USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1227
MARYANN HALL,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
LAWRENCE ALAN HALL,
Defendant, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Robert B. Collings, U.S. Magistrate Judge] _____________________
____________________
Before
Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges. ______________
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Anthony M. Fredella, with whom Fredella & Wheeler was on brief ___________________ __________________
for appellant.
Seth M. Kalberg for appellee. _______________
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November 6, 1996
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Per Curiam. Appellant Maryann Hall, former spouse of Per Curiam. __________
defendant-appellee Lawrence Hall, appeals from a district court
judgment dismissing her diversity suit for breach of their
agreement for an equal division of any remaining capital in
Merlin Machinery, a Massachusetts corporation in which each owned
shares.1 Maryann claims that the adverse jury verdict on which
the district court based its judgment is against the weight of
the evidence and that the court erred in denying her motion for
new trial.2 We affirm.
Maryann's timeous motion for new trial under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(b) requires that we review the sufficiency of the
evidence, see Velazquez v. Figueroa-Gomez, 996 F.2d 425, 426-27 ___ _________ ______________
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 993 (1993), but only for abuse ____ ______
of discretion. Id. at 427. Following careful review of the __
entire record, we are satisfied that the district court acted
well within its broad discretion in denying the motion for new
trial. We add only these brief comments.
The district court submitted two questions to the jury.
The first inquired whether Maryann had proven that capital
remained or should have remained in Merlin Machinery as of the
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1The evidence is viewed, and every reasonable inference
drawn, in the light most favorable to the verdict. J.D. Havinga _____________
v. Crowley Towing and Transp. Co., 24 F.3d 1480, 1483 (1st Cir. _______________________________
1994).
2As Maryann filed no motion for judgment as a matter of law,
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), (b), we cannot entertain the Rule 50 ___
claim. Hammond v. T.J. Litle & Co., Inc., 82 F.3d 1166, 1171 _______ _______________________
(1st Cir. 1996).
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agreed settlement date.3 The jury responded in the negative.
Unlike Larry, Maryann presented no expert testimony on
this accounting question. Moreover, although Maryann presented
other evidence which, if credited by the jury, may have sufficed
to demonstrate undistributed capital in the corporation, nothing
in the record suggests that the jury need have accepted her
evidence over the competing evidence offered by Larry.
Consequently, we must credit Larry's version, see J.D. Havinga v. ___ ____________
Crowley Towing and Transp. Co., 24 F.3d 1480, 1483 (1st Cir. ________________________________
1994). Accordingly, the district court judgment is affirmed. ________
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3We do not reach the second question.
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