Kueter v. Rancourt

USCA1 Opinion









June 24, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________


No. 95-2336

CYNTHIA M. KUETER,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

ALLAN RANCOURT, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________


APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Cynthia M. Kueter on brief pro se. _________________
Alton C. Stevens and Marden, Dubord, Bernier & Stevens on brief _________________ ___________________________________
for appellees, Allan Rancourt and Kennebec Federal Savings & Loan
Association.
Robert E. Sandy, Jr. and Sherman, Sandy & Lee on brief for _____________________ ______________________
appellees, Hubert C. Kueter, Robert E. Sandy, Jr., William A. Lee,
and Sherman, Sandy & Lee.
Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General, and Paul Stern, Assistant ________________ ___________
Attorney General on Motion for Summary Disposition, for State
appellees.


____________________


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Per Curiam. We have reviewed the record and have ___________

read the parties' briefs and memorandum. We affirm the

judgment of the district court for the reasons stated in the

Recommended Decision of the magistrate judge which was

adopted by the district court. The 100-page second amended

complaint plainly was "redundant, rambling, and unorganized"

as the magistrate judge described. Thus, to dismiss it,

especially after plaintiff had been warned to file a short

and concise complaint, was not an abuse of discretion. See ___

Kuehl v. F.D.I.C., 8 F.3d 905, 908-09 (1st Cir. 1993) (where _____ ________

plaintiffs had been warned that their complaint was too long

and had been given a chance to cure the problem, the

dismissal of their new, rambling 43-page complaint was not an

abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1545 (1994). _____________

We add that, in any event, the complaint suffered from more

fatal defects:

1. The district court is without power to review

the state court decisions -- the relief plaintiff clearly was

seeking. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. ___ _________________________________________

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust _______ ______ ______________

Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-416 (1923). ___

2. Plaintiff cannot bring a civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against private parties. The mere

fact that these parties resorted to, or appeared in, state

court is insufficient to turn them into state actors. See ___














Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d ________________ _____________________________

252, 259 (1st Cir. 1993). Nor do plaintiff's conclusory

allegations that these defendants were in a conspiracy with

the state court judges suffice to bring them within 1983's

reach. See id. ___ ___

3. The state judges are absolutely immune from

claims for money damages. See Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, ___ ___ _________

2 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. ________

See Local Rule 27.1. ___

































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