Diaz-Cruz v. United States

USCA1 Opinion




[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


____________________

No. 95-2122

OSCAR DIAZ-CRUZ,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant, Appellee.



____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Stahl and Lynch,
Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Oscar Diaz-Cruz on brief pro se. _______________
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jose A. Quiles-Espinosa, _____________ ________________________
Senior Litigation Counsel, and Warren Vazquez, Assistant U.S. _______________
Attorney, on brief for appellee.


____________________

February 27, 1996
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Per Curiam. Appellant Oscar Diaz-Cruz appeals from __________

the denial of a motion to vacate his sentence filed under 28

U.S.C. 2255. He claims that the disparity between his

sentence and those of two of his co-defendants is unwarranted

and unreasonable. For the following reasons, we agree that

the 2255 motion was meritless.

Only certain kinds of alleged sentencing errors may

be raised in a collateral proceeding under 2255. These are

that (1) a sentence violates the Constitution or the laws of

the United States, (2) the district court was without

jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) the sentence is

greater than the statutory maximum, and (4) the sentence "is

otherwise subject to collateral attack." See 28 U.S.C. ___

2255; Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 772 (1st Cir. ______ ______________

1994). Appellant does not allege that his sentence violates

the Constitution. Nor could he. A defendant has no

constitutional right to receive the same sentence as another

convicted of the same offense. Williams v. Illinois, 399 ________ ________

U.S. 235, 243 (1970) ("[t]he Constitution permits qualitative

differences in meting out punishment"). Appellant also does

not assert that the district court lacked jurisdiction or

that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.

This leaves the last ground. The Supreme Court

"has narrowly confined the scope and availability of

collateral attack for claims that do not allege



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constitutional or jurisdictional errors." Knight, 37 F.3d at ______

772.

Such claims are properly brought under
2255 only if the claimed error is "a
fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of
justice" or "an omission inconsistent
with the rudimentary demands of fair
procedure." The error must "present
exceptional circumstances where the need
for the remedy afforded by the writ of
habeas corpus is apparent." _____________

Id. (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 ___ ____ _____________

(1962)).

Appellant's claim does not rise to the level of a

miscarriage of justice. "Absent extraordinary circumstances,

a defendant has no . . . fundamental interest in whether a

sentence reflects his . . . relative culpability with respect

to his . . . co-defendants." United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d _____________ _____

8, (2d Cir. 1995). See also United States v. Rodriguez, ____ ___ ____ _____________ _________

63 F.3d 1159, 1168 (1st Cir.) ("the mere fact of [a]

disparity is of no consequence"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. ____________

681 (1995). Appellant fails to state any extraordinary

circumstances surrounding his case; he relies instead on a

fairness argument. In this context, we note that the general

rule in this circuit is that it is not proper for a district

court to depart from a guideline range in an effort to

equalize the sentences of similarly situated defendants.

United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1448 (1st Cir.), cert. _____________ _____ _____

denied, 502 U.S. 969 (1991). Given appellant's lack in this ______


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case of a "fundamental interest" in a sentence equal to those

of his co-defendants, his claim of disparate treatment is not

cognizable on a 2255 motion. See, e.g., Entrekin v. United ___ ____ ________ ______

States, 508 F.2d 1328, 1330 (8th Cir. 1974) (defendant's ______

assertion that his sentence was harsher than that received by

his co-defendant cannot be raised in a 2255 motion), cert. _____

denied, 421 U.S. 977 (1975). ______

We add only that to the extent appellant is

separately challenging the trial court's enhancement of his

base offense level by two, "[a] non-constitutional claim that

could have been, but was not, raised on appeal, may not be

asserted by collateral attack under 2255 absent exceptional

circumstances." Knight, 37 F.3d at 772. We can perceive no ______

obstacle that would have prevented appellant from challenging

the two-level enhancement on direct appeal. "Having bypassed

his opportunity to raise the claim on direct appeal, he

cannot raise it now on collateral attack." Id. at 773. ___

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. ________

















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