level
pattern-of-activity enhancement (bringing his total offense
level to 29). It is unlikely, the government argues, that
Congress intended the pattern-of-activity enhancement to have
such limited applicability, and therefore we should broaden
its applicability by construing "sexual exploitation" to
include trafficking in child pornography.
But there may well be activities that constitute
sexual exploitation, as used in subsection (b)(4), that
neither implicate the cross reference to 2G2.1 nor clearly
rise to the level of sexual abuse.8 And, in any event,
while the limited applicability of subsection (b)(4) may be
troubling, it would be more troubling to interpret the phrase
____________________
8. To offer but a single example, imagine a recipient or
sender of child pornography who, in the course of his
activities, associates with teenagers who engage in "sexually
explicit conduct" as defined at 18 U.S.C. 2256(2)(E)
("lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
person"), but who neither has physical contact with them nor
photographs them. This offender should not be sentenced
under 2G2.1; nevertheless, he has clearly made "improper
use" of the minors for his own sexual gratification: he has
exploited them.
The enhancement also has obvious applicability in
cases involving sexual abuse. Section 2G2.2 contains no
cross-reference for a defendant whose trafficking offense
also involved sexual abuse. While application note 5 permits
a sentencing judge to depart upward in such circumstances,
and directs his or her attention to the guidelines applicable
to sexual abuse in determining the appropriate extent of any
departure, subsection (b)(4) substantially increases the
sentence of a defendant who has engaged in two instances of
sexual abuse without requiring an exercise of discretion on _______
the part of the judge.
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"sexual exploitation" in a novel manner solely to give it
wider applicability. Moreover, the government's solution
would result in a subsection that, on its face, enhances
punishment for a pattern-of-activity of sexual abuse or
exploitation, but that in practice primarily enhances
punishment for traffickers. This can hardly be what
Congress, or the Commission, intended when they included the
phrase "sexual abuse or exploitation." Had they intended
such a result, they would have listed the trafficking-type
offenses. Both Congress and the Commission had opportunities
to make clear that they intended trafficking offenses to be
included in "sexual exploitation." Neither chose to do so.
Since both Congress and the Commission have distinguished
trafficking from "sexual exploitation" previously, we will
not now construe that phrase otherwise merely to give
subsection (b)(4) wider applicability.
Our interpretation of subsection (b)(4) is at
variance with the only previous reported decision
interpreting the provision. In United States v. Surratt, a _____________ _______
district court suggested in dictum that the pattern of
activity enhancement might apply to "a pattern of ordering
child pornography through the mail." 867 F. Supp. 1317, 1320
(N.D. Ohio 1994). We think this dictum is simply wrong, for
all the reasons discussed above.
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Having decided that sexual exploitation, as used in
subsection (b)(4), does not include the computer transmission
of child pornography, we pause to consider whether the record
would allow us to conclude that the district court applied
the pattern-of-activity enhancement based on at least two
instances of offense-related activity other than the receipt _____
or transmission of child pornography. Were we able to reach
this conclusion, it would not be necessary to consider
whether the activity contemplated by subsection (b)(4) must
in fact be offense-related, for the district court's
consideration of other sexual abuse or exploitation would be
harmless. A careful review of the record, however, provides
no basis for such a conclusion. While Chapman, in the course
of transmitting photographs to Dan, boasted of sexually
abusing children and discussed how he and Dan could commit
unspeakable atrocities against a young girl, the government
found no evidence that Chapman actually committed or planned
to commit such acts. Similarly, although Chapman boasted
that the December 29 photograph depicted him engaging in anal
intercourse with a young girl, the district court found that
that photograph did not even depict a minor, and the
government offered no other evidence that Chapman had
produced any child pornography. Thus, while there was
considerable evidence that Chapman had transmitted child
pornography on numerous occasions, and had engaged in
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detailed conversations about sexually abusing, and murdering,
young children, the record contains insufficient evidence to
conclude, even on a preponderance standard, that Chapman
actually sexually abused or exploited minors in conjunction
with his trafficking offense (or even during the time he was
an AOL subscriber). Consequently, we have no choice but to
consider whether the district court was correct in
considering Chapman's past activity in applying subsection
(b)(4).9 While we disagree with the Surratt court's _______
dictum, we fully endorse its holding that subsection (b)(4)
is inapplicable to past sexual abuse or exploitation
unrelated to the offense of conviction. See Surratt, 867 F. ___ _______
Supp. at 1320. In Surratt, the defendant was convicted on _______
one count of receiving child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C. 2252(a)(2); during a search of the defendant's home,
the government discovered other videotapes depicting the
defendant sexually abusing his own daughter. Id. Based on ___
this past sexual abuse, the government sought a pattern of
____________________
9. The government does not strongly argue that past activity
should be considered under subsection (b)(4); it maintains
instead that the district court's consideration of Chapman's
previous activity was "harmless error if error at all," in
light of Chapman's multiple computer transmissions of child
pornography. However, because we have ruled that the
transmissions themselves do not constitute instances of
sexual exploitation and that the record provides no other
basis on which the district court could have applied the
pattern-of-activity enhancement for offense-related conduct,
we must consider whether it was proper to look to previous,
non-offense-related conduct.
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activity enhancement under subsection (b)(4). The Surratt _______
court declined to apply the enhancement, stating:
The heading of subsection (b) is
"Specific Offense Characteristics." In
other words, enhancements included in
subsection (b) are available when, as __
part of the offense of conviction, the ____________________________________
defendant undertakes the actions listed
therein.
The government argues that
subsection (b)(4) is different from
subsections (b)(1), (b)(2) or (b)(3)
because it does not begin with the
language "If the offense involved . . .
." This argument is unavailing. The
government appears to be suggesting that
if the defendant ever engaged in such a ____
pattern of behavior, whether as part of
the charged offense or at a completely
different time or place, subsection
(b)(4) should apply. This Court cannot
agree. If the Sentencing Commission had
not intended for the language of
subsection (b)(4) to be applied only to
the specific offense of conviction, that
language would not be included in
subsection (b), entitled "Specific
Offense Characteristics." The government
has pointed to no persuasive authority to
convince the Court that "specific offense
characteristic" means anything other than
characteristics specific to the offense
of conviction.
Id. (emphasis added). ___
We agree with this reasoning. If the Commission
intended for subsection (b)(4) to apply to any previous ___
sexual abuse or exploitation, while at the same time placing
the provision under "Specific Offense Characteristics," we
would expect that it would have taken efforts to resolve this
glaring contradiction. It clearly knew how to do so:
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Application Note 5 states in no uncertain terms that an
upward departure is warranted for any instance of sexual
exploitation or abuse "whether or not such sexual abuse
occurred during the course of the offense."10 Cf. U.S.S.G. ___
2L1.2(1)-(2) (stating clearly that defendant's base offense
level must be increased if defendant "previously" was
deported after conviction for felony or aggravated felony).
The absence of similar language in subsection (b)(4),
combined with the fact that the subsection is classified
under the rubric of "Specific Offense Characteristics,"
compels the conclusion that the application of the subsection
does require that the pattern of activity relate to the ____
offense of conviction.
III. III. ____
For all the foregoing reasons, we vacate the vacate the ___________
sentence and remand for resentencing. sentence and remand for resentencing. _____________________________________
____________________
10. The district court could have invoked this application
note and departed upward based on Chapman's previous sexual
abuse of minors.
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