Mitrano v. Jerry's Ford Sales

USCA1 Opinion









April 18, 1996
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



____________________


No. 95-2127

PETER PAUL MITRANO,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

JERRY'S FORD SALES, INC.,

Defendant, Appellee.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Selya, Cyr and Lynch,
Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Peter Paul Mitrano on brief pro se. __________________
Howard B. Myers and Brown, Olson & Wilson, P.C. on brief for _________________ _____________________________
appellee.



____________________


____________________

Per Curiam. We have carefully reviewed the record in __________














this case, including the briefs of the parties. We affirm

the dismissal of plaintiff/appellant's complaint for lack of

personal jurisdiction.

Plaintiff/appellant has failed to show that

defendant/appellee "purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of conducting activities within [New Hampshire].

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Where all ______ _______

negotiations relevant to the purchase of the automobile took

place entirely out of state, see United Electrical Workers v. ___ _________________________

163 Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1090 (1st Cir. ___________________________

1992) (location of negotiations vitally important to

jurisdictional inquiry based on contract), the mere mailing

of papers to New Hampshire is an insufficient contact to

support the exercise of jurisdiction over defendant/appellee.

Appellant contends, however, that defendant/appellee

waived this defense because, although it raised the defense

of lack of personal jurisdiction in its answer, it did not

include that defense in its subsequent motion to dismiss.

Appellant's position is not entirely without support. See ___

Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co., _______________________________ _________________________

874 F. Supp. 601, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (defense of lack of

personal jurisdiction waived by failure to raise it in first

Rule 12 motion, even though defendant included it in answer);

Committee v. Reimer Co., L.P.A., 150 F.R.D. 495, 498 (D.Vt. _________ __________________

1993) (same). However, we think that a careful reading of



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the relevant language and purpose of Rule 12 indicates that,

in this case, the defense was preserved.

"The purpose of Rule 12 is to eliminate unnecessary

delays in the early pleading stages of a suit so that all

available Rule 12 defenses are advanced before consideration

of the merits." Manchester Knitted Fashions v. Amalgamated, ___________________________ ___________

967 F.2d 688, 691 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing cases). To effect

this purpose, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) provides that certain

defenses, including the lack of personal jurisdiction, are

waived, in one of two circumstances: "(A) if omitted from a

motion in the circumstances described in [Rule 12(g)], or (B)

if it is neither made by motion under this rule nor included

in a responsive pleading . . ." Which of the two parts of

this rule applies depends on the form of defendant's first

defensive move. If defendant's first defensive move is a

preanswer motion, section A requires that the motion contain

all applicable defenses. That 12(h)(1)(A) applies to

preanswer motions is made clear by the 1966 Advisory _________

Committee's notes to Rule 12(h)(1) (Rule provides that

"certain specified defenses, which were available to a party

when he made a preanswer motion but which he omitted from _________________

that motion, are waived") (emphasis added), as well as by

part A's reference to Rule 12(g), see 1966 Advisory Committee ___

notes to Rule 12(g) (Rule precludes "a defendant who makes a

preanswer motion under this rule from making a further motion ________________________________



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presenting any defense or objection which was available to

him at the time he made the first motion and which he could

have included but did not in fact include therein."); Pilgrim _______

Badge & Label Corp. v. Barrios, 857 F.2d 1,3 (1st Cir. 1988) __________________ _______

("'[s]ubdivision (g) contemplates the presentation of an

omnibus preanswer motion in which defendant advances every _________

available Rule 12 defense and objection he may have that is

assertable by motion.") (quoting 5 Wright & Miller, Federal _______

Practice & Procedure: Civil 1384 at 837 (1969))). If, _____________________

however, the first defensive move of defendant is a

responsive pleading, 12(h)(1)(B) requires that the defense of

lack of personal jurisdiction be raised in that pleading.

Taken together, Rule 12(h)(1)(A) & (B) require "that

defendants wishing to raise [a defense of lack of personal

jurisdiction] must do so in their first defensive move, be it ________________________________________

a Rule 12 motion or a responsive pleading." Glater v. Eli ______ ___

Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir. 1983); see also ___________ ___ ____

Roque v. United States, 857 F.2d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 1988) _____ _____________

(Under Rule 12(h)(1), "defense of [personal jurisdiction] is

waived if not raised in the answer (or in a motion filed

prior to or contemporaneously with the answer).") (emphasis _____

in original).

In the instant case, defendant/appellee raised the

defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in its answer to the

complaint. Since this was defendant/appellee's first



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defensive move, the waiver provisions of Rule 12(h)(1) do not

apply. Nor did defendant/appellee waive that defense by

failing to raise lack of personal jurisdiction in its

subsequent postanswer motion to dismiss, see Bronlow v. Aman, __________ ___ _______ ____

740 F.2d 1476, 1483 n.1 (10th Cir. 1984) (defense of lack of

personal jurisdiction not waived even though not raised in

answer to amended complaint since it had already been raised

in an initial motion to dismiss), especially since

defendant/appellee showed no lack of diligence in pressing

this issue before the district court, cf. Rice v. Nova __ ____ ____

Biomedical Corp., 38 F.3d 909, 914 (7th Cir. 1994) (although _________________

raised in initial pleading, defense of lack of personal

jurisdiction waived when not pressed again until appeal);

Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 1990) (same). _______ ____

Affirmed. ________























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