USCA1 Opinion
December 28, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-1267
PETER RAYMOND CUMMINGS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
HONORABLE EDWARD W. HANSON, JR.,
Defendant, Appellee.
____________________
No. 95-1418
PETER RAYMOND CUMMINGS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
EDWARD W. HANSON, JR., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Cyr, Boudin and Lynch,
Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
Matthew Cobb on Opposition to Appellees' Motion for Summary _____________
Affirmance and Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
W. Mark Dunn, Assistant Attorney General, on Motion for Summary ____________
Affirmance for appellees the Honorable Edward W. Hanson, Jr. and the
Honorable Ronald H. Marks.
William Shaw McDermott, William C. Nystrom and Kirkpatrick & _______________________ ____________________ ______________
Lockhart on Motion for Summary Disposition for appellee Dominion Bank ________
of Greater Hampton Roads, N.A.
Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, Alan R. Miller, John N. Love, J. _______________________________ ______________ ____________ __
Jonathan Schraub, and Danny M. Howell on Motion for Summary Affirmance ________________ _______________
for appellees John W. Richardson, Stallings, Richardson & Rawls, P.C.,
John F. Rixey, Julian A. Bryant, Jr., Dinsmore, Evans and Bryant, and
Joseph Lyle, Jr.
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. We agree with the district court that __________
appellant had no business bringing this case in the
Massachusetts district court. Whatever thin technical
arguments could be made in favor of personal jurisdiction and
venue in Massachusetts, appellant's counsel had to know that
this case would be dismissed or transferred to Virginia since
it had ample contacts with Virginia and virtually none with
Massachusetts. Indeed, counsel acknowledged that the case
was likely to be transferred to Virginia even if the
technical arguments prevailed.
Under these circumstances, we think that dismissal
rather than transfer was a permissible choice and that
sanctions of $1,000 jointly and $1,000 against counsel alone
were appropriate. We prefer to rest our affirmance entirely
on Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) (improper purpose) rather than
11(b)(2) (frivolous legal contentions) but have no
disagreement whatever as to the total amount. The request
for further sanctions on appeal is denied, but counsel is
cautioned against a repetition of such conduct.
Affirmed. ________
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