CME v. Ford

USCA1 Opinion




[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 96-1197

CME, ASSOCIATES, INC.,

AS IT IS THE GENERAL PARTNER OF

CME GROUP, LTD.,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH D. FORD AND SHIRLEY ANN FORD, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellants.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Nancy J. Gertner, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________
Boudin, Circuit Judge, _____________
and Ponsor,* District Judge. ______________

____________________

Alan R. Hoffman with whom John R. Cavanaugh and Lynch, Brewer, ________________ __________________ ______________
Hoffman & Sands, LLP were on brief for appellants. ____________________
Judith Gail Dein with whom James J. Arguin, Warner & Stackpole, _________________ ________________ ___________________
LLP and Christopher Nolland were on brief for appellee. ___ ___________________

____________________

October 17, 1996
____________________

____________________

* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

















Per Curiam. This is an action on a promissory note by ___________

CME Associates against the Fords, two of whom were co-signers

of the note. The district court granted partial summary

judgment in favor of CME, establishing the senior Fords'

liability on the note. A number of other issues remain to be

resolved, but the court entered a separate judgment pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

The Fords' primary defense to the note was an alleged

oral modification of the terms of the note by the prior

holder, the FDIC. The district court rejected this defense

on the ground that the note's current owner, CME, is a holder

in due course protected by Massachusetts law against such

modifications absent notice. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, ___

3-305(2)(e). We are satisfied from a review of the record

that CME did not have notice and that there was insufficient

evidence to the contrary to warrant a trial on this question.

The Fords also argued that CME's foreclosure sale of

real property securing the note was conducted in a

commercially unreasonable fashion. E.g., RTC v. Carr, 13 ____ ___ ____

F.3d 425 (1st Cir. 1993). In effect, the Fords said that the

sale was conducted in a negligent manner. But their

affidavit to this effect did not even purport to show that it

was made by someone with knowledge of the facts as required

by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The Fords say that more time

should have been allowed for discovery concerning the conduct



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of the sale, but this is a matter largely within the purview

of the district court, Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb ____________ ____________________

Co., 95 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 1996), and we perceive no abuse ___

of discretion. Moreover, the record does not reflect that

the Fords made anything approaching an adequate showing

before the district court to justify invocation of the

"escape hatch" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Paterson-Leitch _______________

Company, Inc. v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric ______________ ___________________________________________

Company, 840 F.2d 985, 988-989 (1st Cir. 1988). _______

No other issues argued by the Fords in this case require

further comment. It would be helpful in the future for the

district court to be more explicit in setting forth its

express determination that there is no just reason for delay

as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

Affirmed. ________























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