Rhode Island Corp. v. McInnis

USCA1 Opinion












United States Court of Appeals United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit For the First Circuit
____________________

No. 94-1767

RHODE ISLAND DEPOSITORS ECONOMIC PROTECTION CORP., ET AL.,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

JOHN A. HAYES AND IOLA HAYES,

Defendants, Appellants,

v.

STEVEN M. MCINNIS, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees,

No. 94-1768

RHODE ISLAND DEPOSITORS ECONOMIC PROTECTION CORP., ET AL.,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

ROBERT P. MCGOLDRICK,

Defendant, Appellant,

v.

STEVEN M. MCINNIS, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.
____________________

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________



















Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Mark A. Stull with whom Dennis F. Gorman and Fletcher, Tilton & _____________ _________________ ___________________
Whipple, P.C. were on brief for appellants. _____________
Allen N. David with whom Harvey Weiner, Maureen Mulligan, and ________________ ______________ _________________
Peabody & Arnold were on brief for appellees. ________________














____________________

September 7, 1995
____________________



































STAHL, Circuit Judge. Limited partners who STAHL, Circuit Judge. ______________

personally guaranteed the partnership's obligations to a

credit union seek indemnification on their guaranty, as well

as damages, from the attorney (and his law firm) representing

the partnership. The district court entered summary judgment

for the attorneys. We now affirm.

I. I. __

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS ________________________________________

During the heady late eighties, Carol Lavin, a

Jamestown, Rhode Island real estate agent, conceived a plan

to purchase and develop luxury homes on an eighty-acre tract

of land located in Jamestown. Lavin, a novice at real estate

development, enlisted her husband Kevin Lavin, her sister

Janice Barron, and her brother-in-law James Barron in the

project. The new venturers were equally unknowledgeable in

the nuances of real estate development.

Lavin approached the parcel's owners, David

Henderson and Donald Huggins ("sellers"), who indicated a

willingness to sell their land for $2.7 million. Although

the price seemed high, the Lavins and Barrons remained

interested. However, to make the deal work, they needed more

capital than they had. In order to remedy this deficiency,

Carol Lavin and Janice Barron contacted dozens of potential

investors, including appellants John and Iola Hayes and

Robert McGoldrick. During the summer of 1987, the Lavins and



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Barrons met with the Hayeses and McGoldrick on several

occasions to discuss the project. A rosy financial

projection of the completed development forecast a $2 million

profit for the venturers. Eventually, the Hayeses and

McGoldrick, with a vision of high returns, agreed to invest

in the scheme. Like the Lavins and Barrons, the three

investors had no prior experience in real estate development.



On September 14, 1987, Carol Lavin, Janice Barron,

and John Hayes met with appellee Steven McInnis, a Rhode

Island attorney, about legal representation for the project

("September 14 meeting"). The participants discussed the

project's form and financing. McInnis was advised that the

Hayeses and McGoldrick wished to limit their investment to a

total of $200,000 (based on a $100,000 investment by the

Hayeses and a $100,000 investment by McGoldrick). McInnis

suggested that rather than a general partnership they form a

limited partnership, with the Hayeses and McGoldrick as the

limited partners and the Lavins and Barrons as the general

partners. McInnis indicated that the prospective limited

partners (that is, the Hayeses and McGoldrick), might want to

retain their own attorneys to represent their interests.

McInnis agreed to draft the partnership agreement and to

represent the limited partnership, later named Cedar Hill

Developments, L.P. ("the partnership").



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Sometime after the September 14 meeting, the

Hayeses and McGoldrick (hereinafter, "limited partners") and

the Lavins and Barrons (hereinafter, "general partners")

discussed whether they should retain separate counsel, as

suggested by McInnis. By deposition, general partner Lavin

testified, "we all decided as a group to let [McInnis]

represent us," and she later communicated this decision to

McInnis. In his pretrial deposition, McInnis testified that

"they [the general and limited partners] indicated that they

wished me to perform certain tasks on behalf of the `group,'

. . . but it was phrased more in the context of performing

certain, in their view, relatively routine tasks required by

either the bank or the buyers and the seller." McInnis

denies ever agreeing to represent the limited partners

individually. Throughout the course of the representation,

all attorneys fees were billed to the partnership and paid by

partnership funds.

The parties to the transaction eventually hammered

out the details of the transaction. Of the $2.7 million sale

price, $300,000 was to be in cash, $900,000 was to be

financed by the sellers (secured by a second mortgage on the

parcel), and $1.5 million was to be financed through a bank

loan. In addition, the sellers were each to receive a 12.5%

limited partnership interest.





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Meanwhile, Carol Lavin attempted to secure bank

financing. The going proved difficult. Three institutions,

including the Marquette Credit Union ("Marquette"), turned

down the group's loan application. Later, Marquette reversed

its position and agreed to loan up to $3.5 million for the

purchase and development of the land. However, as a

condition for the loan, Marquette required a personal

guaranty from the Lavins, the Barrons, the Hayeses, and

McGoldrick. The Marquette commitment letter, dated November

6, 1987, stated that the limited partners would have to

guaranty the loan personally in the event of a partnership

default. At some point during November 1987, Carol Lavin

informed McInnis of Marquette's guaranty requirement.

McInnis, however, did not participate in the negotiations

with Marquette, and at no point did any of the partners

request his participation. Marquette prepared the guaranty.

On December 11, 1987, the general and limited

partners convened at McInnis's office to sign documents

effecting the formation of the partnership and executing bank

documents including the guaranty. There is conflicting

evidence in the record as to whether the limited partners

knew of the personal guaranty requirement prior to the

December 11 meeting, although all three appear to have signed







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the commitment letter.1 In any event, at this meeting,

McGoldrick clearly evidenced his understanding of the nature

of his obligation, for he explicitly stated that he knew that

he was making himself personally liable for the entire loan

in the event of a default. For their part, the Hayeses

recall nothing about the meeting or the commitment letter,

although they acknowledge their signatures appear on the

guaranty agreement. At no time, either prior to signing the

commitment letter or prior to signing the guaranty itself,

did any of the partners request McInnis to intervene with

Marquette to seek removal or modification of the guaranty.

Closing on the sale occurred on December 15, 1987.

The development quickly floundered. Ultimately,

only three homes were ever sold. By August 1988, the Hayeses

had retained separate counsel. At that time, they demanded,

futilely, a return of their capital contribution and "a

release from all Limited Partnership obligations." By

January 1989, the partnership defaulted with more than $2

million outstanding. Marquette failed in early 1991. Its

receiver held a foreclosure sale on April 17, 1991, at which

it purchased the development for $850,000.

The receiver and its successor, Rhode Island

Depositors Economic Protection Corporation ("DEPCO"), sued on


____________________

1. The Hayeses now state that they are uncertain about
whether their signatures appear on the commitment letter.

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the guaranty to recover $2,004,446, plus interest and late

charges. The limited partners, in turn, instituted third-

party claims against McInnis and his law firm, Cameron &

Mittleman (collectively, "attorneys"), seeking

indemnification and damages. The district court granted the

summary judgment motions of both DEPCO and the attorneys

against the limited partners. This appeal ensued. However,

because of a prior settlement with DEPCO, only the third

party claims are now on appeal.

II. II. ___

DISCUSSION DISCUSSION __________

The limited partners raise two principal issues on

appeal: first, whether they are entitled to indemnification

by the attorneys for the amount owed to DEPCO, plus costs and

attorneys fees; and second, whether they are entitled to

damages against the attorneys under theories of malpractice,

breach of contract, and misrepresentation. After reciting

the standard of review, we discuss each argument in turn.

A. Standard of Review ______________________

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record

reflects "no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . .

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review a grant of summary

judgment de novo. See, e.g., Colonial Courts Apartment Co. __ ____ ___ ____ _____________________________

v. Proc Assocs., 57 F.3d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 1995). We review ____________



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the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, and indulge all reasonable inferences in that party's

favor. Id. ___

B. Indemnification Claim _________________________

The limited partners argue that the attorneys must

indemnify them because of negligence on the part of McInnis

and because of alleged violation of Massachusetts securities

laws. We find indemnification inapposite in this context.

We begin with general principles.2 "The concept

of indemnity is based upon the theory that one who has been

exposed to liability solely as the result of a wrongful act

of another should be able to recover from that party."

Muldowney v. Weatherking Prods., Inc., 509 A.2d 441, 443 _________ __________________________

(R.I. 1986) (citation omitted). Thus, one party may seek

full reimbursement from another when he has fully discharged

a common, as opposed to "joint," liability. W. Page Keeton,

et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 51 (5th ed. ______________________________________

1984) (hereinafter, "Prosser & Keeton"). Stated another way,

"[i]f another person has been compelled to pay damages that

should have been paid by the wrongdoer, the latter becomes

liable to the former." Muldowney, 509 A.2d at 443. _________

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has made clear that

an indemnification cause of action lies in two situations:


____________________

2. The parties do not dispute that the substantive law of
Rhode Island applies.

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first, when there is an express contractual provision

creating a right of indemnity;3 and, second, when equitable

principles give rise to a right to indemnification. Less

clear is the status of a third theory, that of implied

contractual indemnification. Although courts have assumed

that an implied contractual indemnification cause of action

exists, see, e.g., A & B. Constr., Inc. v. Atlas Roofing & ___ ____ ______________________ ________________

Skylight Co., 867 F. Supp. 100, 107 (D.R.I. 1994); Roy v. ____________ ___

Star Chopper Co., 442 F. Supp. 1010, 1019 (D.R.I. 1977), _________________

aff'd, 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. _____ _____ ______

916 (1979), the Rhode Island Supreme Court has never

explicitly so held. For our purposes, we will assume that it

does.

Rhode Island courts will allow indemnity on an

equitable theory when three conditions obtain:

First, the party seeking indemnity must
be liable to a third party. Second, the
prospective indemnitor must also be
liable to the third party. Third, as
between the prospective indemnitee and
indemnitor, the obligation ought to be
discharged by the indemnitor.

Muldowney, 509 A.2d at 443-44. The limited partners' claim _________

fails on the second and third prongs. We know of no cause of

action under which DEPCO would be able to proceed against the

attorneys, a point which the limited partners essentially

concede in their brief. By implication, therefore, the

____________________

3. No such agreement exists in this case.

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limited partners' claim also fails on the third prong. "`The

purpose of an indemnity action is to require the party

primarily liable to hold harmless the party secondarily

liable.'" Id. at 444 (quoting Helgerson v. Mammoth Mart, ___ _________ _____________

Inc., 335 A.2d 339, 341 (R.I. 1975)). Even assuming the ____

attorneys were negligent or disregarded securities laws, that

does nothing to absolve the limited partners of their primary

liability on the guaranty.

For similar reasons, the limited partners' implied

contractual indemnification claim also fails. "[A]

contractual right to indemnification will only be implied

when there are unique special factors demonstrating that the

parties intended that the would-be indemnitor bear the

ultimate responsibility . . . or when there is a generally

recognized special relationship between the parties." Araujo ______

v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard, Nantucket S.S. Auth., 693 _____________________________________________________

F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing Roy, 442 F. Supp. at 1019) ___

(other citation omitted). The limited partners fail to point

to anything in the record demonstrating the parties intended

that the attorneys would bear ultimate responsibility for the

guaranty. Further, even assuming a separate attorney-client

relationship existed between the limited partners and the

attorneys, that is not the kind of "generally recognized

special relationship" that gives rise to an implied

indemnitee-indemnitor relationship. Cf. Prosser & Keeton ___



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51 (special relationships include, inter alia, employer's _____ ____

vicarious liability for the tort of a servant; an independent

contractor, or an innocent partner, or a carrier held liable

for the acts of another; an automobile owner held liable for

the conduct of the driver). While we do not foreclose the

possibility that an intent to indemnify could possibly exist

in the attorney-client context, there is simply no evidence

supporting such a conclusion here.4

To sum up, because there was no express agreement

to indemnify, and because the record does not support either

of the other theories of indemnification, we conclude that

the district court properly granted summary judgment as to

this claim.

C. Damages Claims __________________

The limited partners also asserted claims and

sought damages for professional negligence, breach of

contract, and misrepresentation. The district court


____________________

4. The limited partners argue that a claim of
indemnification lies whenever a putative indemnitor fails to
perform his "contractual obligations in a workmanlike
manner." Without regard to whether the limited partners
state a correct principle of law, their argument is without
force because, as we discuss fully below, there was no
contractual relationship between the limited partners and the
attorneys. Nor do we agree with the limited partners that
they acceded to enforceable rights as third-party
beneficiaries of the contract between the attorneys and the
partnership. We detect no evidence indicating that the
partnership engaged the attorneys' services with the intent
to benefit the limited partners. Cf. Davis v. New Eng. Pest ___ _____ _____________
Control Co., 576 A.2d 1240, 1242 (R.I. 1990). ___________

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determined that the limited partners' claims were time-barred

as they filed the present action more than three years after

discovery of the attorneys' alleged negligence. Because we

conclude that no attorney-client relationship existed in this

case, we do not reach the statute-of-limitations issue.

Recovery under the damages claims rests on the

premise that an attorney-client relationship existed between

the limited partners and the attorneys.5 See Church v. ___ ______

McBurney, 513 A.2d 22, 23 (R.I. 1986). To determine whether ________

such a relationship existed in this case, we start with the

basic proposition that a partnership is a singular legal

entity, and that when that entity retains an attorney, the

partnership is the client. See, e.g., Ronald E. Mallen & ___ ____

Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice 20.7, at 260 (3d ed. _________________

1989) (hereinafter, "Mallen & Smith"). Thus, an attorney for

a partnership or for a general partner does not thereby

undertake representation of limited partners. Id. An ___

attorney, however, may expressly or impliedly undertake

simultaneous representation of the partnership and a partner

or limited partners. Id. at 261. ___

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has often stated

that an attorney-client relationship is contractual in

nature, and thus is the product of an agreement of the


____________________

5. For purposes of its discussion, the district court
assumed that such a relationship existed in this case.

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parties and may be implied from their conduct. Again, absent

such a contractual relationship, the attorneys would have

owed no duty to the limited partners. See Church, 513 A.2d ___ ______

at 23. We have said that, to imply a contract, including one

between an attorney and a client, the law requires more than

an individual's subjective, unspoken belief that the person

with whom he is dealing has become his lawyer. Sheinkopf v. _________

Stone, 927 F.2d 1259, 1260 (1st Cir. 1991). Rather, if such _____

a belief is "to form a foundation for the implication of a

relationship of trust and confidence, it must be objectively

reasonable under the totality of the circumstances." Id. ___

Although the existence of an attorney-client

relationship is critical to their success, the limited

partners offer only minimal argumentation on this point.

After close examination, we conclude that the limited

partners' claim ultimately rests on a subjective belief

completely unsupported by any indicia that the belief was

objectively reasonable or that the limited partners actually

relied on such a belief. Cf. id. at 1266. The limited ___ ___

partners point principally to events surrounding the

September 14 meeting as evidence establishing that McInnis

agreed to represent their interests separately. However, at

that meeting McInnis recommended that, because of potential

conflicts of interest, the limited partners might wish to

retain separate counsel. Later, after consultation between



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the general and limited partners, general partner Lavin told

McInnis that the "group" wanted McInnis to represent them.

Even construed in a light favorable to the limited partners,

we think McInnis was reasonable in understanding "group" to

mean the limited partnership as an entity. Beyond this, the

limited partners point to nothing that would indicate that

McInnis agreed to represent them as limited partners and

McInnis denies having ever agreed to represent the limited

partners. Cf. Mallen & Smith 7.2 (whether attorney-client ___

relationship created depends on intent of the parties,

including that of the attorney). After the nature of the

limited partners' liability became clear to them, they did

not seek McInnis's help. Instead, two of them (the Hayeses)

sought separate counsel.

In contrast, the record strongly supports the

implication that the only attorney-client relationship

involved in this transaction was that between McInnis and the

partnership. Again, McInnis made clear that he agreed to

represent the partnership while suggesting that the limited

partners seek separate counsel. Although not itself

determinative, McInnis billed the partnership directly, and

the partnership paid all fees out of partnership funds. At

least through August 1988, the scope of McInnis'

representation appears to have been limited to preparing the





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partnership agreement, reviewing partnership's loan

documentation, and reviewing the purchase and sale agreement.

In the final analysis, we conclude that the limited

partners rely on nothing more than repeated conclusory

assertions about the nature of their relationship with

McInnis, assertions that are completely unsupported by any

objective indicia. That is not enough to survive summary

judgment on the question of whether an attorney-client

relationship actually existed. See Sheinkopf, 927 F.2d at ___ _________

1266. Consequently, the district court properly granted

summary judgment on appellants' claims for damages.6

III. III. ____

CONCLUSION CONCLUSION __________

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the

district court is affirmed. affirmed. ________












____________________

6. Appellants present a third theory of recovery, grounded
in Rhode Island's consumer protection statute. See R.I. Gen. ___
L. 6-13.1. By its terms, that statute authorizes actions
by either the Attorney General or persons who purchase or
lease "goods or services primarily for personal, family or
household purposes." Id. at 6-13.1-5.2(a). We agree with ___
the district court that the limited partners do not fall
within this narrow definition.

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