Dupont v. DuBois

USCA1 Opinion












[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________


No. 96-1459

MICHAEL KEVIN DUPONT,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

LARRY E. DUBOIS, COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Michael Kevin Dupont on brief pro se. ____________________
Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and David __________________ _____
J. Rentsch, Counsel, Department of Correction, on brief for appellees. __________


____________________

November 6, 1996
____________________


















Per Curiam. Michael Kevin DuPont appeals from the __________

district court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief.1 1

We affirm, without prejudice to his right to seek certain

relief anew in the district court, as is explained below.

A. Background __________

DuPont is incarcerated at MCI-Cedar Junction in

Massachusetts. In 1992, he filed a pro se civil rights ___ __

action against various Department of Corrections personnel

and others, seeking damages and injunctive relief under 42

U.S.C. 1983. Among other things, he alleged that

defendants had violated his rights by using excessive force

against him, seizing his legal materials, denying him medical

care, and threatening to confine him in a disciplinary unit.

At the time he filed his complaint, DuPont was in the

Departmental Segregation Unit (DSU), but he was later placed

in the Departmental Disciplinary Unit (DDU), where he

remains.

In this appeal, DuPont challenges the district

court's denial of his request for an injunction ordering

compliance with certain stipulations, agreements, or orders

in the following cases: Cepulonis v. Fair, D. Mass., No. _________ ____

78-3233-Z; Stone v. Boone, D. Mass., No. 73-1083-T; Alston v. _____ _____ ______

____________________

1The court accepted a magistrate's report recommending 1
denial of some of his requests for relief in an order dated
August 3, 1995, and summarily denied other requests in an
order dated March 13, 1996. DuPont appeals from those two
orders.

-2-













Fair, D. Mass., No. 77-3519-G; Hoffer v. Fair, S.J.C. No. 85- ____ ______ ____

71; and DuPont v. Hall, Norfolk Super. Ct. No. 87-1399. He ______ ____

also objects to the court's denial of his requests for

injunctions forbidding the use of chemical agents or

excessive force against him, forbidding his placement in a

strip cell, directing the return of postage stamps taken from

his incoming mail and the return of certain legal materials,

and directing his release from the DDU.

B. Discussion __________

If the district court has made no clear error of

law or fact in its ruling on a preliminary injunction motion,

we will not disturb its conclusion absent manifest abuse of

discretion. See Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888, 902 ___ _____ ________________

(1st Cir. 1993). For the reasons outlined below, we find

that the district court did not overstep its bounds in

denying the requested relief.

Consent Decree Violations. In part, DuPont seeks __________________________

orders enforcing federal or state court consent decrees, but

such relief is unavailable in an individual action under 42

U.S.C. 1983. See Martel v. Fridovich, 14 F.3d 1, 3 n.4 ___ ______ _________

(1st Cir. 1993).2 2




____________________

2On appeal, DuPont presents a new claim that his placement 2
in the DDU breached a settlement agreement in DuPont v. Fair, ______ ____
Plymouth Super. Ct. No. 89-0105-B, but that claim would also
be barred under Martel. ______

-3-













State Law Violations. DuPont also asserts various ____________________

state law violations, e.g., that defendants have not properly

promulgated certain DDU rules, did not medically screen him

before placing him in the DDU, and have not provided certain

law library access, all in violation of state statutes or

regulations. But he does not explain how defendants thereby

violated federal law, and this court does not have the power

to direct state officials to comply with state law. See ___

Quintero de Quintero v. Aponte-Roque, 974 F.2d 226, 230 (1st _____________________ ____________

Cir. 1992) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. ___________________________________

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984)). _________

Court Access. DuPont complains that defendants _____________

violated his right to court access by restricting his ability

to conduct legal research3 and by seizing legal materials 3

from his cell. DuPont has clearly been able to challenge his

criminal conviction and sentence by filing a direct appeal

and post-conviction motions in state court and by filing two

habeas petitions (and appeals from the dismissal thereof) in

federal court. He has also been able to file and prosecute

this action challenging the conditions of his confinement.

Nothing in the record indicates that DuPont's access to the

courts has not been adequate or meaningful. Consequently, he

____________________

3According to DuPont, he may not physically use the 3
prison's law libraries, but must submit written requests for
xeroxed copies of legal materials and give exact citations
for such materials, and he has no access to softcover advance
sheets.

-4-













has not suffered the "actual injury" required to show a

violation of his right to meaningful court access. See Lewis ___ _____

v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2180-82 (1996). _____

Liberty Interests. DuPont asserts that defendants _________________

have violated his due process liberty interest in law library

access and in not being confined in the DDU by their failure

to comply with obligations imposed in the cases cited in the

beginning of this opinion. Contrary to DuPont's claim,

however, the Alston case did not require defendants to ______

prepare and evaluate a health status report before placing

him in the DDU, which is located at Cedar Junction as is the

DSU where he was previously housed. Alston requires the ______

preparation and review of health status reports only before

an inmate is transferred to an entirely different

institution. Likewise, Stone does not clearly grant DuPont _____

the right to physically use the prison law library. It

requires that all inmates have supervised access to the law

library unless "special circumstances" dictate otherwise.

Such circumstances may well encompass DuPont's confinement in

the DDU.

DuPont v. Fair and the Hoffer and Cepulonis cases ______ ____ ______ _________

relate only to inmates in the DSU, but DuPont alleges that ___

they apply because the DDU is really a pretextual DSU.

DuPont's arguments on this point are not persuasive. The

affidavit by defendant DOC Commissioner Dubois to which he



-5-













points affirmed that the DDU is distinct from the DSU in its ________ __

disciplinary purpose. The list of comparisons between the

DSU and DDU which DuPont submitted to the district court

actually describes significant differences between the two

units. Finally, while the DDU may have effectively replaced

the DSU at Cedar Junction, Commissioner Dubois testified in a

deposition in a different case (which is in the record before

us) that he did not establish the DDU in order to evade legal

obligations applicable to the DSU.

In his objections to the magistrate's report,

DuPont raised an argument based on Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. ______ ______

Ct. 2293 (1995), which had just then been decided, and which

the district court did not discuss in its opinion accepting

the report and recommendation. DuPont asserts that

confinement in the DDU is an atypical and significant

deprivation, giving him a due process liberty interest under

Sandin, which defendants violated when they put him in the ______

DDU. The present record does not contain sufficient

information to permit evaluation of this claim.4 For that 4

reason, a remand to consider the Sandin claim makes no sense. ______

Accordingly, we affirm the denials below on the basis of the


____________________

4We note, too, that DuPont has asked us to send certain 4
materials on file in this court which are relevant to his
Sandin claim to the district court, a request which we hereby ______
grant. The materials were filed in connection with a
previous appeal by DuPont in this case, but were never filed
in the district court.

-6-













arguments originally presented to the district court, but do

so without prejudice to DuPont's right to seek preliminary

injunctive relief anew based on Sandin. We remind him, ______

however, that the district court has directed him to comply

fully with Loc. R. 7.1 in filing motions and supporting

memoranda in that court, and that district courts "are

entitled to demand adherence to specific mandates contained

in the [local] rules." See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. ___ ________________________

Precision Valley Aviation, Inc., 26 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. _______________________________

1994).

Equal Protection. On appeal, DuPont asserts that ________________

the particular law library access restrictions placed on him

as a DDU inmate violate his equal protection rights because

other inmates in "disciplinary segregation," i.e., inmates in

the "locked down max end and segregation blocks 9 and 10,"

have greater library access. This bare allegation does not

establish that the inmates he refers to are situated

similarly enough to DDU inmates to require similar law

library rights. See Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 298, 304 n.8 ___ _____ ______

(8th Cir.) (the district court should not presume that

inmates in administrative segregation for their own

protection are necessarily similarly situated with protective

custodyinmates), cert.denied,1996 WL375894(U.S. Oct.7,1996).5 5 ___________

____________________

5On appeal, DuPont asserts a new claim that defendants' 5
failure to provide DDU inmates with the 90-day periodic
review and early release options given DSU inmates violates

-7-













Mail Rights While in Strip Cell. On three _____________________________________

occasions in 1994, defendants put DuPont in a strip cell for

periods ranging from four to eleven days, during which time

DuPont's incoming mail was allegedly withheld and he was also

denied writing materials. We evaluate the withholding of

incoming mail under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), ______ ______

see Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989), and the ___ __________ ______

restriction on outgoing mail (i.e., the denial of writing

materials) under Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). _________ ________

Because the withholding of mail was reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests and the restriction on

outgoing mail furthered a substantial governmental interest

unrelated to the suppression of expression and was no greater

than necessary, we find no constitutional violation. DuPont

was placed in a strip cell due to intransigence sufficiently

serious to require the use of chemical agents. Restricting

his mail privileges helped the state maintain order and

security in the DDU by ensuring that unpleasant consequences

flowed from such misbehavior. See, e.g., Little v. Norris, ___ ____ ______ ______

787 F.2d 1241, 1243-44 (8th Cir. 1986) ("The purpose of

withholding personal mail is to make punitive isolation

unpleasant, and thereby discourage improper behavior and

____________________

his equal protection rights. As noted above, DuPont's own
list comparing the DSU and DDU suggests that there are
significant differences between the two units. Since DSU and
DDU inmates do not seem to be similarly situated, his claim
seems unlikely to be successful.

-8-













promote security within the prison."). Given the limited

privileges of DDU inmates, which must be earned, defendants

may have had few other alternatives for inducing persistently

disobedient inmates like DuPont to behave. Moreover, the

withdrawal of mail privileges was temporary. DuPont was

given his mail and permitted to write letters after leaving

the strip cell. His confinement was also relatively short in

duration, lasting 11 days or less. The restriction was

content neutral, applying to all incoming and outgoing

correspondence. DuPont was permitted attorney visits and his

attorney could keep him informed about pending cases. He has

not asserted the actual loss of any cause of action due to ____

his inability to write letters or draft legal documents while

confined in the strip cell.

Incoming Stamps. Defendants have removed stamps ________________

from DuPont's incoming mail, citing a DDU rule prohibiting

the receipt of stamps through the mail and requiring DDU

inmates to buy stamps at the prison canteen. DuPont avers

that he did not have enough money in his prison account to

buy stamps. But his correspondents who desire to send him

stamps may donate funds to his prison account for that

purpose, instead. See 103 Code Mass. Regs. 405.16. The ___

prison also provides some free postage for personal mail and

unlimited postage for necessary mail to court officials and

attorneys. Id. 481.10. Under the circumstances, we find ___



-9-













no constitutional violation. See Kaestel v. Lockhart, 746 ___ _______ ________

F.2d 1323, 1325 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (prison could

prohibit the receipt of postal stamps through incoming mail

in order to prevent inmates from using them as a source of

currency outside their regular prison accounts; inmates could

obtain pre-stamped envelopes from the commissary and some

funds were available for postage for indigent inmates)

(applying Procunier standard); accord Pacheco v. Comisse, 897 _________ ______ _______ _______

F. Supp. 671, 682 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying Turner standard). ______

Seizures of Legal Materials. DuPont objects to ___________________________

defendants' seizure of legal materials from his cell.

Contrary to his assertions, however, the settlement agreement

in DuPont v. Hall, supra, did not give him the right to keep ______ ____ _____

12 cubic feet of legal materials in his DDU cell or the right

to select materials to keep in his cell before excess ______

materials were removed and placed in storage. The prison's

property limit regulation expressly permitted him to keep no

more than 1 cubic foot of legal materials in his cell, see ___

103 Code Mass. Regs. 403.09, and so defendants could remove

materials exceeding that limit. The regulation in question

is not arbitrary or unreasonable simply because the federal

prison system has a more generous property limit. See Savko ___ _____

v. Rollins, 749 F. Supp. 1403, 1407-8 (D. Md. 1990), aff'd, _______ _____

924 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1991) (table). Finally, defendants'





-10-













seizures of his excess materials have not caused any actual

injury to his right of court access, as is indicated above.6 6

Excessive Force. DuPont seeks an injunction _______________

against defendants' use of chemical agents when removing

excess legal materials from his cell, alleging that they have

used excessive force and chemical agents against him on

multiple occasions from 1991 to 1994. The record indicates

that chemical agents and/or forced move teams have been used

against DuPont some 14 times in that time period after he has

refused to obey orders or rules. He may be able to convince

a jury that excessive force was used against him on February

14, 1994, as he asserts, but that injury could be remedied

through a damages award. See Cohen, supra, 991 F.2d at 902 ___ _____ _____

(the availability of adequate damages may justify denying

preliminary injunctive relief). On practically all other

occasions when chemical agents were used against him, DuPont

reported no injuries and medical personnel observed none. On

a few occasions, he reported old or minor injuries. Prison

officials sought medical authorization before using chemical

agents on DuPont and his eyes and face were washed after

their use. We conclude, therefore, that defendants have not




____________________

6DuPont also sought the return of particular materials 6
removed from his cell in July 1994. He may review his stored
materials to obtain the particular documents he wants,
however, but has declined to do so.

-11-













systematically used excessive force or improperly used

chemical agentsso asto justify preliminaryinjunctive relief.7 7

Use of Strip Cells. DuPont alleges that the _____________________

conditions in the strip cell in which he was occasionally

confined in 1994 violated the Eighth Amendment. Even

assuming that the conditions he describes were sufficiently

serious deprivations to establish a constitutional violation,

DuPont has not shown facts to indicate that any named

defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his

safety. Thus, he has not shown the requisite "deliberate

indifference" to warrant any relief, at this time, on an

Eighth Amendment claim. See Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. ___ ______ _______

1970, 1977 (1994); Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 446-47 (8th ________ ____

Cir. 1995) (denying injunctive relief to an inmate confined

in a strip cell since he had not shown that any named

defendant had known of and disregarded any excessive risk to


____________________

7On appeal, DuPont objects to the district court's refusal 7
to compel discovery to permit him to identify the guards who
allegedly used excessive force against him. We note that
discovery orders are not generally appealable prior to entry
of final judgment. See 9 Moore's Federal Practice ___ __________________________
110.13[2], at 132 (2d ed. 1996). In addition, our affirmance
does not rest on the ground that DuPont failed to identify
the guards in question, although that reason was cited by the
district court in denying preliminary injunctive relief.
Therefore, we decline to consider the district court's
failure to compel discovery in this appeal. See Coastal ___ _______
Fuels of Puerto Rico v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 990 F.2d _____________________ __________________________
25, 28 (1st Cir. 1993) (declining to review the lower court's
decision on an issue on which the denial of preliminary
injunctive relief did not depend where the decision was not
immediately appealable).

-12-













his health or safety). DuPont filed a grievance about

conditions in the strip cell with defendant DDU Director

Harrington, but not until after his release from the strip _____

cell.

Transfer of Materials to District Court. We hereby _______________________________________

grant DuPont's request that we send certain First Circuit

materials to the district court.

Affirmed, without prejudice to appellant's right to ___________________________________________________

raise a new claim for preliminary injunctive relief in the _____________________________________________________________

district court based on Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 _____________________________________________________________

(1995). The clerk of this court is hereby directed to send _____________________________________________________________

to the district court the materials filed in No. 93-2119 _____________________________________________________________

which are identified by appellant in his appellate brief. __________________________________________________________



























-13-