Sundel v. United States

USCA1 Opinion




[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



____________________


No. 95-1541

NINA SUNDEL,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant, Appellant.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND


[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Selya, Stahl and Lynch,
Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Steven L. Kessler and Geoffrey Q. Ralls on brief for appellant. _________________ _________________
Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, and Michael P. ___________________ ___________
Iannotti, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee. ________


____________________

October 5 , 1995
____________________






















Per Curiam. We affirm the order of the district court __________

dismissing the claims of plaintiff/appellant Nina Sundel

essentially for the reasons given by the magistrate judge in

his report and recommendation, dated December 7, 1994.

We also deny Sundel's request that she be allowed to

amend her complaint on appeal.

First, having elected not to amend her complaint as of

right before the district court, Sundel now must show that

her case fits into the "long-odds exception" to the general

rule that failure to seek amendment below bars relief on

appeal. Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, _________________ _________________

23 (1st Cir. 1989). The only special circumstance facing

Sundel below was her pro se status. However, "pro se status ___ __ ___ __

[does not] absolve [a litigant] from compliance with the

Federal Rules of Procedure." United States v. Heller, 957 _____________ ______

F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting Feinstein v. Moses, 951 _________ _____

F.2d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 1991)). Therefore, once the magistrate

judge recommended that Sundel's Bivens claims be dismissed ______

because of "failure to make specific allegations against

individual defendants," Sundel should have exercised her

right to amend her pleadings, see Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d ___ ________________

at 22 (plaintiff has right to amend pleading after motion to

dismiss, because motion to dismiss is not a responsive

pleading within the meaning of Rule 15), in order to add the

necessary specific allegations. Nor can Sundel contend that



-2-













she was unaware of this information since she included

specific allegations against individuals in her objection to

the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge.

Second, allowing Sundel to amend her complaint would

serve no purpose in this case. The only potentially viable

claims arising out of the facts alleged in Sundel's complaint

are the Bivens claims against individual officers of the ______

government. Since her original complaint was dismissed

without prejudice to her filing such claims, she may still

pursue any such actions via a properly filed new complaint.

On the other hand, if, as Sundel suggests, the statute

of limitations has already run on her Bivens claims, allowing ______

her to amend her original complaint would still not overcome

the time bar unless the amendment related back to her

original complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3).

However, Rule 15(c) requires that, within 120 days of the

filing of the original complaint, "the party to be brought in

by amendment . . . [have] received such notice of the

institution of the action that the party will not be

prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits." In the

instant case, the record indicates that the individual

government agents have never been served process nor

otherwise been provided notice of the action. Absent timely

notice, Rule 15(c)'s relation back provisions do not apply.

Wilson v. United States, 23 F.3d 559, 563 (1st Cir. 1994) ______ ______________



-3-













(quoting Rule 15(c)). Moreover, Rule 15(c) ordinarily

applies only when "the proper defendant is already before the

court and the effect is merely to correct the name under

which he is sued. But a new defendant cannot normally be

substituted or added by amendment after the statute of

limitations has run." Id. (quoting Worthington v. Wilson, 8 __ ___________ ______

F.3d 1253, 1256 (7th Cir. 1993)). Consequently, since the

individual defendants were never before the district court,

they cannot be added if the statute of limitations has now

run.

Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1. ________ ___































-4-