Wilder v. Forte

USCA1 Opinion












July 5, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________


No. 95-1960
No. 95-2018

MARC E. WILDER, II, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,
JOHN MARSHALL,

Defendants, Appellees.


____________________

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Marc E. Wilder, II and Russell J. Carey on brief pro se. __________________ ________________
Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and ____________________
Margaret Melville, Counsel, Department of Correction, on brief for __________________
appellees.


____________________


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Per Curiam. Prior to its repeal in 1994, a ___________

Massachusetts statute providing for the award of good-time

credits to state prisoners specifically withheld such credits

from inmates who had been convicted of enumerated sex

offenses. See Mass. Gen. L., ch. 127, 129. Plaintiffs ___

here, a group of prisoners serving sentences for sex crimes,

have brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging

this statutory exclusion on various constitutional grounds.1 1

The lower court rejected each of their claims at the summary

judgment stage. On the arguendo assumption that plaintiffs' ________

contentions are cognizable in a civil-rights action (rather

than a habeas corpus proceeding), we summarily affirm for the

reasons recited by the magistrate-judge in his June 23, 1995

report. We add only the following.

Underlying several of plaintiffs' claims is the

assertion that their inability to obtain good-time credits

constitutes a separate "punishment" apart from that incurred

at sentencing. This is mistaken. The statutory exclusion

was enacted in 1965, see Amado v. Superintendent, 366 Mass. ___ _____ ______________

45, 48 (1974) (reviewing statutory history)--long before any

of the plaintiffs had been convicted. Accordingly, their

ineligibility for such credits can only be viewed as part of


____________________

1 Of the more than fifty plaintiffs who joined in the 1
action below, only some fourteen are participating in the
instant appeals. We assume arguendo that each of the ________
appellants has properly invoked this court's jurisdiction.

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the punishment imposed by the sentencing court after trial.

Plaintiffs' assertion that the exclusion constitutes a bill

of attainder fails for this reason (among others). See, ___

e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 450 (1965). ____ ______________ _____

Their additional claim that the exclusion violates double

jeopardy (a claim which we assume arguendo is properly before ________

us) falters on the same ground. Even if the exclusion were

viewed as a cumulative punishment for the same offense,

double jeopardy would not be offended. See, e.g., United ___ ____ ______

States v. Centeno-Torres, 50 F.3d 84, 85 (1st Cir.) (per ______ ______________

curiam), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 208 (1995). ____________

The allegation that the exclusion violates due process

proves equally unavailing. Plaintiffs possess no liberty

interest in receiving good-time credits. See, e.g., Sandin ___ ____ ______

v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1995); Riddle v. Mondragon, ______ ______ _________

83 F.3d 1197, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 1996). And the statutory

scheme found violative of substantive due process in Young v. _____

Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 748-51 (W.D. Wash. 1995), a case on ______

which plaintiffs rely, bears no resemblance to the one before

us. Finally, the contention that the exclusion violates

equal protection runs into a wall of caselaw indicating

otherwise. See, e.g., Riddle, 83 F.3d at 1207-08; Artway v. ___ ____ ______ ______

Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1267-68 (3d ________________________________

Cir. 1996); Lustgarden v. Gunter, 966 F.2d 552, 555 (10th __________ ______





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Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1008 (1992); Amado, 366 Mass. ____________ _____

at 46-51.

Affirmed. See Loc. R. 27.1. ____________________________















































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