Ortiz-Pinero v. Rivera-Arroyo

USCA1 Opinion









June 6, 1996
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 95-2167

WILLIE VICTOR ORTIZ-PI ERO,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

VICTOR RIVERA-ARROYO,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MAYOR OF GURABO, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________



ERRATA SHEET


The opinion of this Court issued on May 15, 1996, is amended as
follows:

Cover page: Change "[Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District ______________
Judge" to "Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge" _____ __________________________






































UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 95-2167

WILLIE VICTOR ORTIZ-PI ERO,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

VICTOR RIVERA-ARROYO,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MAYOR OF GURABO, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________


APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________

Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

and Cyr, Circuit Judge. _____________

____________________



Carlos A. Del Valle Cruz for appellant. ________________________
Elisa Bobonis Lang, with whom Jos R. Gaztambide and Gaztambide & __________________ __________________ ____________
Plaza were on brief for appellees. _____


____________________

May 15, 1996
____________________

2

































































3












CYR, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Willie Victor Ortiz CYR, Circuit Judge. _____________

Pinero ("Ortiz") appeals from a district court judgment dismiss-

ing his political discrimination claims against the City of

Gurabo, Puerto Rico, and its incumbent Mayor. We affirm.


I I

BACKGROUND BACKGROUND __________

In 1981, the City of Gurabo enacted an ordinance,

pursuant to P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 1351, designating eleven

municipal offices as positions of "trust" or "confidentiality,"

including the directorship of the Office of Federal Programs

("OFP"), the municipal agency charged with obtaining and adminis-

tering federal funding for various public works projects. See ___

Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series 1981-82 (Sept. 14, 1981).

In August 1991, then-Mayor Ramon Garcia Caraballo

appointed Ortiz, a fellow member of the Popular Democratic Party

(PDP), as OFP Director, and allegedly described the position to

Ortiz as a non-"confidence" position. Mayor Caraballo later

extended Ortiz' appointment through August 1993. In November

1992, however, after the PDP mayoral candidate was rejected by

the electorate, outgoing Mayor Caraballo notified Ortiz that he

should resign forthwith because the OFP directorship was a

"confidential" position which the new administration was entitled

to fill. Ortiz refused to resign. Thereafter, the incoming New

Progressive Party (NPP) mayor, defendant-appellee Willie Victor

Rivera Arroyo ("Rivera"), dismissed Ortiz.

In due course, Ortiz initiated the present action for

4












damages and reinstatement under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City

of Gurabo and Mayor Rivera, claiming political discrimination and

deprivation of his property interest in continued employment

without the benefit of a pretermination hearing, in violation of

the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti-

tution. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground

that the OFP directorship is a "trust" position for which compat-

ible political affiliation constitutes a legitimate qualifi-

cation. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. ___ ______ ______ _____

Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Their motion was accompanied by a _____

written "certification" from the City personnel office defining

the responsibilities of the OFP directorship.1 After determin-

ing that the evidence compelled a finding that the OFP director-

ship is a trust position, the district court granted summary

judgment for defendants on all claims. Ortiz-Pinero v. Rivera- ____________ _______

Acevedo, 900 F. Supp. 574 (D.P.R. 1995). _______

II II

DISCUSSION DISCUSSION __________

A. Standard of Review A. Standard of Review __________________

We review de novo, to determine whether the pleadings, __ ____

____________________

1The certification lists five responsibilities: (1) "[t]o
direct, coordinate and supervise all the operations of the
Federal Programs Office"; (2) "[t]o see to the compliance and
good functioning of said Office"; (3) "[t]o submit all the
corresponding reports to the Municipal Services Administration
Program, the State Agency delegated upon by the C.D.G.B. Pro-
gram"; (4) "[t]o take part in seminars and training that are
offered on the Federal Programs as well as to accompany the Mayor
in all matters concerning the Program"; and (5) "[t]o perform
other similar duties as assigned."

5












depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. See O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d ___ ________ _______

905, 906-07 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 634 (1993). _____ ______

Although all competent evidence and reasonable inferences are

viewed in the light most favorable to Ortiz, he cannot carry the

day on mere "`conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and

unsupported speculation.'" Id. (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. ___ ____________ ____

Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990)). ____________________

B. First Amendment Claim B. First Amendment Claim _____________________

1. Applicable Law 1. Applicable Law ______________

In a political discrimination case, the plaintiff first

must show that party affiliation was a substantial or motivating

factor for the challenged action. See Mount Healthy City Sch. ___ ________________________

Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Jirau- ___________________ _____ ______

Bernal v. Agrait, 37 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994).2 The burden ______ ______

then shifts to defendants to establish either a nondiscriminatory ______

reason for the dismissal, see Ferrer v. Zayas, 914 F.2d 309, 311 ___ ______ _____

(1st Cir. 1990), or that plaintiff held a "political" position __

for which party affiliation constituted an appropriate qualifica-

tion for continued employment, see Branti, 445 U.S. at 518; De ___ ______ __

Choudens v. Government Dev. Bank of P.R., 801 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. ________ ____________________________

1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987). Thus, the Branti/- _____ ______ ______ _
____________________

2We assume, without deciding, that there is sufficient
competent evidence that political affiliation motivated the
dismissal.

6












Elrod defense is designed to ensure that "representative govern- _____

ment not be undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of

policies of the new administration, policies presumably sanc-

tioned by the electorate." Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367. _____

Whether a government position is "political" does not

depend upon such loose-fitting labels as "confidential" or

"policymaking," but on the substance of the duties inherent in _________ __ ___ ______ ________ __

the position itself. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518 (noting: "a ___ ________ ______ ______

position may be appropriately considered political even though it

is neither confidential nor policymaking in character," and, by

the same token, party affiliation is not a relevant consideration

for all policymaking or confidential positions); see Romero ___ ______

Feliciano v. Torres Gaztambide, 836 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987) _________ __________________

(abjuring reliance on "rigid labels" in Branti/Elrod analysis). ______ _____

We employ a two-part inquiry to identify "political"

positions under the Branti/Elrod analysis: ______ _____

First, we inquire whether the overall func-
tions of the employee's department or agency
involve "decision making on issues where
there is room for political disagreement on
goals or their implementation." Second, we
decide whether the particular responsibili-
ties of the plaintiff's position, within the
department or agency, resemble those of "a
policymaker, privy to confidential informa-
tion, a communicator, or some other office
holder whose function is such that party
affiliation is an equally appropriate re-
quirement" for continued tenure. Among the
indicia material to the second element are
"`relative pay, technical competence, power
to control others, authority to speak in the
name of policymakers, public perception,
influence on programs, contact with elected
officials, and responsiveness to partisan
politics and political leaders.'"

7












O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 910 (quoting Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres ________ ________________ ______

Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. __________ _____

denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987)) (other citations omitted). ______

Although obviously fact-intensive, the ultimate deter-

mination whether a government position is "political" presents a

question of law for the court, rather than an issue of fact for

jury resolution. See McGurrin Ehrhard v. Connolly, 867 F.2d 92, ___ ________________ ________

93 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.) (noting that the "important

constitutional and governmental interests surrounding the appli-

cation of the [Branti/Elrod] exception" make it more suitable for ______ _____

determination by the court). Examining all competent evidence in

the light most favorable to Ortiz, we conduct a de novo assess- __ ____

ment of the relevant factors, see In re Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, ___ _____ ______

1327 (1st Cir. 1993) (plenary appellate review generally accorded

issues of law), and "make a common sense judgment in light of the

fundamental purpose to be served [by the Branti/Elrod analysis]." ______ _____

Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242. _______________

2. The OFP and "Partisan Political Interests" 2. The OFP and "Partisan Political Interests" _________________________________________

The OFP is charged with marshaling and administering

the million or so dollars obtained annually from federal agen-

cies, and with doling it out for various public works projects

within the municipality. Thus, the OFP unmistakably is a munici-

pal "department or agency [whose overall functions] involve

`decision making on issues where there is room for political

disagreement on goals or their implementation.'" O'Connor, 994 ________

F.2d at 910 (citations omitted). Indeed, its inherent responsi-


8












bilities inevitably entail the kinds of discretionary decisions

traditionally associated with municipal politics.3 Accordingly,

we conclude that defendants met the first-prong test under

Jimenez Fuentes.4 _______________

3. The Duties Inherent in the OFP Directorship 3. The Duties Inherent in the OFP Directorship ___________________________________________

Under the second prong, we examine any evidence the

defendants may have adduced that "the particular responsibilities __________ ________________

____________________

3See id. (noting that the first prong of the Jimenez Fuentes ___ ___ _______________
test was readily met where the municipal department for which
plaintiff worked was responsible for developing and implementing
public works programs, since "[e]lections often turn on the
success or failure of the incumbent [administration] to provide
these services"); Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242 (finding that _______________
regional director of commonwealth housing department, charged
with ameliorating housing conditions among low and middle income
families, was a position "relate[d] to partisan political inter-
ests"); accord Juarbe-Angueira v. Arias, 831 F.2d 11, 15 (1st ______ _______________ _____
Cir. 1987) ("Where, how, and when the government will repair or
reconstruct public buildings, . . . when and where money is to be
spent, may well be a matter of considerable interest to . . .
political leaders."), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 960 (1988); Mendez- _____ ______ _______
Palou v. Rohena-Betancourt, 813 F.2d 1255, 1260 (1st Cir. 1987) _____ _________________
(finding Administration for Environmental Quality Board engaged
in a "politically-sensitive mission" for purposes of Branti/Elrod ______ _____
analysis).

4Ortiz also contends that the first prong of the Jimenez _______
Fuentes test should focus upon the City as the pertinent "depart- _______
ment or agency," not on the OFP. Ortiz does not contend that
this shift in focus would alter the first-prong inquiry itself,
since under either scenario the City or the OFP would have to
undertake the politically sensitive mission of allocating federal
funds among various constituencies within the municipality. He
argues, instead, that the shift in focus could affect the inquiry
under prong two, see infra Section II.B.3(b), since Ortiz could ___ _____
then be viewed as a subordinate City official rather than the
head of the first-prong "department or agency" (i.e., the OFP). ____
Be that as it may, the attempt to distance Ortiz from political
decisionmaking not only distorts the function of the second-prong
inquiry under Jimenez Fuentes, but runs counter to our precedent _______________
in O'Connor, where we focused the inquiry under prong one upon ________
the municipal department of public works, rather than the munici- __________ _______
pality. See O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 907-08; supra note 3. ______ ___ ________ _____

9












of the plaintiff's position, within the [OFP], resemble those of

`a policymaker, privy to confidential information, a communica-

tor, or some other office holder whose function is such that

party affiliation is an equally appropriate requirement' for

continued tenure." O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 910 (citations omitted) ________

(emphasis added).

a) Lack of Written Job Description a) Lack of Written Job Description _______________________________

Ortiz first argues that summary judgment is precluded

because the City of Gurabo has no official, written job descrip-

tion (a.k.a. Form OP-16) for its OFP Director, nor indeed for any ___

of its municipal employees. He relies upon cases in which we

have held that courts should determine the duties inherent in a

particular position by examining the governmental entity's

written, signed job descriptions, rather than the duties actually

performed by the plaintiff or prior occupants of the position in

question. See, e.g., Mendez-Palou v. Rohena-Betancourt, 813 F.2d ___ ____ ____________ _________________

1255, 1260 (1st Cir. 1987). Ortiz would have us conclude that

the absence of any written job description, combined with con-

flicting circumstantial evidence as to the duties performed by

the OFP director, leaves unresolved issues of material fact which

preclude summary judgment. See Romero Feliciano, 836 F.2d at 3 ___ ________________

("[W]e have considered the OP-16 dispositive in other Puerto Rico

political discrimination cases . . . ."). In so doing, Ortiz

misconstrues our precedents and the nature of the issue under

consideration.

Although written, signed job descriptions may provide


10












highly probative evidence as to the responsibilities inherent in

a particular government position, and may even prove "disposi-

tive," see id. at 3, we have never suggested that their absence ___ ___ _______

is dispositive, cf. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1260 ("Whenever ___ ____________ ________

possible, we will rely upon this document because it contains ________

precisely the information we need . . . .") (emphasis added), or

precludes a defendant from resorting to other evidence, see, ___

e.g., Romero Feliciano, 836 F.2d at 3 (noting that defendant "may ____ ________________

present additional evidence at trial" besides the disputed OP-

16). Nor does the absence of a written, signed job description

preclude summary judgment, so long as defendants adduce other

competent evidence as to the responsibilities inherent in the OFP

directorship from which the "political" nature of the position

can be determined as a matter of law, see McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 ___ ________________

F.2d at 93 (ultimately, the Branti/Elrod defense poses a question ______ _____

of law), even though some nonessential facts may remain in

dispute. See Mariani-Giron v. Acevedo-Ruiz, 877 F.2d 1114, 1117 ___ _____________ ____________

n.5 (1st Cir. 1989).5

b) The Responsibilities Inherent in the Position b) The Responsibilities Inherent in the Position _____________________________________________

Ortiz contends that the district court incorrectly
____________________

5The district court relied on the lack of a written job
description as probative evidence that the OFP directorship is a __
"political" position. Ortiz-Pinero, 900 F. Supp. at 580 (citing ____________
Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1262-63 ("`[A]n employee with responsi- ____________
bilities that are not well defined or are of broad scope more
likely functions in a policymaking position.'") (citing Elrod, _____
427 U.S. at 368)). But since the City had adopted no job de-
scription for any position, cf. supra note 1, and it obviously ___ ___ _____
could not reasonably be inferred on that basis that all City
positions are "political," we give no weight to such an inference
in the present context.

11












assessed the record evidence relating to the duties inherent in

the OFP directorship. He claims that he administered the OFP in

a politically-neutral fashion and took no meaningful part in

mayoral "policymaking" or "political" decisions concerning

federal funding allocations among the various constituencies

within the municipality.

As previously noted, probative indicia that a position

is "political" include "`relative pay, technical competence,

power to control others, authority to speak in the name of

policymakers, public perception, influence on programs, contact

with elected officials, and responsiveness to partisan politics

and political leaders.'" O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 910 (citations ________

omitted). Defendants adduced evidence that Ortiz had not had to

compete with other candidates for the OFP directorship. More-

over, Ortiz concedes that he was no "expert" in the financial and

accounting aspects of the OFP's responsibilities. Thus, we think

the evidence does not support a fair inference that Ortiz was

selected for his managerial or technical expertise. Moreover,

Ortiz' prominent PDP affiliation, see Ortiz Deposition at 179-81 ___

(acknowledging that, at various times, he was a "political

activist," electoral commissioner, and campaign finance director

for the PDP and PDP candidates), plainly permits a fair inference

that he was selected for the OFP directorship based on his

"political" service and talents. See McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 F.2d ___ ________________

at 93 (finding position "political" where plaintiff, formerly a

clerical employee, was tapped for position as director of secre-


12












tary of state's regional office, after having worked on Secre-

tary's state senate campaign, and where Secretary "did not

advertise the job, solicit applications, or . . . consider any

[other] applicant").

More importantly, Ortiz was appointed to head the OFP, ____

whose overall functions clearly involved "`decision making on

issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or

their implementation,'" under the first prong of the Jimenez _______

Fuentes test. See supra Section II.B.2.6 By his own account, _______ ___ _____

Ortiz was in complete charge of the OFP staff,7 as well as the

applications for, and the administering of, all federal grant and

loan programs involving the City, amounting to approximately one-
____________________

6See, e.g., O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 911 ("[W]hatever difficul- ___ ____ ________
ties we might face in applying the second prong of the Jimenez _______
Fuentes test to subordinate positions within the Department, the _______
Superintendent's 'inherent responsibilities' . . . plainly '"had
a bearing on the partisan goals and policies"' of the Department
as a whole.") (citations omitted); De Choudens, 801 F.2d at 9-10 ___________
(noting that it would have been much more likely that the posi-
tion would be considered "political" had plaintiff been president _________
of the bank, rather than senior vice-president); cf. Juarbe- ___ _______
Angueira, 831 F.2d at 15 (finding it not "clearly established" ________
that regional directorship of public building authority was other
than a "political" position, even though it involved only a
"'modicum' of 'policymaking responsibility,'" given that supervi-
sory position was "moderately-high-level position within the
agency").

7Ortiz points out that he supervised an OFP staff of only
four persons (accountant, secretary, and two clerks). As we have
noted, however, the relative staff size, not its absolute size, ________
affords the more illuminating insight. See, e.g., O'Connor, 994 ___ ____ ________
F.2d at 911 n.3 (noting that, on per-capita basis, plaintiff's
supervision of smaller municipality-level staff may be equivalent
to supervision of much bigger staff in a larger municipality);
McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 F.2d at 95 (finding position "political" ________________
even though plaintiff supervised four-person regional office,
where satellite branch was but one of two such offices in Massa-
chusetts).

13












third of its municipal budget. See Ortiz Deposition, at 29-30.8 ___

Ortiz reported directly to the mayor, rather than

through intermediaries, meeting with him on an average of six or

seven times a year. Cf. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1260 (noting ___ ____________

that plaintiff performed duties with "only general instructions

and superficial supervision" from the administration). He served

as the mayor's "eyes" and "ears," periodically visiting public

work projects and reporting back to the mayor on their progress.

See McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 F.2d at 95 (noting that employee who ___ ________________

acted as "eyes and ears" for secretary of state engaged in an

"overtly political task[]").9 Such first-person (thus, more

subjective) field assessments often influence policy formulation,

and policymaking influence, even though indirect, is an important

____________________

8We reject the contention that the April 1993 certification
of duties issued by the City personnel department, see supra note ___ _____
1, is without any probative force because it is unsigned and was
not prepared until after Ortiz left office. Of course, an OP-16
signed by the employee has added probative value since it consti-
tutes the employee's contemporaneous "admission" concerning the
duties inherent in the position. But it does not follow that the
unsigned certificate, by which the City prospectively commits
itself to its description of the duties inherent in the OFP
directorship, is without probative weight. Although we have
noted that an unsigned OP-16 may leave a factual dispute as to
its authenticity, see Romero Feliciano, 836 F.2d at 3-4, Ortiz ___ ________________
asserts no challenge either to the authenticity or the validity
of the certification. Nor did we suggest in Romero Feliciano _________________
that such evidence should be completely discounted in a trial on
the merits.

9See Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 246 (noting that "politi- ___ _______________
cal" position holders, like directors, "monitor the progress of
the agency's programs and thus gauge the success of the Admini-
stration's . . . policies"); cf. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1260 ___ ____________
(finding it relevant that plaintiff "represents the President in
activities . . . [and gives] top level counselling [to] the
President").

14












indicium of "political" positions.10

Ortiz admittedly received and reviewed copies of

federal audits and oversight reports, including the Federal

Transit Administration's Triennial Review of the City's federally

funded transit program, which identified areas where the City was

not in compliance. See Defendant's Exh. 6; see also 49 U.S.C. ___ ___ ____

5307(i) (2). This politically-sensitive report is precisely the

type of document whose contents are not likely to be shared

freely with any but the mayor's trusted political confidants for

fear it might become fodder for the political opposition. Cf. ___

Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1262-63 ("[W]e believe that an official ____________

working in close contact with the head of a government agency is

also more likely to be privy to a substantial amount of confiden-

tial information. . . .").

Finally, Municipal Ordinance No. 3, enacted in 1981

pursuant to P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 1351, designates only eleven

municipal offices as positions of "trust" or "confidentiality,"

including the Director of the Office of Federal Programs.11
____________________

10See McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 F.2d at 94 (noting that plain- ___ ________________
tiff did not have "final authority to hire or fire employees,
[but] she had 'input'"); Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 245 ("That _______________
Regional Directors do not have final decision-making authority is
not determinative . . . . 'because such positions [i.e., direc-
torships] are a natural source of influential recommendations of
changes in policy.'") (citation omitted).

11Section 1351 of the Personnel Act provides, in pertinent
part:

1. Each [commonwealth] agency shall present
for approval of the [Central] Office [of
Personnel Administration] a plan containing
the confidential positions by which it de-

15












Consistent with the ordinance, former Mayor Caraballo notified

Ortiz in writing on December 24, 1992, that he was among the

eleven municipal officials who must resign to make way for the

incoming NPP administration.

Against this formidable array, Ortiz offers five

arguments. First, he contends that Municipal Ordinance No. 3 is

a nullity because the defendants have not shown that it was duly

submitted to the Central Office of Personnel Administration for

approval, as supposedly required by the Personnel Act. But see ________ ___ ___

supra note 11. This claim is unavailing. _____

On its face, the ordinance reflects that it had been

submitted to the Central Office of Personnel Administration

("Central Office") for review. See Municipal Ordinance No. 3, ______ ___

3. Thus, the burden lay with Ortiz to show that the City did not

comply with the statutory requirements,12 and he proffered no
____________________

sires to operate. In the case of municipali-
ties, the Municipal Assembly shall follow the
ordinance or resolution approving the plan
submitted by the mayor and shall send it to
the Office for the sole purpose of ascertain- ___ ___ ____ _______ __ __________
ing that the provisions of section 1350 of ___ ____ ___ __________ __ _______ ____ __
this title have been complied with. ____ _____ ____ ____ ________ ____

P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 1351 (emphasis added).

12We recognize that the burden of proof normally shifts to
the governmental entity to establish that the substantive re- ___________
quirements of its enactment comport with the First Amendment.
But we have found no authority, nor can we discern any sound
reason, for shifting the burden of proof where the challenging
party alleges only procedural irregularities of nonconstitutional __________
dimension in an ordinance-enactment process. See, e.g., Friends ___ ____ _______
of the City Market v. Old Town Redev. Corp., 714 S.W.2d 569, 575 __________________ _____________________
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986) ("Ordinances are presumed to have been
adopted in accordance with the requirements of the law . . . .").


16












evidence that the ordinance was not duly submitted to the Central

Office. See O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 906-07 (noting that summary ___ ________

judgment opponent must proffer more than "'conclusory allega-

tions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation'")

(citation omitted). In all events, the statutory language does

not purport to make submission to the Central Office a prerequi-

site to the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 3. Rather, the ________

requirement of post-enactment compliance "review" by the Central

Office, in relation to a municipal ordinance, stands in sharp __ ________ __ _ _________ _________

contrast to the heightened obligation of Commonwealth agencies to ____________ ________

seek Central Office approval. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 1351 ________ ___

(mayor's "plan" to be submitted to Central Office "for the sole

purpose of ascertaining that the provisions of section 1350 of

this title have been complied with"). See Appendix A for text of ___

1350.

Second, Ortiz correctly notes that state laws identify-

ing government positions as "trust" or "confidential" are not

dispositive of the federal-law question whether a particular

position is "political." See Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 243 ___ _______________

n.9. On the other hand, we have explained that state laws and

municipal ordinances designating positions as "trust" or "confi-

dential" like P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 1351, and Municipal

Ordinance No. 3 are entitled to "some deference" under the

Branti/Elrod formula, see Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 246; ______ _____ ___ ________________

accord Juarbe-Angueira, 831 F.2d at 14, especially where other ______ _______________

evidence clearly points in the same direction.


17












Third, Ortiz attempts to estop defendants from assert-

ing a Branti/Elrod defense by pointing to the putative assurance ______ _____

made to him by Mayor Caraballo in August 1991, that the OFP

directorship was not a "trust" position, see supra p.2. Even ___ _____

this evidence is not hefty enough to ward off summary judgment,

however.13

For one thing, application of the equitable estoppel

doctrine against governmental entities, including municipalities,

is narrowly circumscribed. See Heckler v. Community Health ___ _______ _________________

Servs. of Crawford County, 467 U.S. 51, 60-62 (1984). Moreover, __________________________

any attempt to interpose estoppel as a bar to the Branti/Elrod ______ _____

defense must fail, since reliance on the Caraballo representation

would not have been objectively reasonable in the circumstances.

See United States v. Javier Angueira, 951 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. ___ _____________ ________________

1991) (noting that even if estoppel is available against govern-

mental entity, "`the party raising the [estoppel] defense must

have reasonably relied on some "affirmative misconduct" attribut-

able to the sovereign.'") (citations omitted); A.E. Alie & Sons _________________

v. United States Postal Serv., 897 F.2d 591, 593 (1st Cir. 1990) __________________________

(same).

____________________

13We note, as a threshold matter, that its admissibility is
far from clear. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Even assuming that ___
former Mayor Caraballo could bind the City by his representa-
tions, see Fed. R. Evid. 801 (permitting "admissions" of party- ___ ______
opponent), it is extremely problematic whether the successor ________
mayor, defendant Rivera, can be bound, especially since the very
nature of the 1983 claim made by Ortiz appears to preclude any
characterization of former Mayor Caraballo as a party "opponent."
As this evidence is otherwise deficient, however, we need not
determine its competence at this time.

18












Immediately prior to his appointment to the OFP direc-

torship, Ortiz, concededly a "political activist," served for

three years as City assemblyman, a position which would have ___________

brought all City ordinances within his constructive knowledge.

See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531 n.25 (1982) (noting ___ ____________ _____

that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of

duly enacted statutes/ordinances); Deibler v. City of Rehoboth _______ _________________

Beach, 790 F.2d 328, 331 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); cf. Good v. _____ ___ ____

Dauphin County Social Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d ______________________________________________________

1087, 1091 (3d Cir. 1989) (reasonably competent government

officials should know laws governing their conduct). Similarly,

Ortiz admitted to having served for four years in a previous

"trust" position, as Regional Director of the Administracion de

Derecho al Trabajo, making it highly unlikely that he was not on

actual notice of P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 1351, or of the fact

that municipalities were required to designate certain "trust"

positions by ordinance. __ _________

Fourth, without citing either authority or a policy

rationale, Ortiz argues that the OFP directorship cannot be

considered a "political" position since there is no requirement

that the municipal assembly approve the mayor's selection for the

post. We think this far too thin a reed to warrant rejection of

the traditional Branti/Elrod criteria. Many "political" appoint- ______ _____

ments (e.g., to the executive staff of a governor or mayor) are

not subject to legislative approval, a requirement which corre-

lates more closely to the issue of political accountability in


19












the legislative branch, than to the partisan political attributes

of an executive position.

Finally, Ortiz insists that the OFP directorship duties

actually performed by him under Mayor Caraballo were merely

administrative and technical, that Caraballo alone decided how

federal funds were to be spent, and that Ortiz merely informed

the mayor regarding the administrative status of federal funding

applications. These claims are insufficient to overcome the

well-supported legal determination, see supra pp. 9-14, that the ___ _____

OFP directorship is a "political" position. At most, Ortiz'

contrary characterizations, fully credited, establish the servic-

es actually rendered by Ortiz while he served as the director, as

distinguished from the responsibilities inherent in the position

itself. Cf. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1258 (actual duties not as ___ ____________

probative as inherent duties). As the ultimate issue presented

is one of law, rather than fact, McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 F.2d at ________________

93, summary judgment was warranted on the political discrimina-

tion claim.

C. Due Process Claim C. Due Process Claim _________________

Ortiz advances essentially the same arguments as

support for the due process claim: that he had a legitimate

expectation of continued employment under commonwealth law, which

gave rise to a "property right" entitling him to a pretermination

hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 ___ _______________________ __________

(1985). The pretermination process due a government employee is

a matter of federal law, see Rivera-Flores v. Puerto Rico Tel. ___ _____________ ________________


20












Co., 64 F.3d 742, 749 (1st Cir. 1995), whereas the preliminary ___

question whether a government employee possessed a protectable

"property right," or a legitimate expectation of continued

employment, is controlled by the employment contract or state

law. See id. ___ ___

Since Ortiz' employment contract included a clause

permitting his unilateral, unconditional termination by the mayor

at any time, commonwealth or local law would be the only possible

basis for an actionable claim to continued employment. Accord-

ingly, Municipal Ordinance No. 3 is dispositive of the due

process claim, since it designates the OFP directorship as a

"confidential" position, pursuant to P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3,

1351. The Personnel Act in turn defines "confidential" appoint-

ees as, inter alios, "those who intervene or collaborate substan- _____ _____

tially in the formulation of public policy, who advise directly

or render direct services to the head of the agency," and are

subject to "free selection and removal." Id. 1350. Thus, Ortiz ___

had neither a property right nor a contract right to continued

employment as OFP Director, and defendant-appellee Rivera was

under no constitutional obligation to afford him a pretermination

hearing.

III III

CONCLUSION CONCLUSION __________

The claims for damages are barred under the doctrine of

qualified immunity, because Ortiz failed to demonstrate that it

was "clearly established" that the OFP directorship was not a


21












"political" position. See Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1259-60. ___ ____________

Furthermore, since we conclude as a matter of law that the OFP

directorship was indeed a "political" position, the claims for

damages and reinstatement are foreclosed on the merits. Finally, ___ _____________

the due-process claim fails because Ortiz possessed no right to,

or reasonable expectation of, continued employment as OFP direc-

tor.

The judgment is affirmed; costs to appellees. The judgment is affirmed; costs to appellees. ____________________________________________






































22












Appendix A __________

LAWS OF PUERTO RICO ANNOTATED
TITLE THREE. EXECUTIVE
CHAPTER 51. PUBLIC SERVICE PERSONNEL
SUBCHAPTER V. PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM; STRUCTURE

1350. Confidential employees

Confidential employees are those who intervene or collabo-
rate substantially in the formulation of the public policy, who
advise directly or render direct services to the head of the
agency, such as:
(1) Officers appointed by the Governor, their personal
secretaries and drivers; as well as their executive and adminis-
trative assistants who answer directly to them.
(2) Heads of agencies, their personal secretaries and
drivers; as well as their executive and administrative assistants
who answer directly to them.
(3) Assistant heads of agencies and their personal secretar-
ies and drivers.
(4) Regional directors of agencies.
(5) Personal secretaries and drivers of officials selected
by popular election, as well as their assistants who answer
directly to them.
(6) Members of boards or standing committees appointed by
the Governor and their respective personal secretaries.
(7) Members and personnel of boards or commissions appointed
by the Governor having a specific period of effectiveness.
(8) Personnel of the offices of the Puerto Rico Ex-Govern-
ors.
Confidential employees shall be of free selection and
removal. Likewise confidential shall be those employees who
though of free selection may be removed only for good cause by
provision of law or those whose appointment is for a term pre--
fixed by law.
Every regular employee in a career position who is appointed
to a confidential position shall be entitled to be reinstated in
a position equal or similar to the last one he held in the career
service.













i