DiPietro v. Coalter

USCA1 Opinion









October 31, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT




____________________


No. 95-1422

EDWARD DIPIETRO,

Petitioner, Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM COALTER,

Respondent, Appellee.


____________________

ERRATA SHEET



The opinion of this court issued on October 23, 1995 is amended
as follows:

On cover sheet, change "[Hon. Morris E. Lasker, U.S. District _____________
Judge]" to "[Hon. Morris E. Lasker,* Senior U.S. District Judge]. _____ __________________________

*Senior U.S. District Judge, of the District of New York,
Southern District, sitting by designation."































October 23, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT




____________________


No. 95-1422

EDWARD DIPIETRO,

Petitioner, Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM COALTER,

Respondent, Appellee.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Morris E. Lasker, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Selya, Stahl and Lynch,
Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

William J. Brown, Jr., and Marasi, Franco & Brown on brief for ______________________ _______________________
appellant.
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, Margaret C. Parks, Assistant __________________ _________________
Attorney General, and Gregory I. Massing, Assistant Attorney General, ___________________
on brief for appellee.


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____________________






Per Curiam. Petitioner Edward DiPietro, a Massachusetts __________

inmate, appeals from the dismissal of his habeas petition as

containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. For the

following reasons, we vacate and remand.

I.

On December 19, 1989, DiPietro pled guilty in Middlesex

Superior Court to indictments charging him with trafficking

in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to

distribute it. He was sentenced on March 2, 1990 to a term

of eighteen to twenty years imprisonment, with twelve years

to serve. Approximately two years later, DiPietro filed a

motion for new trial. This motion was denied, and DiPietro

unsuccessfully appealed to the Massachusetts Appeals Court.

See Commonwealth v. DiPietro, 624 N.E.2d 587 (Mass. App. Ct. ___ ____________ ________

1993). On March 1, 1994, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial

Court (SJC) denied DiPietro's application for leave to obtain

further appellate review (ALOFAR). See Commonwealth v. ___ ____________

DiPietro, 631 N.E.2d 58 (Mass. 1994). ________

DiPietro then turned to federal court. On April 15,

1995, DiPietro filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254

alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel















guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment because (a) trial counsel

had misrepresented, prior to DiPietro's guilty plea, that a

motion to suppress evidence had been filed and denied; (b)

counsel had misinformed him that pending state legislation

would deprive him of "good time" credits if he were convicted

after January 15, 1990; and (c) counsel had failed to file

appropriate pretrial motions and was generally unprepared.

The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the petition on the ground

that the latter two claims, although raised in the motion for

new trial and before the Massachusetts Appeals Court, were

not fairly presented in DiPietro's ALOFAR submitted to the

SJC. The district court concluded that DiPietro had indeed

failed to present these two claims adequately to the SJC and

dismissed the petition under Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 ____ _____

(1982) (holding that a district court must dismiss a petition

which contains any unexhausted claim).

II.

Under 28 U.S.C. 2254, a federal habeas petitioner must

first "exhaust[] the remedies available in the courts of the

State." See 28 U.S.C. 2254(b). To do so, the applicant ___

must present the highest state court with a "fair

opportunity" to confront and correct the alleged error. Mele ____

v. Fitchburg Dist. Court, 850 F.2d 817, 820 (1st Cir. 1988). _____________________

In Mele, we mapped the contours of this requirement in the ____

context of prevailing Massachusetts appellate practice. The



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petitioner in Mele had raised a federal constitutional claim ____

before the Massachusetts Appeals Court but did not mention

the claim in his ALOFAR. We held that "an appealed issue

cannot be considered as having been fairly presented to the

SJC for exhaustion purposes unless the applicant has raised

it within the four corners of the ALOFAR." Id. at 823. ___

The instant case is distinguishable from Mele in at ____

least two respects. First, DiPietro did not entirely omit

the claims at issue from his ALOFAR, but rather mentioned

them in a footnote which purported to incorporate by

reference arguments he made in his Massachusetts Appeals

Court brief. Second, it is undisputed that after DiPietro

filed his ALOFAR, the SJC requested from DiPietro, and

received, a copy of the intermediate court briefs and record

appendix. Nonetheless, the district court concluded that the

question whether DiPietro fairly presented his second and

third ineffective assistance claims in his ALOFAR must be

resolved without reference to his intermediate court brief

since no evidence exists that any justice of the SJC actually

referred to the brief. The district court further concluded

that these claims were not fairly presented within the ALOFAR

itself.1

____________________

1. We agree with the district court that DiPietro's footnote
presentation of his second and third claims, viewed in
isolation from the Appeals Court brief, is inadequate to
satisfy exhaustion concerns because it fails to identify the
factual and legal bases of these claims. See Scarpa v. ___ ______

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We think that DiPietro did exhaust his second and third

ineffective assistance claims. Under the SJC's practice as

we understand it, the decision to grant or deny further

appellate review ordinarily is made solely on the basis of

the ALOFAR itself. Mele, 850 F.2d at 822 (citing Mass. R. ____

App. P. 27(e)). We have made it plain that we do not expect

the SJC "to scour the whole of the record below for potential

error beyond that called to the court's attention by the

applicant." Id. Where, as here, however, the SJC departs ___

from its practice and requests to see papers previously

filed, these papers are properly before it. DiPietro's

ALOFAR did alert the SJC to his second and third claims,

which were, in turn, adequately delineated in his

intermediate court brief provided to the SJC. Cf. Scarpa, 38 ___ ______

F.3d at 6 (stating that where petitioner identified a federal

basis for a claim in his motion for new trial, he provided a

backdrop against which his later state court filings had to

be viewed). Under the circumstances, we are persuaded that

the SJC had a "fair opportunity" to address these claims. We

add that the Commonwealth, having reconsidered its position

below, now urges us to find exhaustion.

Vacated and remanded. See Loc. R. 27.1. _____________________ ___




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Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. ______ ____________
Ct. 940 (1995).

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